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Languages change all the time. Present-day English is different from the English 
spoken 500 years ago, as words are now pronounced in a different way. For instance, 
most words with an ai sound (e.g. mice) used to be pronounced with a long i in Middle 
English (this pronunciation is often preserved in the spelling, compare mice, lice, rice, 
twice, etc.). Even present-day languages are changing, such as English spoken in the 
United States, where many speakers, starting around the 1960s, have replaced the æ 
sound in man with the one in bed.  
 
Changes like these typically affect millions of speakers, and it remains an open 
question how such a regularity can come about. One route of explanation sought by 
linguists is that speakers subconsciously adjust the positions of their tongues to ensure 
that the distances between the pronunciations of e, i, a, etc., are roughly equal. In the 
pronunciation of British English a (as in bath), for instance, the tongue approaches the 
low back end of the mouth, while in e (as in bed), it is more fronted. This leaves enough 
distance between them so that speakers are able to distinguish between the two vowels. 
If the pronunciation of a started to change (for instance because of language contact 
between two speech communities), it could run the risk of becoming indistinguishable 
from e. Speakers would then adjust their pronunciation of e in order to ensure that the 
two vowels remain distinguishable. Every speaker, in this logic, has a cognitive 
representation of where the pronunciations of their vowels are located in their oral 
cavity. If the pronunciation of a vowel changes, they “update” this representation by 
adjusting the pronunciation of other vowels to maintain contrast.  
 
Quite recently, scholars have begun to pay more attention to the fact that whenever 
groups of speakers change the pronunciation of a vowel, they project a certain kind of 
identity to the outside. When speakers from the North of the United States pronounce 
man with the same vowel as in bed, for instance, they could do so to distance 
themselves from the South of the United States. As linguists have started to explore 
such routes of explanations, it has become increasingly questionable whether a 
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cognitive mechanism in the sense of above that controls the physical distance between 
tongue positions actually exists. Increasingly often, linguists refrain from referring to 
such principles in their explanation of large-scale sound change.  
 
This marks a significant change of thinking within linguistics. Many concepts that 
were once believed to explain multigenerational language change are now treated as 
stand-ins for other explanations, often grounded in the social functionality associated 
with the change. In this thesis, I try to make this change of thinking as explicit as 
possible. I claim that this an important thing to do, as what I discuss has implications 
not only for linguists but also for cognitive and social scientists interested in how 




In this thesis, I discuss, from a metatheoretical perspective, how variationist 
sociolinguistics seems to be undergoing a paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense. 
Roughly around the turn of the millennium, sociolinguists interested in the study of 
phonological change have shifted their focus from sociological macro-categories like 
social class or gender to social performativity and indexical meaningfulness in 
language variation. While some have theorised this development as a methodological 
extension of already existent work (Eckert, 2012), I locate here a radical theory change 
– an ontological breach with important consequences. What seems to be at stake is not 
the reliance on monolithic social categories but the ‘narrow interface between 
language and society’ (Labov, 2001, p. 28) from the early days. In other words, the 
orthodox conception of language change as language-internal factors ‘unfolding’ 
themselves in a speech community is being overthrown. 
 
The main body of this thesis comprises three papers, two of which have already been 
published (Woschitz, 2019; Woschitz & Yağlı, 2019), one of which is currently under 
review (Woschitz, under review). In Woschitz and Yağlı (2019), my colleague and I 
provide a case study of lexical meaning change in the course of the run-up to the 
Turkish constitutional referendum 2017. We argue that language change, be it lexical 
or phonological, cannot be separated from the sociocultural surroundings in which it 
takes place. Woschitz (2019) surveys how Labov himself has quarrelled with this fact 
in his own work, and how, in an œuvre that spans 50 years, he has adjusted his 
theoretical framework to rise to the challenge. Part of the described reorientations have 
been initiated by so-called third-wave variationism, with Eckert (2012) leading the 
way, but epistemological tensions in Labov’s treatment of language and society have 
been present from the start. Third-wave variationism, in turn, is still sorting out the 
consequences of the radical reorientations it proposes. 
 
Woschitz (under review) zooms out for the big picture. In this paper, I draw a parallel 
between the history of Labovian sociolinguistics and Chomskyan syntax. Even though 
these two linguistic subdisciplines are rather different in nature, I argue that their 
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theoretical reorientations over the past 60 years share certain philosophical similarities. 
Here, I turn to the philosophy of science, particularly to the scientific realism debate, 
to assess whether one can identify in their developments a common denominator that 
warrants talking about scientific progress in the broad sense. I argue that linguists 
turning away from Universal Grammar and internal factors in their explanations of 
language-related phenomena is indicative of a broader trend within linguistics – a 
reverse trend that problematises linguistic autonomy that was envisaged by linguists 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Over the last years, metatheoretical discussions have become part of a mainstream 
discourse within sociolinguistics. Coupland’s (2016c) edited volume Sociolinguistics: 
Theoretical Debates, for instance, surveys current theoretical challenges circling 
large-scale phonological change, indexicality, superdiversity and language 
embodiment in the pursuit of an all-encompassing theory of ‘sociolinguistic change’. 
Sociolinguists of all kinds, so the narrative goes, should cooperate to contribute to a 
holistic social theory (on which see Bell, 2016; Coupland, 1998, 2016a). For many, 
this seems rather programmatic, but at the same time, it seems that considerable 
progress has been made towards achieving what Coupland envisages. Gone are the 
days in which sociolinguists contented themselves with establishing broad correlations 
between linguistic variables and sociological categories, such that one can say that the 
working class speak like X, or that women speak like Y. It is now frowned upon to not 
consider in one’s theorising how class or gender is systematically performed in 
everyday life.  
 
Sociolinguistics has clearly come a long way ever since it has been established as a 
mainstream subdiscipline of linguistics in the 1960s. But how exactly it has arrived at 
its current position – that is, by virtue of what broader philosophical movements the 
field has developed and what kinds of detours it has made in the process – is less clear 
and still a matter of controversy. Figueroa (1994) is a useful reference point, but not 
many sociolinguists have set out to continue her line of work to the present day. In 
mainstream Labovian sociolinguistics, for instance, it is not clear whether one can 
witness ontological continuity in how the language/society interface has been 
theorised over the years. The present thesis is devoted to addressing this question. By 
triangulating empirical sociolinguistic work, contemporary history and philosophy of 
science, I shall theorise scientific progress within Labovian sociolinguistics, make 
explicit where epistemological tensions lie in contemporary scholarship and how they 
came about, and reconcile these with the historical Zeitgeist academia can never be 
separated from. As such, the thesis can be seen to contribute to linguistic 
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historiography, discussing, among other things, the structuralist heritage in 
sociolinguistics. 
 
A story of progress often told in variationist sociolinguistics circles is Eckert’s (2012) 
wave-model. Eckert conceives of variationist sociolinguists as having progressed, over 
the years, along three loosely-ordered theoretical waves. She claims that Labovian 
variationism of the 1960s and 1970s – so-called ‘first-wave variationism’ – has been 
mainly concerned with ‘broad correlations between linguistic variables and the 
macrosociological categories of socioeconomic class, gender, ethnicity, and age’ 
(Eckert, 2012, p. 67). For first-wave variationists, it has been sufficient to make claims 
like “in sound change that happens below the level of conscious awareness, the lower 
middle class most likely leads”, to echo Labov (1972b, 2006 [1966]). Along came the 
second wave, which applies ‘ethnographic methods to explore the local categories and 
configurations that inhabit, or constitute, these broader categories’ (Eckert, 2012, p. 
67). An example of this is Eckert’s (1989a) own study of social categories in high 
schools. In North American high schools, she argues, social class is not the 
immediately salient ‘axis of differentiation’ (Gal, 2016b) as often is in adult life. It is 
the peer-based social order that counts for the students, in her case whether one belongs 
to the category of Jocks or Burnouts. Jocks are most likely to attend college after high 
school and largely restrict their social environment to school activities. The Burnouts, 
on the other hand, are likely to take up a blue-collar occupation later in life and 
maintain social ties outside school to ease their entry in the job market. These social 
categories are evidently mediated by social class: whether one has ambitions and the 
means to attend college is, to a large extent, dependent on one’s socioeconomic 
background. But socioeconomic background is, in the eyes of students, an 
epiphenomenon of the Jock/Burnout opposition. No student is categorically denied 
membership to either category, irrespective of their own socioeconomic background. 
What is important is that every student has to position themselves in the social nexus 
with reference to this opposition – even so-called ‘in-betweens’ (Eckert, 2018, p. 34), 
neither Jocks nor Burnouts, who make up the majority of students. 
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Locally-relevant social categories like these, Eckert argues, underlie the often-
reproduced pattern that, on average, younger people from the lower middle class lead 
in phonological changes (see Labov, 1972b). For instance, the Northern Cities Shift, 
an ongoing vowel chain shift in the Inland North of the United States, was found to 
spread from urban centres (Labov, Yaeger, & Steiner, 1972). In the ethnographic 
suburban setting, Burnouts were found to lead in the use of advanced variants of the 
Northern Cities Shift, with Jocks trailing (Eckert, 2018, pp. 64-65, 77-78). This makes 
sense when considering the fact that it is they, not Jocks, who have social ties to urban 
centres. That they adapt their way of speaking to urban speech becomes an index of 
their outgoingness beyond school.  
 
In the Third wave, finally, such locally-situated meaning of variation is treated ‘as an 
essential feature of language. Variation constitutes a social semiotic system capable of 
expressing the full range of a community’s social concerns’ (Eckert, 2012, p. 94). 
Here, the focus shifts entirely from treating a sociolinguistic variable as an emblem of 
category membership (to an age cohort, social class, gender group, etc.) to the notion 
of style. Variation is studied in how it relates to the construction and projection of 
personae, social stereotypes like a Valley Girl, Burnout or Jock; to navigate through 
social landscapes (Eckert, 2019). 
 
Eckert has been eager to clarify that her wave-model is to be conceived of as an 
elaboration of the previous ones, rather than a marked shift from received opinions: 
 
The unfortunate aspect of the wave metaphor is that it has often been taken to mean 
that each wave supersedes the previous one. I would say that each wave refines aspects 
of the previous one, but it has always been clear that the basic ideas of each wave have 
always been implicit in the earlier waves. (Eckert, 2018, p. xi) 
 
This is the starting point of my thesis, part of which shall be devoted to scrutinising 
whether this is a whig-historical account that papers over theory-change. Where third-
wave variationists see a methodological extension of the orthodox Labovian paradigm, 
I shall identify a radical theory change – an ontological breach or an incipient scientific 
revolution in the Kuhnian sense (on which see chapter 4). The radical theory change, 
however, is not manifested in the criticism of social macro-categories such as social 
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class or gender but in the renunciation of the ‘narrow interface between language and 
society’ (Labov, 2001, p. 28) from the early days. As shall be discussed in chapter 3, 
first-wave variationism tends to treat ‘social structure’ as a material substratum that 
carries forward language change dictated by ‘language-internal’ factors. Third-wave 
variationists seem to be turning the table by treating – rather hesitantly – much of what 
previously fell under language-internal principles as theoretical artefacts devoid of 
ontological status. 
 
At the same time, however, first-wave variationism is not as monolithic as suggested 
in the model. In Labov’s trilogy Principles of Linguistic Change (1994, 2001, 2010), 
a similar ontological breach seems to have occurred between Internal Factors (1994) 
and Social Factors (2001) on the one hand, and Cognitive and Cultural Factors (2010) 
on the other hand – though a certain epistemological tension in his treatment of 
language and society has been present from the start. Care must be taken, therefore, to 
not suppose strict historical linearity in describing looming theoretical reorientations. 
One can find remnants of old dogmas even in Labov’s and Eckert’s most recent work, 
culminating, perhaps, in their recent joint paper (Eckert & Labov, 2017). 
 
In order to do justice to the complexity of the described theory change from a narrow 
to a broad interface between language and society, I shall examine it from different 
angles. The main body of this thesis comprises three papers, two of which have already 
been published (Woschitz, 2019; Woschitz & Yağlı, 2019), one of which is currently 
under review (Woschitz, under review). Given that I chose to do my PhD by 
publication, the reader might observe certain redundancies between these papers. I 
decided to leave them in for reasons of time management and faithfulness to the 
original and hope that the reader will forgive me for that. 
 
In Woschitz and Yağlı (2019), my colleague and I provide a case study of lexical 
meaning change in the course of the run-up to the Turkish constitutional referendum 
2017. We argue that language change, in whichever form, cannot be separated from 
the sociocultural surroundings in which it takes place. As such, it is very third-wave 
in nature, and we heavily draw on Silverstein’s (1976, 2003) theory of indexicality and 
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indexical orders in our analysis, as do sociolinguists interested in phonological change. 
Woschitz (2019) surveys how Labov himself has quarrelled with his own theoretical 
notion of a ‘narrow interface between language and society’, and how, in an œuvre 
that spans 50 years, he has adjusted his theoretical framework to rise to the challenge. 
As already mentioned, part of the described reorientations have been initiated by the 
third wave, with Eckert (2012) leading the way, but epistemological tensions in 
Labov’s treatment of language and society have been present from the start. Third-
wave variationism, in turn, is still sorting out the consequences of the radical 
reorientations it proposes. 
 
Woschitz (under review) zooms out for the big picture. In this paper, I draw a parallel 
between the history of Labovian sociolinguistics and Chomskyan syntax. Even though 
these two linguistic subdisciplines are rather different in nature, I argue that their 
theoretical reorientations over the past 60 years share certain philosophical similarities. 
Here, I turn to the philosophy of science, particularly to the scientific realism debate, 
to assess whether one can identify in their developments a common philosophical 
denominator that warrants talking about scientific progress in the broad sense. I argue 
that linguists turning away from Universal Grammar (UG) and internal factors in their 
explanations of language-related phenomena is indicative of a broader trend within 
linguistics – a reverse trend that problematises linguistic autonomy that was envisaged 
by linguists in the past 200 years (see Joseph, 2002, chapter 3). 
 
The fifth chapter aims to synthesise the three papers into a coherent whole. Here, I 
revisit Weinreich, Labov and Herzog’s (1968) Empirical Foundations for a Theory of 
Language Change, which, down to the present day, still often sets the research agenda 
of mainstream variationist sociolinguistics. Step by step, I discuss how the emerging 
popularity of the notions of style and register, either described or alluded to in the 
previous papers, can shed new light on Weinreich et al.’s famous ‘problems’ of 
language change (the actuation problem, embedding problem, etc.). Where Labov 
once attempted to clearly assign these problems to either language ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ domains, contemporary enregisterement studies collapse internal and 
external factors into a messy whole. Internal factors, if acknowledged at all, are 
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restricted to synchronic constraints of language behaviour, possibly at the level of UG, 
while external factors assume primacy in explaining why and how languages change. 
Here, the ontological breach from the orthodox variationist framework comes to the 
fore as clear as day. 
 
My personal epiphany during this PhD was that academics are, first of all, people. 
Very smart people indeed, but ultimately people with opinions, personal histories, 
arrogance or insecurities that cannot be separated from their work. Eckert (2018) quite 
openly talks about her impostor syndrome even though she is professor of linguistics 
at Stanford, which ranked 8th for linguistics worldwide in this year’s QS University 
Rankings.1 Her 2018 book, which is the first book-length manifesto of third-wave 
variationism to date, reads more like an autobiography – Eckert herself calls it an 
‘intellectual memoir’ – rather than an historically or philosophically accurate depiction 
of how variationist sociolinguistics has actually developed. She tells the story of a 
female scholar finding her voice in an academic culture dominated by white men who 
shied away the minute she began introducing ethnography and gender theory into her 
theorising. 
 
She closes her book on a personal note: 
 
Writing this “intellectual memoir” has often been an awkward exercise. At times I’ve 
thought I was being unbelievably arrogant, at other times I’ve thought I was just 
embarrassing myself. But, like the rest of my life, I’ve just done it and I’ll live with 
the consequences. (Eckert, 2018, p. 193) 
 
Unbelievable arrogance, embarrassment, having to live with the consequences – these 
are all intimate and private emotions that I had not expected to see when I began my 
PhD. I therefore hasten to say that the critique offered in the following pages is not 
meant to be an attack on individuals. If anyone has to ‘live with the consequences’, it 
is sociolinguistics as an academic discipline. But the crucial thing is that I conceive of 
sociolinguistics as the theoretical status quo abstracted away from the scientific 
community in which it is practiced. More often than not, to anticipate the discussion 
                                                        
1 https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/university-subject-rankings/2019/linguistics, 
last accessed on 22 April 2019. 
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of Kuhn (1970 [1962]) in chapter 4, problem areas in the work of individual scholars 
are not due to personal shortcomings (both Eckert and Labov are exceptional scholars 
with great attention to detail) but due to paradigm-constraints that transcend the 
individual. It is these paradigm-constraints I aim to capture when I talk about theory 
change, not necessarily how individuals have changed looking at things. When I place 
special emphasis on Labov, Eckert or Chomsky, I only do so because their theories 
have had a massive impact on how academia in general theorises on their respective 
phenomena, and because it is they who have pushed the paradigms to their limits. This 
should be always borne in mind when reading the critique offered. 
 
Adopting such a philosophical perspective comes with the price of idealisation. When, 
in the following pages, I set out to identify theoretical developments in sociolinguistic 
thought, one first needs to define what given thought – i.e., given paradigm – actually 
looks like at certain points in history. That is, one first needs to abstract, at different 
points in history, from a vivid scientific community relatively static sets of convictions 
and beliefs that all members of given community allegedly share. Then, these sets can 
be compared, conclusions can be drawn, inconsistencies can be made explicit, and so 
on. In rare cases, this can be a rather straight-forward process. Chomsky (2006), for 
instance, wrote a philosophical treatise of his own theoretical framework (Language 
and Mind), in which he, at least implicitly, acknowledges how he changed his ways of 
thinking over the years (from phrase-structure rules in Syntactic Structures, to 
principles and parameters in Lectures on Government and Binding, to biolinguistics in 
the Minimalist Program; see chapter 4.3), and what this means for his theory of UG. 
Labov never did that. In this case, one needs to reconstruct theory-stages at different 
points in time before one can begin to discuss any theory changes at all. This is an 
ambitious project for a PhD thesis, given that his œuvre covers more than 50 years. To 
this end, I had to restrict my analysis to milestone publications, such as Principles of 
Linguistic Change (1994, 2001, 2010), and to relevant journal articles and conference 
proceedings; in short, to all those publications that are often cited and that have had a 
massive impact on the linguistic scholarship in question.  
 
 8 
I shall treat books or papers as definitive portrayals of the convictions and intellectual 
beliefs of the authors at the time they wrote them. This is a process of idealisation 
again, but it is again a price to be paid. For instance, when Labov (2001) extrapolates 
from his work on the Philadelphian speech community the nonconformity principle 
(see chapter 3), I, as a reader, will assume that he wants to convince me that this 
principle is a general driving force underlying language change – it is framed like this, 
and it would certainly fit the narrative outlined in the first part of the trilogy (Labov, 
1994). Otherwise, he could have just called his book, say, Linguistic Change in 
Philadelphia, and not Principles of Linguistic Change. Granted, the title of the book 
series could have simply been the editor’s choice, because publishing books with 
sensationalist titles will sell better than quasi-ethnographic work on a single city. But 
when linguistics students pick up the book from the library to study for their exams, 
they will not necessarily know that, and they will justifiably expect broad 
generalisations of language change from a book that says Principle of Linguistic 
Change on the cover. 
 
When, later in the same book series, Labov (2010) downgrades the nonconformity 
principle to one possible driving force among many, he considerably weakens the 
claims he had made 9 years before without explicitly acknowledging it. This is a first 
point of reference to trace a theoretical reorientation in Labov’s œuvre (more on which 
can be found in chapter 3). From there, one can pick up the threads and trace even 
more recent developments down to the present day, which I have aimed to capture in 
the fifth chapter of this thesis.  
 
The same kind of reasoning runs through this entire thesis, except for chapter 2, which 
is a comparatively straight-forward empirical paper. In the rest of the thesis, secondary 
literature was consulted where available (especially in the discussion of Chomsky in 
chapter 4), but the lion’s share involved extensive critical reading on my part, 
synthesising the continuities and discontinuities I found into a coherent story, and 
measuring my story against other, more prominent accounts of how sociolinguistics 
has progressed over the years. Where my own evaluations do not match these, such as 
the wave-model proposed by Eckert, I have tried to make the sources of disagreement 
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as explicit as possible by drawing on the philosophy of science and metatheoretically-
leaned linguistic literature. This, I hope, will be the original contribution of this PhD 
thesis to linguistic scholarship, and I hope to have found with this methodology a 
sensible middle course that allows me to remain faithful to the authors while being 
able to highlight important theory changes at the same time. 
 
On a personal note, when I engage in intellectual discussions – and what is a PhD 
thesis if not a whole-hearted discussion –, I do so because I find them, first of all, 
stimulating. Of course, writing a PhD thesis means that I will have to challenge certain 
ways of thinking, and this necessitates criticising the people championing them, but I 
always have the bigger picture in mind. I want to advocate a discussion culture where, 
even after the harshest discussions, one can sit together over drinks and laugh over it. 
In this spirit, I want to invite the reader to set aside their presuppositions, to step back 
and (re-)evaluate, with a cool head, the theoretical underpinnings of their own work; 
to think with me, for a while, about the bigger picture, namely how we have implicitly 
or explicitly conceived of language and society in general, how this conception might 
challenge or even contradict competing views, and where this conflict will take us in 




CHAPTER 2: THE MEANING CHANGE OF HAYIR 
DURING THE TURKISH CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFERENDUM 20172  
This paper aims for a systematic analysis of the lexical meaning change of hayır in the 
course of the run-up to the Turkish constitutional referendum on 16 April 2017. 
 
Hayır is an Arabic loanword that was borrowed into Turkish between the 8th and 10th 
centuries in the context of Turkic tribes converting to Islam. What makes the word 
unique is that it means both ‘good’ and ‘no’, and both meanings are used in everyday 
Turkish, e.g., Hayır haberdir inşallah (Hope this is good news) and Yorgun musunuz? 
(Are you tired?) - Hayır (No) (Dictionary of Turkish Language Association (TLA), 
1998, p. 967).3 On top of that, both meanings have acquired different indexical 
meanings over the last millennium. Hayır ‘good’ has predominantly acquired religious 
indexical meaning, which has to do with the fact that the Quran employs it in this 
meaning. In the course of the Neo-Ottoman endeavours of the AKP under Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan (see chapter 2.3.3), it acquired additional politicised indexical 
meaning. Hayır ‘no’, on the other hand, has not acquired similar meaning extensions: 
in the past, attempts from political stakeholders to attribute indexical meaning to it 
were unsuccessful (see chapter 2.3.4). This, however, changed in the course of the run-
up to the Turkish constitutional referendum in 2017. There, people had to choose 
between increasing the power of Erdoğan by voting evet (yes), thus fuelling his Neo-
Ottoman ambitions, or to preserve the Kemalist laicist nation by voting hayır (no). 
This led to an odd situation where a pro-democratic vote and a diametrically opposed 
Neo-Ottoman ideology were expressed with the same word hayır. No-voters soon 
began to take up this homonymy to contest the regime. By placing the Neo-Ottoman 
                                                        
2 The following chapter appeared in print as Woschitz, J., & Yağlı, E. (2019). The meaning change of 
hayır during the Turkish constitutional referendum 2017. Language Sciences, 72, 116-133. 
3 The TLA defines these two expression units as one lemma. 
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indexical meaning of ‘good’ into a dialogue with the second referential meaning ‘no’, 
they managed to create a new meaning that directly opposes Neo-Ottomanism. 
 
To explain such meaning changes, scholars have often focused on the specific interests 
of the parties who pushed the change (e.g. Hill, 2008; Wong, 2005). For instance, it 
could be argued that what happened with hayır in the context of the 2017 referendum 
could be best explained as an example of one party claiming someone else’s resources 
to achieve a political goal. Claiming the word hayır from their political opponent 
means to fight fire with fire. Such an approach would fall under the broad framework 
of cultural appropriation (see chapter 2.2), which places special emphasis on the 
agency of the involved individuals or collectives.  
 
In this paper, we want to emphasise that given agency of individuals or collectives can 
only be interpreted holistically if we analyse the sociolinguistic surroundings in which 
it is embedded. These include the driving forces of the individuals or collectives 
pushing forward the change. But the complex indexical history of the targeted 
word/phrase/item, itself the result of sociolinguistic meaning-making that extends 
beyond the utterance in situ, seems to be equally important. While it is true that the 
motivation of the claiming party can initiate meaning change, we argue that the 
trajectory of the change is often set by its indexical history. Whether people achieve a 
lexical meaning change depends not only on their own motivation and the socio-
political surroundings but also on the indexical complexity of the word itself. 
 
To develop this argument, we are going to lay out Silverstein’s (1976, 2003) theory of 
indexicality and indexical orders. We shall then discuss how agents can create new 
indexical meaning through stance (Jaffe, 2009b) and voice (Agha, 2005). We claim 
that stance as a means of engaging with indexical resources allows us to add a temporal 
logic to a concept that could otherwise be wrongly read as a mere synchronic concept 
of indexical meaning. Silverstein’s concept of indexicality allows for a temporal 
dimension from the very start; indeed it seeks to reconcile the diachrony/synchrony 
distinction (Silverstein, 2003, p. 203, see chapter 2.1). Applied to the study of meaning 
change, this means that in order to grasp the whole picture, the indexicality of a word 
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needs to be understood as the product of various meaning changes at various points in 
time. This can help us understand that the synchronic state of coexistent indexical 
meanings can be theoretically reinterpreted in a temporal logic. 
 
Our analysis of hayır makes a strong case for this assertion, because it traces how 
speakers have attributed new indexical meanings to hayır over the past millennium, 
but all these different indexical meanings are synchronically available for speakers of 
the 21st century. In our data analysis, we posit three distinct indexical orders of hayır 
that all played an important role in the meaning-making process in the course of the 
2017 referendum. This enables us to show that the indexical past of hayır is deeply 
implicated in the meaning change. It also enables us to show that the new meaning is 
the result of an indexical dialogue within the word itself which is made possible by the 
extraordinary situation of hayır meaning ‘good’ and ‘no’, two meanings that are 
distantly semantically related and, what is more, carry different indexical values. 
 
Our analysis will also show that people attempted in the past to change hayır in a 
similar manner but failed to do so. In a second line of argument, we discuss in detail 
the circumstances that affect whether an attempted appropriation is successful. We 
draw on Bakhtin’s (1981 [1934-35]) heteroglossia and Ducrot’s (1984) theory of 
polyphony, and we align their theorising with  Voloshinov (1986 [1929]) and the idea 
of fractal recursivity (Irvine & Gal, 2000). We claim that different levels of political 
division in a society might affect whether the meaning change is carried through. This 
will be discussed in detail in chapter 2.3.4, where we show how the referendum drove 
a wedge between two parts of the society: one holds either the Kemalist or the Neo-
Ottoman belief.  
 
In summary, our paper will deliver two messages. First, we aim to convince the reader 
that when it comes to lexical meaning change, in the context of appropriation, the 
indexical complexity of the word plays an important role in deciding on which 
direction the change is going. In this line of argument, we elaborate on similar-spirited 
work (e.g. Beaton & Washington, 2015; Hill, 2008; Schwartz, 2008; Wong, 2005, 
2008) where indexicality, whether in a Silversteinian or in a more general Peircean 
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understanding of the term, sheds important light on the mechanics of the meaning 
change. Second, whether the meaning change is successful depends on the severity of 
the situation. Just as ideology is always immanent in the indexical past of a word, it is 
also present in the struggle over who has control of a symbolic resource. We therefore 
distinguish between two important sides in lexical appropriation: the trajectory of the 
change, which we argue is set by its indexical past, and the amount of thrust behind it, 
which is set by the socio-political surroundings of the meaning-making process.  
2.1. Indexicality, indexical orders and stance 
The theory of indexicality was first introduced by Silverstein (1976). In his paper, he 
aims at doing away with the reference/performance distinction in the study of language 
by claiming that reference itself is a performative act among others. To develop this 
argument, he elaborates on Roman Jakobson’s (e.g. 1971) work on shifters. Shifters 
are linguistic features like deictic terms where ‘the reference "shifts" regularly, 
depending on the factors of the speech situation’ (Silverstein, 1976, p. 24). Silverstein 
extends this notion with the help of Peircian semiotics (Peirce, 1932 [c. 1897-1910], 
1932 [c. 1897]) by claiming that all signs, not just shifters, inherently have shifting 
qualities. In this logic, a sign does not necessarily have one single symbolic, indexical 
or iconic meaning. Instead, specific meanings are activated contextually in 
performative action (Silverstein, 1976, pp. 18-19). For instance, to give an example 
from sociolinguistics, the sign vehicle pre-consonantal and word-final (r) in Labov’s 
(2006 [1966]) NYC study might signify ‘higher class’ in the context of New York 
City, but in regions where non-rhotic accents are prestigious, it would actually carry 
the opposite meaning. These indexical meanings do not necessarily add or change the 
original referential meaning. The sign vehicle car still denotes a transport vehicle, 
regardless of the social meanings communicated by a rhotic pronunciation, so it carries 
symbolic-denotational and indexical-non-referential meaning simultaneously. The 
classical reference/performance dichotomy, Silverstein argues, cannot account for 
how a sign vehicle can acquire such multi-faceted meanings. Hence, Silverstein 
postulates that ‘the property of sign vehicle [sic] signaling contextual "existence" of 
an entity, is itself a sign mode independent of the other two’ (Silverstein, 1976, p. 25). 
This property he calls indexicality. 
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In a later essay, Silverstein (2003) introduces the prominent notion of indexical orders, 
where indexical signs can build on each other to create new related meaning. This 
process is formalised in ordinal degrees, ranging from 1st-order, 2nd-order to nth-order 
indexicalities.4 A 1st-order indexicality is what can be taken as a linguistic 
phenomenon that indexes certain characteristics, but without invoking any social 
judgment. Take as an example the High Rising Terminal (HRT), i.e. rising intonation 
at the end of a sentence, a full treatment of which can be found in e.g. Levon (2016).5 
At a 1st-order level, people would be able to point to speakers who use HRT, and 
although they might become aware of the fact that the feature is unequally distributed 
among men and women (if it is indeed true that women use it more than men do), this 
awareness does not leave the descriptive stage. This can change if people decide at 
some point to extrapolate a characteristic from their empirical observation, in which 
case the 1st-order indexicality is brought into 2nd-order play. For instance, by relating 
HRT to feminine speech in general, people can begin to perceive rising intonation at 
the end of a sentence as a gender-specific trait (this example is taken from Jaffe, 2016, 
p. 94). This perception could, for instance, be grounded in the ideology that rising 
intonation connotes hesitancy, and that women are less self-confident than men. 
Silverstein (2003, p. 194) argues that such an ideologically/culturally driven construal 
of an nth-order indexicality is always immanent in the semiotic performance of 
speakers. This sort of ‘ethno-metapragmatic’ (ibid.) construal can then be the starting 
point of another association, for instance a restriction to the belief that HRT is only 
used by ‘ditzy’ California Valley Girls (see e.g. Tyler, 2015), reaching the point of an 
n+1th indexical order.6  
 
Sociolinguistics has accounted for the question what instantiates indexical change (e.g. 
from nth-order to n+1th-order) by focusing on the agency of speakers, particularly in 
the theory of stance (see Jaffe, 2009b). According to the theory of stance, speakers 
                                                        
4 Nth-order indexicality is often used as a stand-in for any indexical order and is not meant to be the 
‘final’ indexical order. 
5 The discussion of HRT is oversimplified here for illustrative purposes. Reporting on the interactional 
depth of HRT is beyond the scope of this paper. 
6 This has become a trope in popular culture, see e.g. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tj4EIGje4dA, 
last accessed on 12 September 2017. On a technical note, Silverstein (2003) erroneously uses ‘n+1st’ to 
denote ordinals which mathematicians would call ‘n+1th’. I will adhere to the latter, correct convention. 
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can, as a means of self-presentation, create new indexical meaning by drawing on pre-
existing indexical resources that are available to them (Jaffe, 2009a; this is related to 
what Levi-Strauss, 1962 calls ‘bricolage’). This can give rise to new, possibly 
competing or nested, indexical meanings (e.g. HRT as a marker for women vs. HRT 
as an index for California Valley Girls), constituting what Eckert (2008) terms an 
indexical field. For instance, if a gay male speaker uses HRT despite or because of its 
nth-order indexicality of being a feminine trait, he could thereby create a new n+1th-
order indexicality whereby a gay man might use HRT on the grounds of the public 
conception that feminine-sounding men do not comply with heteronormative 
masculinity. Other gay men with the desire to openly show their sexuality could take 
up the new n+1th indexicality as an act of stance-taking, to voice, for example, that 
they are not afraid to index their sexual orientation in public discourse. Thus, for 
someone to take a stance is a circular rather than a unidirectional process, as speakers 
not only draw on pre-existing indexical resources but also contribute to them (Jaffe, 
2009a, p. 15). This, in turn, can lead to the situation where even those speakers who 
have not engaged in a meaning change personally still have to adapt to the new 
indexical meanings that result from the agentive behaviour of others.7 Indexical orders, 
then, do not suggest a strict temporality, as if an n+1th-order indexicality had to be a 
chronological successor of a previous nth-order indexicality (Eckert, 2008, p. 464; 
Silverstein, 2003, pp. 195-196). Rather, they constitute a state of reciprocity because 
nth-order and n+1th-order indexicalities mutually define and instantiate each other. 
Likewise, indexical fields are both the result of and the basis for agentive behaviour. 
 
Stance-taking is often ritualised, that is speakers often systematically draw on 
indexical resources to voice stereotypical characterological figures/personae or 
‘entextualized figures of personhood’ (Agha, 2005, p. 43). The concept of voice goes 
back to Bakhtin (1981 [1934-35]), who in his literary analysis was concerned with 
how characters in Dostoyevsky’s prose communicate on several layers. Applied to 
linguistics, a similar process is mirrored in the indexical performance of speakers. For 
instance, in the American Indian language Lakota, there is grammaticalised male and 
female speech, in the form of different enclitics to be used by men and women. In the 
                                                        
7 We would like to express our gratitude to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to us. 
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Lakota tribes, as in most cultures, the upbringing of a child was traditionally female 
business. Men are nonetheless affectionate with children, and have been recorded 
using female-speech (Agha, 2005, p. 48). Men thus temporally acquire the persona of 
a caregiver (3rd-order indexicality) that normally is not theirs through tropic use of 
grammatically gendered linguistic registers (1st-order indexicality), thereby invoking 
the 2nd-order meaning of motherliness (ibid.). Similar examples include professionals 
in Beijing using full-tone variants and less local features (1st-order indexicalities) to 
voice a yuppie-persona (2nd-order indexicality; Zhang, 2005); or the (non-)usage of 
retroflex /t/ in British Asian English (1st-order indexicality) to voice in-group 
affiliations (2nd-order indexicality; Sharma, 2011). Podesva (2007) has also shown 
how one gay man, over multiple speaking contexts, uses falsetto (1st-order 
indexicality) to voice the persona of what Podesva calls a ‘flamboyant diva’ (2nd-order 
indexicality) to express his homosexual identity (3rd-order indexicality).  
 
The recognition of such personae, utilising indexical resources that sometimes 
encompass many indexical orders, stands and falls with the awareness of semiotic 
processes, i.e. the indexical field subsuming all relevant indexical orders underlying 
the meaning-making process (Agha, 2005, p. 43). Each indexical field might provide 
speakers with different resources for entextualised meaning, and the possible 
personhoods that can be voiced by stance-taking are highly context-specific.  
2.2. Lexical meaning change and cultural appropriation 
Even though indexical analyses are not restricted to grammatical features, lexical items 
have not received much attention in indexicality research (Beaton & Washington, 
2015, p. 13). Rather, related lexical meaning change has traditionally been studied by 
critical theorists in the framework of cultural appropriation. Cultural appropriation is 
broadly defined as ‘the taking – from a culture that is not one's own – of intellectual 
property, cultural expressions or artifacts, history and ways of knowledge’ (Ziff & 
Rao, 1997, p. 1). Such an analysis is concerned with how agents contribute to the 
perpetuation of power imbalances (ibid., pp. 8-9). Appropriation is often seen as a kind 
of theft that goes hand in hand with degradation of a marginalised group (e.g. Hill, 
2008, pp. 158-159).  
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Hill (2008) cites white racism in the United States as an example. White speakers, on 
a regular basis, appropriate words and phrases from African American English which 
originally carried negative connotations and bring them into 2nd-order play (this is not 
the term Hill uses) in order to make it a desirable quality (ibid., pp. 166-170). Such is, 
for example, the case with slang phrases like I’d hit that or words like gangsta, which 
white speakers have adopted as an index of hypermasculinity (ibid., p. 168). Such a 
2nd-order usage by the claiming party is only warranted by, and reinforces, the 
stigmatised 1st-order index that is normally attributed to African American people. In 
this case, hypermasculinity reinforces the belief that black men are aggressive and 
dangerous.  
 
A similar mechanism is at work when white speakers appropriate Spanish in mock-
speech. For instance, words like macho or adios, originally carrying the neutral 
meanings male and goodbye in Spanish, are used in mock-speech respectively to 
denote a hyperaggressive male stereotype and to express goodbye and good riddance 
(ibid., pp. 135-136). Another example is the phrase hasta la vista, baby (broadly 
translated as until we meet again, baby); made famous by Arnold Schwarzenegger in 
the movie Terminator II: Judgment Day. After saying what is now among 
Schwarzenegger’s catchphrases, his character shoots his opponent. Getting this joke, 
Hill argues, ‘requires access to a negative stereotype of Spanish speakers as 
treacherous and insincere, the kind of people who would tell you politely “Until we 
meet again” and in the next instant blow you away’ (ibid., p. 120). Similar to the 
appropriation of African American English, then, mock-speech covertly places white 
speakers over the marginalised Spanish-speaking community. This marginalisation 
process has gone so far that white speakers even have claimed the Spanish word gringo 
for themselves, even though it is a term that pejoratively pictures whites as 
‘characteristically racist individuals’ (Schwartz, 2008, p. 229). Following the logic 
“Look at those criminal/untrustworthy/poor/etc. Hispanics. Who would want to be like 
them?”, white speakers feel confirmed in their hierarchical thinking and take pride in 
their inability to speak Spanish (ibid., pp. 229-230).  
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Similar marginalisations outside the US have been reported by Wong (2005, 2008) in 
his analysis of the appropriation of tongzhi by gay-right activists in Hong Kong. 
Tongzhi originated about 2200 years ago in the Qin Dynasty to refer to ‘people with 
the same ethics and ideals’ (Wong, 2008, p. 428). Even though nowadays the term has 
predominantly communist connotations, LGBT-communities have claimed it in its 
first-order meaning of likeminded revolutionaries in their fight for equal rights (see 
Wong, 2005). ‘Through the use of tongzhi, activists exploit the revolutionary 
connotations of the term and its suggestions of solidarity, intimacy and striving for 
liberty. Like Chinese revolutionaries, activists use the term to present a public, 
collective and political front’ (Wong, 2008, p. 441). This movement has been 
contested by local newspapers, whose authors aim to uphold a heteronormative 
worldview by exclusively using tongzhi in their articles to denote homosexuals in 
illegal or other dubious behaviour (Wong, 2005). This is a kind of hostile 
reappropriation with the only aim to criminalise the LGBT-community, in contrast to 
the appropriation rooted in emancipatory efforts of a minority. 
 
Beaton and Washington (2015) point out that appropriation is not necessarily a black 
and white process that concerns either the oppressor or the oppressed. They show that 
primarily uninvolved people can likewise appropriate words, for instance to defend 
the community under threat. Favelado, a derogatory term for slum-dweller in Brazilian 
Portuguese, for instance, 
 
is retaken by fans of the Rio de Janeiro Flamengo soccer team as a term of in-group 
solidarity, even though the fans themselves are not necessarily from the favela […] 
By making the connection between themselves, the players, and the slur, they foster 
an in-group identity alongside slum-dwellers. [...] the fans reclaim the insult that is 
used against them, temporarily assuming an identity that may not authentically be 
theirs (ibid., pp. 15, 18). 
 
By aligning themselves with the soccer team, the fans achieve to repackage parts of 
the derogatory n+1th indexical meanings attributed to favelado (𝑒. 𝑔.		𝑑𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡	 →
	𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡	𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑡, 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡	 → 	𝑏𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑠). Such an analysis sheds important light on the 
micro-processes that are at work in the fight over symbolic resources, because the 
interactional context (in this case, the soccer game) seems to decide which parts of the 
indexical field can be altered (ibid., p. 16).  
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In summary, all of the above studies refer to indexicality in the context of power 
imbalances in one way or another. Hill (2008, pp. 143-157), for example, locates white 
racism in nonreferential indexicality (Silverstein, 1976, pp. 30-33). She argues that 
mock-speech deliberately or non-deliberately performs social distinction. This allows 
us to account for why people sometimes do not consider themselves racist while 
engaging in racist behaviour at the same time. Beaton and Washington (2015) are 
concerned with the complexity of appropriation that is brought into play by indexical 
fields. Wong (2008, p. 423) only implicitly deals with indexicality and indexical orders 
by acknowledging that ‘the speakers’ agency involved is both enabled and constrained 
by the discursive history of the term and larger socio-historical processes’. 
 
All of the above authors show that much like phonetic or suprasegmental differences, 
lexical items can be appropriated as symbolic resources to construct shared identity. 
This process is mediated by the historical past of the term, and speakers knowingly 
draw on present and past connotations. Overall, this is congruent with the indexical 
approach outlined in chapter 2.1, where we have already seen that semiotic processes, 
i.e. indexical fields along with its indexical orders, are among the main factors that 
decide on how a feature is interpreted. The unique advantage of applying Silverstein’s 
framework is that ultimately, the different kinds of meaning-making outlined above 
(e.g. Hill’s analysis of performing whiteness or Wong’s analysis of LGBT-activism) 
can be accounted for by the same underlying semiotic mechanisms of indexicality, 
indexical orders and stance. This enables researchers to extrapolate from case studies 
a broader theory of meaning-making. Nothing stops us, then, from applying the same 
theoretical tools in the analysis of lexical items. Our analysis of hayır will show that 
doing so indeed bears fruit. 
2.3. Data analysis 
On 16 April 2017, a referendum proposing 18 amendments to the constitution was 
held in Turkey, effectively aiming to change the constitutional status from a 
representative system to a presidential one. It was initiated by the Justice and 
 21 
Development Party (AKP)8 and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the two 
leading promoters of ‘evet/yes’ that were represented in the parliament during the 
referendum. The official argument behind the referendum was the necessity of changes 
in the administrative system which should bring an end to the shortcomings of unstable 
coalition governments formed previously in the current parliamentary system. The 
leading opposition siding with ‘hayır/no’ were the Republican People’s Party (CHP) 
and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP). They criticised that providing the president 
with too much power would break and exploit the separation of powers which has been 
guaranteed by the constitution. After a vote-counting that was criticised as disputable 
(e.g. Bilgin & Erdoğan, 2018; Çalışkan, 2018), the referendum resulted in a 51-49% 
lead for the yes-side, and the proposed 18 amendments are going to be enacted 
incrementally until 2019. 
  
Before we describe the indexical meaning-making process of hayır during the 
referendum, we are going to outline how its meaning has changed in the past to arrive 
at its current meaning. As noted in the preceding chapter, it is important to take these 
semiotic processes into account when investigating meaning-change. As it turns out, 
people in the context of the 2017 referendum have been well aware of the historical 




Figure 1: The four indexical orders of hayır 
 
                                                        
8AKP is an initialism for Turkish Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, which is called AK Parti by party 
members. 
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The first indexical order describes the borrowing of hayır from Arabic into Turkish 
between the 8th and 10th century. The second order describes how hayır became 
restricted to religious contexts at the time of the Ottoman Empire. The third order 
shows how hayır has been politicised by the AKP to propagate their Neo-Ottoman 
ideology. The fourth level encompasses the employment of the word by the democratic 
grassroots movement in the course of the constitutional referendum on 16 April 2017. 
That is, it indexes Kemalist ideologies that directly oppose Neo-Ottoman ideologies. 
For the analysis of the first order, we present evidence from etymological resources. 
In the analysis of the second and the third orders, we remain diachronic and 
additionally provide evidence from an online hypertext dictionary called Ekşi Sözlük 
(literally, “sour dictionary”), a collaborative platform for users with diverse political 
ideologies which has one of the highest visiting rates in Turkey.9 The transition 
between the third and the fourth indexical orders is the most visible part of the current 
indexical meaning-making process. Hence, in the fourth order, we present diachronic 
evidence in the discourses of the no-side, yes-side and newspapers during the 
referendum process. We focus on how hayır has acquired new indexical meaning in 
the course of the period that covers the four months leading up to the Turkish 
constitutional referendum held on 16 April 2017.  
2.3.1. The first order: Borrowing 
Since the conversion of Turkic tribes to Islam between the 8th and 10th century, there 
has been close contact between Turkish and Arabic cultures in social and religious 
practices. Turkish has borrowed several words from Arabic in the course of this, 
among others the word hayır [hajɯɾ]. 
 
In the source language Arabic, the root (k-y-r) can be employed in two semantic 
environments; namely (i) ‘choice’ or ‘selection’ (i.e. ḵāra as a verb)  and (ii) ‘good’ 
(i.e. xayr as a noun) (Wehr, 1979, p. 308). Turkish adapted the word as (i) a particle 
that means ‘disapprove’ and ‘no’10 and (ii) as a noun that means ‘goodness’, ‘favour’ 
and ‘an act charitably with no thoughts of personal gain’, and as an adjective that 
                                                        
9 As for May 2017, Ekşi Sözlük is ranked 14th in Turkey and 654th in global by Alexa traffic rank, 
alexa.com, last accessed on 21 June 2019. 
10 Notice that Turkish did not borrow the Arabic word la (no) in this process. 
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means ‘good’, ‘beneficent’ (TLA Dictionary, 1998, p. 967).11 The oldest written 
source in Turkish that mentions the word hayır in the meaning of ‘good’ is the 11th 
century work Kutadgu Bilig (wisdom which brings good fortune), which, in its poetic 
style, follows Arabic prosody. It is also the first written source given after Turkic 
people became Muslim. 
 
Modern Turkish also uses the Turkic equivalent iyi for ‘good’, and both hayırlı and iyi 
are used in everyday conversation, e.g. ‘İyi/hayırlı günler’ (Have a good day). Hayır 
for ‘no’, on the other hand, replaced the Old Turkic equivalent yok [jɒk] which partly 
grammaticalised in the process, for instance to an attributive adjective as in ‘Hiç 
paramız yok’ (We have no money). This replacement has most likely taken place for 
politeness reasons. Meninski Thesaurus, which dates back to 1680, for instance, 
mentions that the word hayır was started to be used in diplomatic language to refuse 
someone in a polite manner as “I say no with good reasons”.12 Remnants of its original 
usage, however, can still be found in everyday conversation, for instance in Geldiler 
mi? (Did they come?), Yok, daha gelmediler (No, they have not yet.) (TLA Dictionary, 
1998, p. 2456), where it is used synonymously with hayır.  
2.3.2. The second order: Hayır as a religious practice 
The intersection point in the semantic content of hayır in Arabic and Turkish resides 
in the meanings ‘good’ and ‘goodness’, which can be traced through shared idiomatic 
expressions and proverbs. It is also the meaning that is used in the Quran, which has 
played a significant role in Middle Eastern everyday life. For instance, the Ottoman 
Empire (1299-1922), at its peak point between the 15th and 16th centuries (İnalcık, 
1998), endorsed an entirely Muslim lifestyle (e.g. Barkey, 2005; Mardin, 1994, pp. 
113-128; Sezer, 1981, p. 9). Although this has changed with the foundation of the 
                                                        
11 Turkish has another loanword from the same Arabic root for ‘choice’, which is karar (decision, 
judgment). In addition, there is another word ghayr in Arabic which was also borrowed by Turkish, but 
which seems to be unrelated to hayır. The word ghayr forms a minimal pair with xayr and denotes the 
meaning “other than”, e.g., ghyr rasmiin (Arabic), gayriresmi (Turkish), unofficial (English). 
12 It is not clear, at this point, whether this is achieved by combining both first-order meanings, i.e. ‘no’ 
and ‘good’, or by religious connotations, which would then technically fall under the 2nd order. Our 
correspondences with Turkish etymologists and historians did not help to resolve this issue. Thus, the 
oldest available source to consult is Meninski Thesaurus. Given that it was first published during the 
Ottoman Empire, both interpretations are warranted.  
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Republic of Turkey in 1923, Islam has continued to play an important part in the lives 
of the Turkish people. In line with this, Turkish hayır in its (ii) first-order meaning 
became restricted to religious environments, constituting a second indexical order that 
combines goodness with a sense of divinity. For instance, in the dictionary of the TLA, 
the word hayır ‘good’ is exemplified with the sentences Hayır haberdir inşallah! 
(Hope this is good news, lit. trans. “Good news is God willing”) and Dualarında hep 
hayırlı, dindar bir evlat isterdi (In his prayers, he used to ask for a beneficent and 
religious child, lit. trans. “In his prayers, all he asked is a beneficent and religious 
child”). In both examples, hayır is used in a religious phrase, either to denote that 
something is desirable (along with the Arabic loanword inşallah) or in religious 
storytelling respectively (TLA Dictionary, 1998 p. 968).  
 
The Turkic counterpart iyi, on the other hand, remained neutral. For instance, a web 
search for the proverb in (1) below yields clearly religious results when hayır is used. 
When iyi is used, search results do not yield any polarity, because the proverb itself 
has been employed and institutionalised in widely circulated coursebooks, 
newspapers, broadcasts, etc. 
 
(1) İyilik / Hayır yap denize at, balık bilmezse Hâlik bilir. 
Lit. trans. Do something good and throw it to the sea, no one knows but God. 
 “Cast one’s bread upon the waters.” 
 
People are thus well aware of the religious indexicality. Further evidence for this can 
be given from a thread on hayırlı13 in the collaborative hypertext dictionary Ekşi 
Sözlük. In Ekşi Sözlük, users have been describing words, events and people from their 
                                                        
13 The derivational suffix -lI in Turkish forms nouns, adjectives and adjective phrases (Göksel & 
Kerslake, 2005, p. 60f). 
• From nouns and adjectives, it derives words that possess an entity, e.g. akıl-lı (clever), hayır-
lı (good), sevgi-li (lover), 
• From nouns of place and locative pronouns, it indicates where a person belongs, or comes 
from, e.g. Avusturya-lı (Austrian), Londra-lı (Londoner), köy-lü (villager), 
• From numerals, it denotes groups made of numbers, e.g. üç-lü (trio), altı-lı (sextet), 
• From noun phrases, it derives adjectival phrases that possess an aspect or entity, e.g. dört 
çocuk-lu (with four children), deniz manzara-lı (with a sea view), mavi elbise-li (in blue dress). 
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own perspectives since it was founded in 1999. The following extract (2) involves 4 
out of 12 entries on hayırlı:14 
 
(2) 
Thread: ‘Hayırlı’– Good 
Turkish English 
(a) October 10, 2000 
Yararlı, yarayışlı, kut’lu, iyi-güzel 
manasında bir söz kendisi. 
It is an utterance which means 
beneficial, useful, blessed, good-
beautiful. 
(b) November 29, 2001 
Nedendir bilinmez ama genellikle dindar 
kesimin kullandığı sıfat. 
It is an adjective which is somehow 
usually used by the religious section of 
the society. 
(c) April 18, 2010  
Dincilerin pek sevdiği ifade. Az önce TRT 
Haber’de bir ilahiyat profesörü kutlu 
doğum haftası çerçevesinde “peygamber 
efendimiz”i anlattıktan sonra süresi 
dolunca (“Allahtan” her şeyin bir sonu 
var), “hayırlı yayınlar” demiştir. 
[...]  
It is an utterance which is liked by 
religious people. Shortly before, after 
talking about “our master prophet” 
considering the holy birth week, a 
professor of theology on TRT News 
said “have a [good] broadcast” when 
his time was up (“Thank God” 
everything comes to an end). 
[…] 
(d) October 30, 2014 
Ben Allah’ın bizi çoktan seçmeli bir 
hayata karşı tabi tuttuğuna inanıyorum... 
Hep hayırlı bir yol da sunuyor bize... 
Ama biz bazen hayırsız yollarda ısrarcı 
oluyoruz... Sonra neden mutsuzum? 
 
Hep Allahım hayırlı yolu görmeme ve 
seçmeme yardımcı ol diye dua etmek 
lazım. 
I believe that God tests us with a 
multiple choice life exam. Indeed, it 
provides us with [good] options. 
However, we sometimes insist on bad 
ones. And then we ask why we are 
unhappy. 
 
We should always pray to God for 
seeing and choosing the [good] options. 
 
(2a) describes the word along with its synonyms, among which is the religiously 
connoted ‘blessed’. (2b) shows that is not just a matter of arbitrary word choice by 
linking hayır directly to religious practices. The author of (2c) substantiates this claim 
with a quotation from a professor of theology in a television programme on state-
owned TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Association). In (2d), the writer employs 
hayırlı with 2nd-order meaning in his/her own discourse. 
                                                        
14 In the extracts provided in this chapter, the words hayır and hayırlı are given in square brackets [  ] 
in the English translation and are bolded in the source text. Hyperlinks are underlined. 
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2.3.3. The third order: Hayır indexing Neo-Ottoman ideologies 
At its peak point, the Ottoman Empire covered around five million square kilometres 
ranging from the Middle East to Central Europe and Northern Africa, and thus 
encircled various ethnic and religious practices. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, 
and with the foundation of the Republic of Turkey under Atatürk in 1923, the ‘Ottoman 
cultural heritage’ had started to be less visible in the public sphere, mainly due to laicist 
reforms focusing on the separation of social and religious practices in the early years 
of the republic. However, in the years following the 1980 coup d’état, the Kemalist 
nation-building period gradually came to end and the ideological motive of Neo-
Ottomanism emerged under the rise of the AKP (Yavuz, 2016, p. 439).15  
 
Two important figures who paved the way for this ideological motive were Turgut 
Özal and Süleyman Demirel, who were both prime ministers and presidents of Turkey 
from 1983-1993 and from 1991-2000 respectively. Both were active agents in 
renouncing the statism that had been implemented under Atatürk by advocating for 
economic liberalism. Aiming for a religious and linguistic commonwealth spreading 
from Turkey to Central Asia (i.e. the Former Soviet republics) to the Balkans through 
terms which stress ‘brotherhood’ and ‘kinship’, Özal legitimised Turkish cultural and 
economic dominance by helping conservative Muslim entrepreneurs who formed the 
essence of Turkish economy (Özel Volfová, 2016, p. 493).  
 
Following Özal, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the founder of the AKP, introduced Neo-
Ottomanism as a new foreign policy for Turkey in his TV address on 25 February 
2005. For the AKP, regaining a former political and economic strength is closely 
linked to the rejection of Atatürk’s idea of a secular nation (Onar, 2009, p. 12; Özel 
Volfová, 2016, pp. 496-497; Taspinar, 2008, p. 14; Türkeş, 2016, p. 199). While 
Özal’s main political aim was to construct a transnational Turkishness via shared 
ethnicity, Neo-Ottomanism under the AKP seeks to reinvoke an idealised Ottoman 
                                                        
15 The term “Neo-Ottomanism” was first introduced by Ahmet Davutoğlu, who later became the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister of Turkey, in his column in one of the pro-Islamist 
daily newspapers Yeni Şafak in April 1999. In his article, Davutoğlu stresses the need for neo-liberal 
thinking in both foreign and domestic affairs, and he argues that returning to Ottoman roots lives up to 
this need. He then puts this return to conservative and traditional values on a par with the French 
Revolution and the Congress of Vienna. 
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past by capitalising on religious uniformity. In order to reconstruct the religious-
historical basis of the Ottoman Empire in a neoliberal fashion, the AKP worked 
together with liberals and left-liberal intelligentsia, among whom there were 
columnists, TV commentators and bureaucrats (Türkeş, 2016, p. 192). Columnists, for 
instance, have promoted AKP’s policies, and TV commentators have endorsed AKP’s 
discourses and policies, both implicitly and explicitly. In this line, it can be said that 
liberal elites have become a major tool endorsing the current socio-political motivation 
by representing Turkey’s new policy. With this socio-political impetus, neo-
Ottomanism has claimed a variety of public spaces and discourses within a spectrum 
of architecture, film and television, fashion and even in culinary culture. 
 
Neo-Ottomanism has also resonated with the indexical meaning of hayır, linking 
previous religious indexical meaning to the refusal of Atatürk’s secularism and thus to 
a political ideology. AKP-affiliates have started to use hayır to take a political stance, 
of which ordinary people have become increasingly aware. Erdoğan, for instance, has 
been reported in several instances to say hayırlı olsun (All the best, lit. trans. “be 
good”), a phrase with heavy religious connotations. This led to the emergence of a 
third-order indexicality. Similar to the evidence given for the second indexical order 
(hayır as a religious practice), below we present some extracts from the threads in Ekşi 
Sözlük on the use of hayırlı in the contexts hayırlı günler (have a good day) and hayırlı 
işler (have a good work), where people link this use to the highest political 
representative of Neo-Ottoman ideology, namely the AKP.16 The first thread below is 
on the phrase hayırlı günler: 
 
(3) 
Thread: ‘Hayırlı günler’ – Have a good day! 
Turkish English 
(a) October 20, 2011 
Akpli olmayıp öyle gözükmeye çalışan 
birtakım memur kesiminin dillerinden 
düşmeyen söz.  
[...] 
It is a phrase used by civil 
servants/officers who are trying to seem 
like an AKP supporter while they are 
not. […] 
                                                        
16 The AKP has been the sole representative of this ideology in the recent political agenda of Turkey 
since it was first mentioned. 
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(b) August 28, 2014 
İyi günler ne zaman hayırlı günler oldu 
lan hıyarto diye cevap verilmesi gereken 
laf. 
 
(bkz: eski köye yeni adet getirmek) 
(bkz: şekilcilik) 
(bkz: günlük hayata siyaset sokan piç) 
It is an expression where it needs to be 
asked why “have a [good – iyi] day” 
became “have a [good – hayırlı] day”. 
 
(see: new tricks to old dogs) 
(see: pretentiousness) 
(see: bastard who politicises everyday 
life) 
 
The author in (3a) puts forward the idea that the word hayırlı is used by those who are 
working for the government (i.e. Civil servants, officers, etc.) aiming to seem like an 
AKP supporter because they either feel threatened by or want to take advantage of the 
two polarised ideologies. (3b) raises the question concerning the change in the 
connotations of the words iyi and hayır. Following the format of the Ekşi Sözlük 
medium, the second author provides the readers with three hypertexts which stress this 
shift as an unwelcomed innovation. 
2.3.4. The fourth order: Hayır indexing Kemalist ideologies 
On 14 January 2017, a group of users in Ekşi Sözlük initiated a movement called 
hayır’lı günler (Have a good day). By dividing the word hayırlı into its two 
morphological constituents with an apostrophe as hayır’lı, they created a context in 
which the interpretation of the word started to go hand in hand with voting ‘no’ in the 
constitutional referendum. Since the medium of Ekşi Sözlük provides its users with an 
environment in which they can link dictionary entries to others through hypertexts, 
authors who were going to vote for ‘no’ in the referendum highlighted the word 
hayır/no through hyperlinking hayırlı günler to hayır’lı günler on the website. Similar 
trends were also observed in the other phrases involving hayırlı, e.g. hayır’lı işler 
(have a good work) and hayır’lı akşamlar (have a good evening). In this regard, we 
interpret the following extracts in (4a-c) alongside this movement.  
 
(4) 
Thread: ‘Hayırlı işler’ – Have a good work! 
Turkish English 
(a) January 14, 2017  
Çok müthiş ötesi ultra ekstra über işler için 
bir slogan. Neyse ben reserve alayım da 
lazım olacak... 
It is slogan for an awesome, ultra, extra, 
über work. Anyway, I reserved this entry 
for the following days. 
(b) January 14, 2017 
 29 
Çok güzel bir ekşi gençlik hareketi. 
Desteklenmeli ki en azından çorbada 
tuzunuz bulunsun. 
It is a very nice Ekşi youth movement. It 
should be supported and one should give 
a hand to it. 
(c) January 14, 2017 
(Bkz: hayır’lı işler) (See: Have a [good] work) 
 
In (4a), the author forecasts the probable effect of the movement and draws the 
attention of the readers through magnifying its importance through the words ultra, 
extra, über which can be interpreted in the semantic content of ‘above the ordinary’. 
The writer in (4b) invites the other users in the dictionary to join the movement and 
the author of (4c) directs the readers to the entry hayır’lı işler through a hyperlink. 
 
Shortly after the initiation of the movement, no-voters took up the new indexical value 
on Twitter and Facebook and started to employ hayırlı with hashtags in presenting 




Figure 2: Tweets sent involving hayır(lı) with and without hashtags (1st tweet: Have a [good] work, 
have a [good] day, have a [good] Friday…Have you ever thought why we are not going to say “yes” 
in the referendum? Because in every bad, there is [good]. 2nd tweet: Have a [good] work everybody. 
3rd tweet: Have a [good] day, have a [good] work, have a [good] weekend, have [good] friends) 
 
Figure 2 shows three tweets of the hayır’lı günler movement initiated by the users of 
Ekşi Sözlük earlier on the same day. In the first tweet, the user uses an apostrophe to 
highlight the word hayır to contrast it with evet. The second and the third tweets 
involve hashtags (e.g. #hayırlı), which were later adopted by the Twitter community 
to index that someone will vote hayır and not evet. 
                                                        
17 Hashtags are also hypertextual in their nature. Clicking on a hashtag reveals every tweet using the 
same hashtag. 
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There have been endeavours in the past where individual opposition politicians also 
tried to employ hayır in its double meaning (‘good’ and ‘no’) to take a political stance, 
for instance during the electoral campaigns for the previous constitutional referenda in 
Turkey (1982, 2007 and 2010). However, this had not resonated with non-politicians 
and thus was not taken up by the target audience. Below we provide two statements 
prior to the 2010 constitutional referendum from Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and Devlet 
Bahçeli, the presidents of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist 
Movement Party (MHP) respectively. 
 
(5)  
(a) Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (CHP) – 8 July 2010 
Turkish English 
Topluma karşı sorumluluk hisseden herkesi 
referandumda ‘hayır’ demeye çağırıyorum. 
Halk arasında dendiği gibi ‘hayırda hayır 
vardır.’ 
I invite people who care for this country 
to vote for ‘[no]’. Following the 
colloquial speech in Turkish, I can say 
that ‘there is [good] in voting for [no]’. 
(b) Devlet Bahçeli (MHP) – 2 August 2010 
Turkish English 
Hayırda hayır vardır. Bir başka deyişle 12 
Eylül günü yapılacak olan halk oylamasından 
çıkacak olan sonuç beyaz veya kahverengi 
oyların birbirlerini aşan konumlarından 
ziyade 8 yıldan bu yana ülkemizi yönetecek 
AKP'nin ülke yönetimine devamına ilişkin bir 
yorumunu getirecektir. 
There is [good] in voting for [no]. In other 
words, the result of the referendum to be 
held on 12 September is more than the 
numbers. Rather, it will be regarded as the 
comment of the people on how the AKP, 
which has been ruling for 8 years, is going 
to manage the country. 
 
It can be seen in (5ab) that both political actors from the opposition parties promote 
hayır/no with the colloquial saying ‘There is good in voting for no’. Again, 
notwithstanding the similarity in the indexical meaning now evident in the fourth 
indexical order, back then the word hayır could not establish the same impact as in the 
course of the 2017 referendum. In the 2007 referendum, 68,95% of all voters voted 
evet/yes for the change in the procedures for the general elections (e.g., elections to be 
made every four, not five years; the president to be elected by the public, not by the 
parliament). In the 2010 referendum (57,88% evet/yes), the agenda was the revision 
of 30 amendments of the constitution prepared by a military junta and the minimisation 
of the effect of the military over the parliamentary system. In 2017 (51% evet/yes), 
people cast their votes on the change in the legislative system and the structure of the 
parliament. With regard to these voting outcomes, we put forward the idea that the 
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grade of political division in a society might have an impact on whether appropriated 
words can take up new indexical meaning. This will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter 2.4. 
  
Contrary to the previous referenda in which political actors employed hayır in a top-
down fashion, the current process shows a bottom-up pattern. Having been stigmatised 
by Erdoğan and the AKP, the people initiating the grassroots movement in Ekşi Sözlük 
described themselves as secular and committed to Atatürk’s notions of statism. They 
reacted to the social structures presented to them by ruling ideologies through the 
political actors and the media, and they have started to contrast their employment of 
hayır with second and third-order indexical meanings to stress their presence and 
reclaim their space as the guardians of the democracy and the republic. 
  
We now provide evidence for how the discourses of this grassroots movement of the 
no-side influenced the political actors of the no and the yes-side. We will then show 
how the yes-side reacted to the new indexical meaning. The cases we present comprise 
three contexts: (i) the good day/work/Friday case, (ii) how the meaning-making 
process reflected on no-campaigns, and (iii) how the yes-side tried to erase hayır from 
the public sphere. 
 
The good day/work/Friday case 
Wishing a good day/work/Friday in social media forms the initial phase of the 
meaning-making process. Evidence for this is given in a hayırlı Cumalar (have a good 
Friday) thread in Ekşi Sözlük. As already shown in the previously given examples of 
have a good day/work, people in Muslim countries give their good wishes to others in 
their communities on Fridays (Jumu’ah) since Friday is the congregational prayer day 
of the week. With the introduction of internet forums, e-mails and social media, this 
oral tradition has been maintained. 
 
(6)  
Thread: ‘Hayırlı cumalar’ – Have a good Friday! 
Turkish English 
(a) 23 December 2016 
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Nasıl, hayırlı mı cumalar?  
Atatürk heykeli indirilirken, askerler 
soysuzlar tarafından diri diri yakılırken 
hayırlı mı? 
 
12 saati aşkın süredir herhangi bir sosyal 
medya uygulamalarına doğru düzgün 
bağlanamıyoruz bile. vergisini verdiğimiz 
herhangi bir şeyden yararlanamıyoruz bile. 
yakında herkese hayırlı cumalar dilediğiniz 
Facebook'unuz bile kalmayacak. 
 
Hadi hayırlı cumalar. 
How? Are Fridays [good]? 
Wishing a [good] Friday while Atatürk’s 
statues are being pulled down and soldiers 
burned by the bigots? 
 
We haven’t had connection to any social 
media applications in the last 12 hours. 
We cannot benefit from anything that we 
pay taxes for. In the future, you will not 
have any Facebook where you post your 
‘have a [good] Friday’ wishes. 
 
Ok! Have a [good] Friday. 
(b) 15 January 2017 
Nedense an itibarı ile Türkiye'de trend topic 
olan dilek. 
For some reason, it is a wish which is a 
trending topic in Turkey (Twitter trends). 
(c) 27 January 2017  
Herkese, bol hayır'lı ve mübarek bir gelecek. I wish a [good] and blessed future to 
everybody. 
(d) 27 January 2017  
Bol #hayır'lı cumalar. Have a plenty of [#good] Fridays. 
 
As stated above, the no-voter’s voices rested upon the political fragility towards 
secularism, which threatens the founding principles of the Turkish republic. In this 
regard, the argument presented in (6a) is one of the initial grassroots-stances taken by 
the people who were going to vote for ‘no’ in the referendum. The author in (6a) 
justifies his/her point through giving reference to recent incidents in Turkey that had 
been on the agenda of the no-side for some time. Trying to draw the attention of the 
readers and the other writers to the importance of this matter, the author in (6b) adds a 
description to the thread that reports Twitter trending topics in Turkey. (6c-d) provide 
examples of how people appropriated the use in social media, just as predicted by the 
extracts given in (4a-c). 
 
In Turkey, the entries in Ekşi Sözlük go viral easily. It is one of the most-visited 
websites in Turkey (see footnote 9 above) which integrates social media such as 
Facebook, Twitter and other internet media content websites. Normally, this is a rather 
unidirectional process, in that social media often takes up entries, but not vice versa. 
In the context of 2017 referendum, however, reciprocal influence between Ekşi Sözlük 
and Twitter could be observed and thus the use of hayır managed to reach wider 
audiences. When people started to use hashtags with hayırlı alongside a picture of 
Atatürk and profile pictures with #hayır hashtags, the appropriation process went viral. 
Taken up by political opposition parties, this trend then spread so rapidly that the AKP 
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and its affiliates eventually had to actively react to it by employing counter-measures. 
Deniz Zeyrek, a columnist in one of the mainstream newspapers Hürriyet, noted that 
the bureaucrats and the yes-supporters in his address book and e-mail lists started to 
use Cumanız mübarek olsun instead of Hayırlı Cumalar (Hürriyet, Janaury 28, 2017) 
to avoid being affiliated with anti-government ideologies. The same trend was also 
adopted by pro-government journalists. The below extract shows some tweets by 
Hikmet Genç, who is a columnist in pro-Islamist daily newspaper Yeni Şafak. 
 
(7)  
Tweets by Hikmet Genç 
Turkish English 
9 December 2016 
Asselamu Aleyküm… Hayırlı Cumalar… 
 
Peace be with you. Have a [good] Friday. 
16 December 2016 
Hayırlı Cumalar… 
 
Have a [good] Friday. 
30 December 2016 
Hayırlı Cumalar… 
 
Have a [good] Friday. 
6 January 2017 
Hayırlı Cumalar… 
 
Have a [good] Friday. 
13 January 2017 
Selamun Aleyküm… Cumamız mübarek 
olsun. 
 
Peace be with you. May your Friday be 
blessed. 
20 January 2017 
Es’selamu Aleyküm… Cumamız mübarek 
olsun. 
 
Peace be with you. May your Friday be 
blessed. 
27 January 2017 
Selamun Aleyküm… Cumamız mübarek 
olsun. 
 
Peace be with you. May your Friday be 
blessed. 
3 February 2017 
Selamun Aleyküm… Cumamız mübarek 
olsun. 
 
Peace be with you. May your Friday be 
blessed. 
 
Tweeted by a journalist who has around 325k followers, the meaning-making process 
launched by the grassroots of the no-side received a response that involves a deviation 
from the word hayır through employing a synonym mübarek (blessed). 
 
Another turning point in this contagious nature of the use of hayır in wishes was Prime 
Minister Binali Yıldırım’s substitution of hayırlı with a similar expression. This can 
be regarded as evidence for how the grassroots movement of the no-side affected the 





Figure 3: Meaning-making process: Grassroots of no-side ® political actors of yes-side 
 
The following extract (8) involves Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım’s substitution of 
hayır in his public address in an unveiling ceremony on 11 February 2017 in Antalya: 
 
(8) 
Binali Yıldırım (AKP) – 11 February 2017 
Turkish English 
16 Nisan’da Türkiye’de yeni bir bahar 
olacak. Şimdiden uğurlu kademli olsun. 
There will be a new springtime on 16 
April. Let it be lucky. 
 
In the context given in (8), it is widely known that the expression hayırlı olsun 
(congratulations, enjoy, etc.) has been used by politicians and officials who attend an 
unveiling ceremony. However, Binali Yıldırım substitutes uğurlu kademli olsun (let it 
be lucky) for hayırlı olsun.  
 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, similarly substituted 
iyi/bereketli’mübarek for hayırlı in one of his visits to a local market in Antalya on 24 
February 2017. Below is an extract from an article in the mainstream daily newspaper 
Hürriyet on Minister Çavuşoğlu’s handling of hayır: 
 
(9) 
Hürriyet – 24 February 2017 
Turkish English 
 
[…]Dışişleri Bakanı Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, 
Antalya'nın Döşemealtı ilçesinde pazar 
esnafını gezdi. Yaklaşık 2 saat süren 
ziyarette 'hayır' kelimesini kullanmayan 
[…] Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt 
Çavuşoğlu visited stallholders in a local 
market in Döşemealtı, Antalya. In his 
two-hour visit, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, who 
did not use the word [no], mostly used 
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Bakan Çavuşoğlu, sık sık 'İyi pazarlar', 
'Bereketli pazarlar', 'Cumanız mübarek 
olsun' gibi cümleler kullandı.  
 
Bazı vatandaşların 'Hayırlı Cumalar' 
sözlerine, Bakan Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu'nun 
“Hayır yok, evet var" demesi dikkat çekti. 
[…] 
the phrases ‘iyi pazarlar’ (Have a good 
market day), ‘bereketli pazarlar’ (Have a 
productive market day), and ‘Cumanız 
mübarek olsun’ (Have a blessed Friday). 
In response to some of the citizens’ 
‘Have a good Friday’ wishes, Mevlüt 
Çavuşoğlu draws the attentions by 
saying, “There is not [no], there is yes”. 
[…] 
 
At the same time, pro-government parties tried to actively stigmatise hayır by adding 
negative connotations to the fourth-order usage. For instance, shortly after the hayır 
movement went viral, the leading pro-government newspaper daily Sabah got 




Sabah – 3 February 2017 
Turkish English 
 
[…] Kanal D ve Star TV’de yayımlanan 
dizilerde, referandum öncesi halkın tercihini 
‘Hayır’ yönünde etkilemeye dönük algı 
çalışması dikkat çekiyor. ‘Hayat Şarkısı’, 
‘Kara Sevda’ ve ‘Adı Efsane’ dizilerinde 
kurgulanan oylama sahnelerinde ‘Hayır’ 
kararı çıkıyor ve ‘Her şey Hayır’lı olacak’ 
repliği vurgulanıyor. […] 
[…] In TV dramas televised in Kanal D 
and Star TV, there are perception 
operations in order to influence people’s 
decisions towards ‘[No]’ before the 
referendum. In dramas named ‘Hayat 
Şarkısı’, ‘Kara Sevda’ and ‘Adı Efsane’, 
the voting scenes result in ‘[No]’ and the 
lines ‘Everything will be [good]’ are 
stressed. […] 
 
As seen in (10), Sabah stresses and prioritises the word hayır through single quotes, 
initial capitals and apostrophes, and thus represents the emergence of the fourth-order 
indexicality with a construction of hayır as a red-flag word. Instantiated by such pro-
government newspapers as Sabah, Yeni Şafak and Yeni Akit, and introduced by AKP’s 
political actors, the word hayır was tried to be reconstructed as a word that is 
‘undesirable’.  
 
AKP supporters partially took up this denigration attempt, as for example shown in 
(11), where an AKP supporter asks the Minister of Youth and Sports, Akif Çağatay 





Hürriyet – 4 March 2017 
Turkish English 
Gençlik ve Spor Bakanı Akif Çağatay 
Kılıç, Zonguldak'ta Ak Parti seçim 
bürosunun açılışını yaparken, "Hayırlı 
uğurlu olsun inşallah" dedi. Bakan Kılıç, 
arkasındaki bir kişinin "Hayırlı olmasın 
sayın bakanım" demesi üzerine, "Yok o 
anlamda değil. Bereketli olması, iyi olması, 
ülkemizin daha çok gelişmesi için, o 
anlamda hayırlı olsun diyoruz" dedi. [...] 
The Minister of Youth and Sports Akif 
Çağatay Kılıç said ‘Let’s hope that it will 
be [good]’ while he was unveiling 
AKP’s polls office in Zonguldak. In 
response to one of the people around that 
said, ‘It should not be [with no] dear 
Minister’, Kılıç said, “No, it is not in that 
sense. We say it will be [good] in the 
sense that our country is to develop 
further.” […] 
 
Following the construction of hayır as a red-flag word by the AKP discourse makers, 
an AKP supporter asks for a clarification on the use of the word hayırlı by the Minister 
Kılıç. Upon receiving comments from a supporter on his use of hayır, Kılıç justifies 
himself by implying that he is aware of the ongoing meaning-making process. Kılıç 
also uses yok in his response to the supporter (i.e., Yok o anlamda değil, lit. trans. “No, 
it is not in that sense”) in a context where both hayır and yok are unmarked. 
 
This attempt to denigrate hayır, however, was only short-lived, and political actors 
soon returned to reclaiming attempts. In Minister of Foreign Affairs Çavuşoğlu’s 
speech on 14 March, he performed his second attempt to dismantle the fourth-order 
meaning of hayır linked to ‘no’. 
 
(12) 
Hürriyet – 14 March 2017  
Turkish English 
[…] Bakan Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, 16 Nisan'ın 
vatana, millete hayırlı olmasını dileyerek, 
"Ben 'hayırlı' dediğimde bazıları şaşırıyor. 
Hayırlı işler, hayırlı günler, hayırlı cumalar 
demekten korkmayın. 'Hayırlısıyla evet' 
diyoruz" dedi. […] 
[…] Presenting his [good] wishes to the 
country and the nation, Minister 
Çavuşoğlu said, “When I say [good], 
some people are surprised. Do not be 
scared when you say, ‘Have a [good] 
work’, ‘have a [good] day’ and ‘have a 
[good] Friday’. We say ‘[Yes] with 
[good]’ […] 
 
In (12), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who explicitly invented a substitution word 
for hayır 20 days earlier (see extract 9), attempts to reclaim the emerging indexical 
meaning of hayır by stressing the homonymic nature of the word, e.g. ‘We are going 
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to vote for ‘yes’ with hayırlı/good’. Minister Çavuşoğlu is the only person to have 
used this phrase. 
 
In summary, what we have depicted so far here is a reflexive dialogue contesting the 
indexical meaning of hayır: The political stance taken by the grassroots movement 
against the referendum campaigns of AKP yielded a fourth-order indexicality, and a 
subsequent reflexive stance taken by political actors of the AKP and pro-government 
journalists first substituted hayır with the help of invented words/phrases, then tried to 
add denigrating meaning to the fourth-order index, only to return to reclaiming 
attempts again. 
 
Reflections in no-campaigns 
The employment of hayır by the grassroots movement in referendum-related 




Figure 4: Meaning-making process: Grassroots of no-side ® political actors of no-side 
 
Extract (13) involves an excerpt from the news by Hürriyet about the Mayor of 
Çaycuma, a representative of the main opposition party CHP: 
 
 (13) 
Hürriyet – 25 February 2017  
Turkish English 
[…] “Pazar yerinde restoran anlamında da 
fazla bir yer yok. Özellikle pazarcı esnafına 
vermek için böyle bir organizasyon yapmayı 
[…] “There are not any restaurants 
around the local market. We aimed to 
provide stallholders with this service by 
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düşündük, 'hayırlı cumalar' diyerekten. 
‘Hayır’ sözcüğü moda bir sözcük. 'Evet' de 
moda bir sözcük bu dönem. Geçmişte 
'hayırlı cumalar' diyenler, bunu şimdi 
kullanmamayı tercih ediyorlar. Bu da bu 
işin esprisi oldu diyebiliriz. Ben Bülent 
Kantarcı olarak mesajlarımı her şekilde 
vermeye çalışıyorum. Mesaj almak 
isteyenler her zaman mesajı alabilirler." 
saying ‘have a [good] Friday’. The word 
‘hayır’ is trending nowadays. Similarly, 
the word ‘Evet’ is also trending. Those 
who say ‘have a [good Friday] in the past 
prefer not to say that today. What we do 
can be regarded as witty. I, as the mayor 
of the city, Bülent Kantarcı, try to give 
my messages in any form. Those who 
want to receive my message can do so.” 
 
In (13), the Mayor of Çaycuma serves Hayır çorbası (No/good soup) to stallholders in 
a local market. In promoting this activity, the Mayor organises the event on a Friday 
and thus builds on the already-established political dialogue by the grassroots. That is, 
he serves the soup in the context of Hayırlı Cumalar (Have a good Friday). Upon being 
asked the question why he named the event as Hayır çorbası, his response shows a 
strong implicature that he is aware of the ongoing meaning-making process. 
 
Similarly, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the president of the CHP, employed hayırlı in his 
public speeches given in various parts of Turkey. Below, we provide an extract from 
one of his speeches which was given in Ordu: 
 
(14) 
Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu – 20 March 2017 reported by Anadolu Agency 
Turkish English 
 
[...] Ne yaparlarsa yapsınlar ben bu milletin 
ferasetine güveniyorum. Ne söylerlerse 
söylesinler ben bu milletin sağduyusuna 
güveniyorum ve ‘Hayır’ çıkacağına 
inanıyorum. Hayırlı bir iş olacaktır Türkiye 
için. [...] 
[…] No matter what they do, I believe in 
the understanding of the people of this 
nation. No matter what they say, I believe 
in the common sense of the nation and 
the result will be [no].  
It will be a [good] job for Turkey. 
[…]  
 
The phrase hayırlı bir iş (good job) in extract (14) was employed by the CHP President 
Kılıçdaroğlu several times in his public addresses given during the referendum 
process. 
 
Following Kılıçdaroğlu, the youth branch of the CHP started to treat hayırlı kurabiye 





Hürriyet – 22 March 2017 
Turkish English 
Title: CHP’li gençlerden işe gidenler için 
‘hayırlı kurabiye’ 
[...] 
Avcılar’daki CHP’li gençler akşam 
saatlerinde elbirliği ile hazırladıkları 
kurabiyeleri ambalajlayarak hayır 
broşürleri ile birlikte günün ilk ışıklarında 
işlerine gidenlere ‘Hayırlı sabahlar’ diyerek 
dağıtırken bunu görenler şaşırdı.[...] 
Title: ‘[Good] cookie’ by CHP youth for 
those who are going to work 
[…] 
By saying ‘[good] morning’ while the 
CHP youth in Avcılar were treating the 
cookies, which they collaboratively 
prepared together with [no] leaflets, 
people who saw them were baffled.  
[…] 
 
In the context of (15), the youth branch of the CHP of Avcılar district in İstanbul builds 
on the same indexical order and treats hayırlı kurabiye (Good cookie) to people in 
İstanbul. In addition, along with the cookies, they also hand out their referendum 
brochures.  
 
In the second context of the fourth-order indexicality, we have provided some evidence 
from CHP political actors and their youth branch who formed the no-side of the 
referendum. Emerging from grassroots, hayır reached a stage where it served as one 
of the major tools in no-campaigns.  
 
Erasing ‘hayır’ from the public sphere 
Upon being unsuccessful in disclaiming the fourth-order indexical meaning of hayır, 
the AKP’s discourse, which went hand in hand with the government institutions, 
centred upon erasing it from the public sphere. We regard the meaning-making process 
occurring in this step as emerging out of the notions of power and dominance. Since 
the ruling ideology held the political materials over the referendum, they could actively 
engage in the production and reproduction of ideas or texts in domains ranging from 
politics to education and the media. 
 
The following extracts from news texts are given as parts of the erasure process of the 
word hayır after it had been appropriated by the grassroots. The first extract is from a 





Sözcü – 14 February 2017  
Turkish English 
[…] Kentin çeşitli bölgelerinde ev ve 
işyerlerine dağıtılmaya başlanan ve 
panolara asılan afiş ve broşürlerde, şu 
ifadeler yer alıyordu: “Neyi kazanmak 
istediğinize karar verin… Çocuklarınızı 
zehirlemek ister misiniz? İktidarsız olmak 
ister misiniz? Tekerlekli sandalyede bir 
yaşam mı sürmek istersiniz? Kanser olmak 
ister misiniz? Kalp krizi geçirmek ister 
misiniz?. HAYIR diyorsanız, hayatınızı ve 
geleceğinizi kazandınız.” Ancak broşürler, 
“Hayır” ifadesi nedeniyle, referandumla 
bağlantı kurulup yanlış anlaşılacağı 
düşüncesi üzerine toplatıldı. Broşürlerin 
basımı da durduruldu. AKP Konya 
Milletvekili Abdullah Ağralı da, “Broşürler 
önceden basılmış, yanlış anlaşılmaya neden 
olmaması için dağıtımı durduruldu” diye 
konuştu. 
[…] The booklets and banners which 
were started to be circulated and 
displayed in billboards were saying: 
“Decide on what you want to achieve… 
Do you want to poison your children? Do 
you want to become impotent? Do you 
want to continue your life in a 
wheelchair? Do you want to have 
cancer? Do you want to have a heart 
attack? If you say [NO], you win your 
life and future.” However, the booklets 
were pulled off from the circulation in 
case of any misunderstanding related to 
[no] in the referendum. AKP MP of 
Konya, Abdullah Ağralı, stated that, 
“Those booklets were published 
beforehand. Its circulation was ceased in 
case of misunderstandings.” 
 
(16) involves a news extract about removing the ‘no to smoking’ booklets from 
circulation in Konya, which is one of the strongest electoral districts of the AKP. When 
asked about it by a journalist, Konya MP of the AKP states that the booklets were 
aborted in order not to yield a misunderstanding before the referendum. 
 
The following news extract (17) involves an incident reported from Manisa, where the 




Hürriyet – 23 February 2017  
Turkish English 
 
Manisa’nın Yunusemre ilçesindeki bir 
okulun girişine 3 yıl önce asılan “Hayırla 
geldiniz” ve “Hayırla gidiniz” tabelaları, 
“Hoşgeldiniz-Welcome” ve “Güle güle-
Goodbye” yazılı olan yenileriyle değiştirildi.  
 
Okul müdürü, kendisine “hayırcı müdür” 
denildiği için tabelaların kaldırıldığını 
açıkladı. Manisa İl Milli Eğitim Müdürlüğü, 
değişiklikle ilgili inceleme başlattı. […] 
In the town Yunusemre of the Manisa 
province, the old signboards in a school 
saying ‘Come in [good] manner’ and 
‘Leave with [good] manner’ were 
changed to ‘Hoşgeldiniz-Welcome’ and 
‘Güle güle-Goodbye’. The headmaster 
stated that since people had called him 
‘[no-lover] headmaster’, the signboards 
were changed. The Provincial Directorate 




In (17), the headmaster of the school is pressured to change the plates saying Hayırla 
geldiniz (Come in good manner) and Hayırla gidiniz (Leave with good manner) to 
bilingual Hoşgeldiniz-Welcome and Güle güle-Goodbye ones. Although the news text 
quotes the headmaster saying that he personally made the decision, people working in 
administrative positions made similar decisions during the referendum period in order 
to not to be perceived as someone against ‘yes’.  
 
 
Figure 5: The banners in the entrance of a school in Manisa, before (Hayırla geldiniz / Come in good 
manner) and after (Hoşgeldiniz / Welcome). Source: Nermin Uçtu, DHA, February 22, 2017. 
 
A similar incident to the one given in (16) was observed in Kocaeli, where the AKP 
municipality removed the phrase su kayıp-kaçağına hayır (say no to illegal use of 
water) from water bills: 
 
(18) 
Sözcü – 2 March 2017  
Turkish English 
AKP'li Kocaeli Belediyesi'ne bağlı Kocaeli 
Su ve Kanalizasyon İdaresi Genel 
Müdürlüğü (İSU), su faturalarında yıllardır 
yer alan ve kaçak suya ilişkin yayınlanan 
‘HAYIR’ ibaresini çıkardı. Daha önceki 
faturaların üst bölümünde mavi şerit 
üzerinde ‘Su Kayıp-Kaçağına HAYIR’ 
yazısı yer alıyordu. Belediye ani bir kararla 
bu yazıyı referandum öncesi sildi. Yeni 
faturalarda “Temiz su insani bir haktır. 
Sağlıklı üretim bizden tasarruflu tüketim 
sizden. Sudan güç aldık” gibi bilgilendirme 
yazıları yer aldı. 
Water and Sewage Administration of the 
AKP Municipality of Kocaeli removed 
the expression ‘[NO]’, which is related to 
illegal use of water, from the water bills. 
The captions saying ‘say [NO] to illegal 
use of water’, which was previously 
located in the upper part of the bills with 
blue tapes, were removed. In the new 
version of the water bills, it now says 
“Clean water is a human right. We are 
responsible for the clean water and you 




The protagonists of the news reports given in (16-18) justify their erasure attempts by 
probable misunderstandings. However, we observe in similar incidents prior to the 
referendum that protagonists felt pressured to erase hayır from the public sphere. 
2.4. Discussion 
Our analysis has shown that hayır has acquired its meaning extensions through Neo-
Ottoman interpretations of religious 2nd-order meaning. However, in the 4th indexical 




Figure 6: The indexical orders of hayır revisited 
 
In our post-hoc analysis, we were able to show that the direction of this meaning 
change seemed to lie in the indexical properties of the word itself, which extends both 
diachronically and synchronically through its indexical orders. Hayır extends 
diachronically because the indexical orders were added over the timespan of the last 
millennium, and synchronically because all indexical meanings are available at the 
same time for agents to create new indexical meaning. This strengthens the position of 
the studies reported in chapters 2.1 and 2.2:  the case of hayır clearly shows that people 
engage in meaning-making in a systematic way. By employing homonymous ‘no’, a 
first-order meaning which has not acquired indexical meanings similar to ‘good’ in the 
previous indexical orders (see figure 6), the grassroots of the no-side, who advocate 
that the new constitution betrays the country’s founding principles among which 
secularism is the key, introduced a fourth-order indexicality that diametrically opposes 
the second and third-order indexical meanings of ‘good’. 
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By engaging with the indexical past of hayır, political activists projected other 
speakers who use the word in their second or third-order meaning into their own usage 
of the term to create a contrast. Employing hayır with its fourth-order meaning yields 
a fictional Kemalist-persona that in the 2017 referendum opposed a fictional Neo-
Ottoman persona who employs it with its third-order meaning. We thus witness in the 
same word two different registers associated with different personae (see Gal, 2016b, 
p. 121). As we have shown in our discussion of the fourth indexical order, pro-
governmental agents could not simply ignore this source of misunderstanding. Hayır 
did not become so powerful simply because some people tried to claim it for their own 
purpose. It became so powerful because it tells us the story of a looming political 
division in Turkey. The ruling party itself plays a crucial role in how this division came 
into being, and as such it had to react not only to a lexical vilification but to a threat to 
its own regime. The political division in Turkey is thus evident on different scales: the 
point of contention at the level of society is clearly reflected in the fight over the 
linguistic sign hayır, which does not carry one single meaning but an indexical 
dialogue of different viewpoints. 
 
Bakhtin (1981 [1934-35]) referred to this dialogic characteristic as heteroglossia, 
claiming that speakers never only speak for themselves, but in doing so invoke the 
voices of others as well, and with them the social and cultural contexts in which the 
utterance has been embedded. Often, however, it is not so clear which voices or 
contexts in particular are echoed in a heteroglossic utterance. Ducrot (1984) therefore 
claims that ‘it is necessary to dissect the different enunciative layers that make up the 
utterance’ (Angermuller, 2014, p. 43). Indexical orders, as we have shown, prove a 
useful tool to sketch out these layers (see figure 6). From this follows, in turn, that 
indexical meaning-making needs to be understood as a reflexive/polyphonic (Bakhtin, 
1981 [1934-35]; Ducrot, 1984) phenomenon, because it incorporates different voices, 
opinions, or other levels of contrast existing in society – just like it can create what we 
perceive as contrasts at a broader level in the first place. Irvine and Gal (2000) discuss 
this in depth when they speak of linguistic differentiation, a concept which partly 
draws on Voloshinov (1986 [1929]). Voloshinov, coming from a Marxist position, 
claimed that the linguistic sign is deeply social in nature, as opposed to what he called 
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abstract-objectivist conceptions of the sign. Ideology and language, for Voloshinov, 
are not entities simply derived from the consciousness of the base structure – they 
determine consciousness in the first place. Because each usage of a word leaves a mark 
for subsequent usage or reception, ideology and the linguistic sign cannot be separated 
from one another. Each sign ‘refracts’ a social reality outside itself: the context in 
which it was used, by whom it was used, who was forbidden to use it in a similar way, 
etc. Class struggle, thus, also happens at the level of the linguistic sign, as speakers 
regularly fight over to whom a linguistic sign belongs. 
  
When Irvine and Gal (2000, p. 38) speak of fractal recursivity as one mechanism of 
linguistic differentiation, they capture methodologically how ‘different levels of 
contrast [...] within a cultural field’ are semiotically ‘refracted’. Fractal recursivity, for 
them, ‘involves the projection of an opposition, salient at some level of relationship, 
onto some other level’ (ibid.). In the 2017 Turkish referendum, this opposition is 
binary due to the nature of the referendum: people could either vote to endorse a Neo-
Ottoman ideology (evet) or to sustain the competency of the parliamentary system 
(hayır), and one excludes the other (as in 𝐴 ⟶ ¬𝐵). This opposition is projected onto 
hayır in the form of a complex indexical history which reflects – refracts – the 
sociocultural contrast. Similar projections can be found in lexical appropriations in the 
context of cultural theft and/or degradation of a marginalised group (see chapter 2.2). 
African Americans, Hispanics, ‘slum dwellers’ in Brazil, tongzhis in Hong Kong – 
these are all marginalised groups in their respective surroundings, and the 
(re)appropriation of their semiotic resources by the major society or other stakeholders 
refracts a cultural contrast of two or more clashing ideologies. As was shown in chapter 
2.2, appropriation can either amplify a cultural opposition, for instance by performing 
whiteness at the expense of African Americans/Hispanics; or water it down, as in the 
case of repackaging ‘slum dweller’ in Brazil; or utilise it for the sake of unification 
and protection, as in the case of LGBT-communities appropriating tongzhi in their 
fight for equal rights. All these strategies are inherently political in nature, if 
understood in a broad sense, as different stakeholders are involved in endorsing their, 
possibly competing, ideologies. In the fight over semiotic resources, their ideologies 
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become, in a way, manifest. To speak with Voloshinov (1986 [1929], p. 33), they 
become ideologemes. 
  
The saliency of such existing cultural contrasts seems to influence the aptness of an 
appropriated item to acquire new indexical value. Peirce (1932 [c. 1897], p. 172) 
famously argued that ‘nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign’. Following 
this assertion, for an index to be interpreted as such, it needs to be part of a wider 
shared repertoire. Hence, racialised or sexualised cultural dividing lines seem to be 
prone to indexical meaning-making because of their socio-political saliency – hardly 
anyone has no opinion on these matters. But several cultural contrasts can facilitate 
enregisterment, as evidenced in the case of hayır: in the second indexical order, secular 
endeavours under Atatürk made hayır indexical of the religious as opposed to what 
many Turks have perceived as the Western part of society. In the third indexical order, 
political control over the media and the internet politicised that very index, which 
became indicative of a political distinction between Kemalists and Neo-Ottomans that 
surfaced in post-1980 Turkey. In the fourth order, in the 2017 referendum, hayır was 
enregistered due to a stark socio-political contrast that emerged from this distinction. 
As already hinted at in chapter 2.3.4, there have been endeavours in the past to add the 
same fourth-order indexical meaning, but they all failed. In the 2010 referendum, the 
agenda was the revision of 30 amendments of the constitution prepared by a military 
junta and the minimisation of the effect of the military on the parliamentary system. 
Voting evet was the democratic choice – however, it was a democratic choice in the 
eyes of the EU more than it was for the Turkish opposition parties. For the EU, 
weakening the influence of the military meant complying with EU constitutional 
standards, which is an important step towards EU membership. However, as seen in 
chapter 2.3.4, the CHP promoted hayır despite being pro-EU because they felt that 
weakening the influence of the military would lead to a renewed political instability. 
The political opposition was not in agreement how to handle this issue. In 2017, on 
the other hand, people cast their votes on the change in the legislative system and the 
structure of the parliament. Voting evet meant fuelling an authoritative regime, and 
making the democratic choice was clearly expressed with hayır. The ideological Neo-
Ottoman baggage hayır had acquired previously to the referendum then opened the 
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door for this front to engage in a ‘language game’ (Wittgenstein, 2013 [1953]), the one 
we described in the fourth indexical order. A unified political opposition was more 
receptive to indexical meaning making because they shared the common goal of 
protecting the democratic state. The potential loss of democratic rights, paired with the 
impossibility of taking a “real” political stance due to censorship and oppression, 
enabled the sign vehicle hayır to acquire new indexical meaning denoting political 
opposition. It became part of the repertoire of a wider audience, and because of this it 
became so powerful. 
2.5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have applied the theory of indexicality and indexical orders to account 
for the meaning change of hayır in the context of the 2017 referendum in Turkey. In 
the first indexical order, hayır as an Arabic loanword means both ‘no’ and ‘good’ and 
is thus homonymic in nature. ‘Good’ acquired new indexical meaning by being linked 
to religious practices, and eventually became associated with the AKP as the sole 
representative of the political Islam that builds upon Neo-Ottoman interpretations of 
the religious practices. In the course of the 2017 referendum, the grassroots movement 
contested these ideologies by playfully engaging with the first, second and third-order 
meaning of hayır. By employing homonymous ‘no’, a first-order meaning which had 
been sidelined in the previous indexical orders, the grassroots of the no-side, who 
advocated that the new constitution will yield a country that betrays its founding 
principles among which the secularism is the key, have introduced a fourth-order 
indexicality that diametrically opposes the second and third-order indexical meanings. 
  
We have argued that this meaning-making is a systematic process. We distinguished 
in our analysis between the trajectory of the meaning change, which we claim is set by 
its indexical properties, and the amount of thrust behind it, which we claim is set by 
the socio-political surroundings projected onto the appropriated item in question. This 
forestalls shortcomings often attributed to semiotic accounts within sociolinguistics. 
Silverstein, for instance, has been criticised on the grounds that his theory of 
indexicality focuses too much on the linguistic sign, without bothering too much with 
how e.g. indexical orders are socially constructed (Blommaert, 2007; Joseph, 2013, p. 
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3). In this paper, we have tried to persuade readers that we get the most out of our 
analyses if we take both sides into account. We have shown that studying how 
language is used sheds important light on the linguistic sign. This is why Silverstein 
(1976) introduced the concept of indexicality in the first place (see chapter 2.1): 
indexicality, itself the result of sociolinguistic behaviour that extends beyond 
utterances in situ, is an individual sign mode, which can only be accounted for by 
analysing how the sign is used. The different indexical orders of hayır came into being 
for socio-political and historical reasons, and when analysed in detail, they reveal how 
speakers have always affected the semantic content of the word over the last 
millennium. As such, sociolinguistic agency is part and parcel of the linguistic sign. 
Shedding light on individual properties of the linguistic sign (i.e., the sign vehicle, the 
object, and indexicality), in turn, brings ‘theorized order’ (Silverstein, 2003, p. 194) 
into how speakers engage in semiotic meaning making. Only by digging up the 
indexical past of a word invoked in a meaning change are we able to grasp the whole 
picture. Our analysis of hayır shows that accounts focusing on the motivations of the 
speakers alone fall short of the mechanics at work. 
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CHAPTER 3: LANGUAGE IN AND OUT OF SOCIETY: 
CONVERGING CRITIQUES OF THE LABOVIAN 
PARADIGM18 
Lately, sociolinguistics has undergone a theoretical reorientation which has been 
discussed from various viewpoints (Coupland, 2016c), all of which advocate for a 
‘need to reinterpret language (including dialect) variation in terms of social semiotic 
processes’ (Coupland, 2016a, p. 437). This reorientation is grounded in a fundamental 
critique of classical variationism in the Labovian tradition (Labov, 1972b, 2006 
[1966]).  
 
There appear to be two levels of critique of the orthodox Labovian paradigm, here to 
be understood as the work undertaken until approximately the turn of the millennium. 
On the one hand, so-called third-wave variationism (Eckert, 2012) criticises Labov’s 
(2006 [1966]) relatively static use of sociological macro-categories and style by 
addressing the way individuals alter their phonemic repertoire in locally situated 
communities of practice (Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 1998; Moore, 2004; Podesva, 
2007; Zhang, 2005, 2008). In this line of thought, sound change, which Labov and 
Labovians have always taken as the chief phenomenon they aim to explain, has been 
treated as a given, and it has been argued that individuals can take up a change to 
determine the trajectory or advancement of this change (Eckert, 1988, pp. 197-198; 
2008, p. 454; 2016, p. 78; Eckert & Labov, 2017, p. 467).  
 
The relative autonomy of linguistic processes, however, has been challenged with 
recourse to what Silverstein (1985) theorises as the ‘total linguistic fact’. Grounded in 
the framework of indexicality (Silverstein, 1976), it challenges the idea that language 
change can be taken as a given (e.g. Silverstein, 2016, p. 63) and seeks explanations 
                                                        
18 The following chapter appeared in print as Woschitz, J. (2019). Language in and out of society: 
Converging critiques of the Labovian paradigm. Language & Communication, 64, 53-67. 
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for it in the semiotic performance of speakers, aligning, for instance, their phonetic 
realisations with indexical functionality.  
 
These two strands of criticism, represented by Eckert and Silverstein, have started to 
converge in recent scholarship, and this, I argue, is part of an ontological reorientation 
of variationist sociolinguistics, by which I mean that key entities posited to exist 
according to the theory (language, society, etc.) have fundamentally changed. Put 
differently, it would be oversimplifying nowadays to speak of “one kind of Labovian 
variationism”, because these criticisms have resonated with Labov’s own later work 
as well. To show this, I will first outline the ontological groundings of orthodox 
Labovian sociolinguistics. I will then outline how these have been challenged. Finally, 
I shall discuss how the two poles of criticism fall at different hurdles, and will discuss 
important issues that deserve more attention, should one wish to resolve issues arising 
from this. 
3.1. The ontological groundings of orthodox Labovian sociolinguistics 
Perhaps one of the most long-standing contentious points in linguistics addresses the 
question how exactly language and society are related. Much ink has been spilled over 
it, and linguists have attributed differing importance to the social components of 
language, particularly in the discussion over sound change. The Neogrammarians, for 
instance, were eager to conceive of linguistics as a natural science, and by positing 
their famous exceptionless sound laws, they limited considerably the influence of the 
social sphere on what they conceived of as linguistic structure. Saussure’s (1857-1913) 
student, Antoine Meillet (1866-1936), held against this notion when he famously 
proclaimed that a language is a social fact. In his line of thought, changes in the 
linguistic structure can only be explained with recourse to changes in the social 
structure (see Labov, 2001, pp. 22-23). Meillet’s student, André Martinet (1908-1999), 
was more ambivalent. Though acknowledging that we have to consider ‘language-
external’ factors (to him, influences from other languages or dialects), Martinet (1952, 
p. 28) claimed that the importance of ‘non-linguistic’ (read: social) factors may ‘well 
have been grossly exaggerated by our predecessors’, and that linguists do best in 
exploring the functional economy of phonological systems. 
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When Labov entered the academic scene in the 1960s, his own work built on a long-
standing quarrel. His impetus on the scholarly conception of language, much of which 
he himself has credited to his mentor Uriel Weinreich (1926-1967), has addressed the 
social-asocial debate mentioned above (Labov, 1972b, pp. 264-265). Labov has 
criticised among other things Bloomfield’s (1933) and Hockett’s (1958) assumption 
that sound change is too slow to be observed, and that ‘non-linguistic’ data should be 
categorically excluded from linguistic analysis (Labov, 1963, pp. 291-292; Murray, 
1998, p. 166). As to the first point, Labov (1994, pp. 43-109) has shown that, with the 
help of meticulous apparent-time and real-time analyses, one can depict how vowels 
raise/fall//front or move to the back over generations. As to the latter point, Labov 
(2001, p. xv) has shown that these sound changes can only be understood with recourse 
to ‘the material substratum’ in which they are embedded: the speech community. This 
speech community, and this is probably the cradle of modern sociolinguistics (for a 
more historically accurate account, see Joseph, 2002, chapter 5), is not a uniform, 
homogeneous set of speakers but an ‘orderly heterogeneous’ collective (Weinreich et 
al., 1968, p. 100), in which different realisations of ‘saying the same thing’ (e.g. 
[sʌmθɪŋ] vs. [sʌmθɪn] with velar vs. apical nasal) can be located along social 
boundaries (e.g. higher vs. lower social class). The concept of a speech community 
thus unites linguistic structure with social aspects of language use, and as such it 
discards the whole social-asocial distinction. Hence the importance of the famous 
(2006 [1966]) New York City English study, in which Labov has unprecedentedly 
generalised that we can find sociolinguistic variation within language varieties that is 
not explainable by mere idiolectal differences or free variation but by large-scale social 
mechanisms that underlie each and every community. 
 
Thus, Labov’s achievement was to show empirically that a language is inherently 
social because we cannot make full sense of it when abstracted from the social context 
in which it is practiced. This reaffirms Saussure’s conception of a language as a social 
fact19, and much like Saussure, Labov has argued that we can only make sense of 
changes at the level of whole languages (the Saussurean langue) by systematically 
                                                        
19 But see Labov (1972b, pp. 185-186) for how he criticizes Saussure on the basis of his conception of 
‘the social’. 
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including in our analyses the study of parole, that is, how people use language in their 
everyday lives (Figueroa, 1994, p. 71). The study of parole, in Labov’s work, is 
methodologically constrained to sociological macro-categories (if he discusses 
individuals like Nathan B., as in Labov, 2006 [1966], they are treated as tokens of a 
social type), in his own studies most often but not exclusively social class and gender. 
It is these patterns at the level of the speech community that are interesting to him, and 
he conceives of them as Durkheimian social facts (Figueroa, 1994, p. 72), i.e. as social 
patterns that emerge from the collective beyond individual manifestations: 
 
[A social fact is] every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the 
individual an external constraint; or again, every way of acting which is general 
throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its own right 
independent of its individual manifestations. (Durkheim, 1938 [1895], p. 13) 
 
This sociological tradition is inscribed in Labov’s (2006 [1966], p. 5; 2016, p. 598) 
central dogma of sociolinguistics: 
 
Language as conceived in this book is an abstract pattern, exterior to the individual. 
In fact, it can be argued that the individual does not exist as a linguistic entity. [...T]he 
individuals we study are conceived of as the product of their social histories and social 
memberships. (Labov, 2006 [1966], p. 5, the quoted passage was written in 2006) 
 
Labov has been criticised on the grounds that his recourse to social memberships (e.g. 
social class or gender) as predictors for linguistic variation and change is 
overdeterministic and unreflecting (e.g. Ash, 2004; Coupland, 2016a, p. 436; Woolard, 
1985). Indeed, his work seems to provide little account of how individuals are 
socialised into the bigger social patterns in question (Figueroa, 1994, p. 88). But this 
might follow from the fact that Labov adheres to a Weberian sociological theory rather 
than a Marxist one (see Ash, 2004, p. 403). Weber saw social class as a neutral 
organising principle, and it is he who coined the term ‘social stratification’; while 
Marx’s goal was to uncover class structures in order to overcome them (ibid.). Labov’s 
socio-political impetus lies elsewhere, particularly in his defence of African American 
Vernacular English as an autonomous, non-deficient variety of English (Labov, 1972a; 
see also Pullum, 1999), which has been nearer and dearer to him than the unjust 
inheritance of social status or educational mobility. Social class and gender, in fact, 
are mere stand-ins to him for social processes at work. Labov’s (2006 [1966]) finding 
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that change below the level of conscious awareness (‘change from below’, to be 
discussed in the following paragraphs) coincides with the lower middle and upper 
working class does not indicate a mechanism of social class itself. It is the social 
centrality that is relevant, and sometimes it maps onto stratifications of social class, 
but which social organising principle it maps onto is ultimately a matter of cultural 
contingency (Labov, 2001, p. 188; 2006 [1966], pp. 203-208). Likewise, with regard 
to gender, it is the community-specific ways in which gender is performed, for instance 
how women in Western societies have engaged in social networks differently from 
men, that are responsible for the often-found leading position of women in 
phonological change (Labov, 2001, chapters 8 & 10). A critique that is merely geared 
towards the use of social macro-categories, therefore, misses the important point that 
the adherence to sociological terms (social class, gender, etc.) does not preclude the 
importance of interactional components that might be decisive on how these larger 
patterns come into being. In fact, it is even acknowledged in the founding manifesto 
of variationism that the ‘actuation problem’ and the ‘embedding problem’, i.e. how a 
change comes into being and how it is embedded in linguistic and social relations, can 
only be addressed by taking these components into account (Weinreich et al., 1968, 
pp. 183-187). 
  
The issue that underlies current theoretical debates within sociolinguistics goes deeper 
and should not only address the methodological implementation of sociological 
methodologies but also the ontological presuppositions in which they are implemented 
(see e.g. Coupland, 2016c). Figueroa (1994, p. 144) argues that what has separated 
variationist work from other sociolinguistic endeavours in this regard is its ontological 
commitment that allows for a clearly distinguishable social and linguistic side. This is 
self-evident in Labov’s trilogy on principles of linguistic change (1994, 2001, 2010), 
where he devotes different volumes to internal and social factors, and not for didactic 
reasons: 
 
When the analyses are carried out, it appears that the two sets of factors - internal and 
external - are effectively independent of each other. [...] These basic sociolinguistic 
findings provide the methodological rationale for the way the material in volumes 1 
and 2 is divided and for the separate discussion of internal and external factors. 
(Labov, 1994, p. 3) 
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Internal factors are, for instance, principles that underlie chain shifting and cut across 
various languages, such as the raising of long vowels, the lowering of short vowels, 
the lowering of diphthongal nuclei and the fronting of back vowels (ibid., p. 122). 
Labov’s contribution to the long-standing dispute within historical phonology over 
finding a common denominator in sound changes of the past is an elaboration of 
Stockwell’s (1966) suggestion to subdivide the phonological space into a peripheral 
and a non-peripheral area. This then allows for the simple generalisation that, in chain 
shifts, ‘peripheral vowels become less open and nonperipheral vowels become more 
open’ (Labov, 1994, p. 601). Combined with other principles that describe regularities 
in diphthongisation (the Upper and Mid Exit Principle, ibid.), this principle accounts 
for a range of ongoing changes (e.g. the Northern Cities Chain Shift) and changes in 
the past (e.g. the Great Vowel Shift). Importantly, these principles are governed by 
Neogrammarian regularity: they operate beyond lexical constraints, show gradual and 
not discrete movement, and are subject to phonetic conditioning (ibid., pp. 455-471). 
 
How does the speech community come into play? After all, one important dictum of 
the Neogrammarians was that the social sphere beyond dialect borrowing or analogy 
has only little influence on language change, a vision they did not share with 
dialectologists, who looked for explanations for sound change in the lexical diffusion 
of words (Labov, 1994, chapter 17). Part of the answer lies in Labov’s own narrow 
conception of the speech community itself, whose members are ‘united by a uniform 
evaluation of linguistic features, yet diversified by increasing stratification in objective 
performance’ (Labov, 1972b, p. 117; see also Labov, 2001, chapter 6). Even though 
casually formulated, an important ontological statement looms in this definition. Given 
that most sound changes happen below the level of conscious awareness (Labov, 1994, 
p. 471), there is nothing there for the speech community to comment on for the most 
part. If the speech community is nonetheless ‘diversified by increasing stratification 
in objective performance’, it is in large part due to phonological changes surfacing in 
different phonetic realisations along social boundaries such as age or gender. Younger 
people and women, for instance, have been found to make more use of novel linguistic 
forms compared to their elder and male counterparts (see e.g. Labov, 2006 [1966], pp. 
197, 208) – even if they are not conscious of it. As shall be laid out by the end of this 
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chapter, this is one of the reasons why they are treated as the social correlate of 
linguistic factors. More specifically, the speech community is downgraded to a passive 
recipient of Neogrammarian change, which is treated as a distinct ontological reality 
guided by ‘language-internal factors’. 
 
The distinction along the lines of availability to social evaluation is taken up in Labov 
perceiving a ‘narrow interface between language and society’: 
 
For the most part, linguistic structure and social structure are isolated domains, which 
do not bear upon each other. [...] The force of social evaluation, positive or negative, 
is generally brought to bear only upon superficial aspects of language: the lexicon and 
phonetics. (Labov, 2001, p. 28) 
 
Social evaluation, in the majority of all cases, is operationalised as conscious, overt 
commentary which is restricted to surface forms – though it might be unconscious and 
unavailable for productive manipulation as well (see the below passage on style-
shifting). Regardless, Labov distinguishes between changes from ‘above’ and ‘below’ 
the level of conscious awareness.20 While change from above can be rather easily 
explained because it describes e.g. overt prescriptions of correct speech from the ruling 
classes, change from below has remained rather opaque and undertheorised (e.g. 
Labov, 1972b, pp. 178-181; Labov, 2006 [1966], pp. 203-209). In Labov (1994, p. 
542), change from below is a stand-in for regular sound change which is governed by 
Neogrammarian regularity (see above). It is 
  
the result of gradual transformation of a single phonetic feature of a phoneme in a 
continuous phonetic space. It is characteristic of the initial stages of a change that 
develops within a linguistic system, without lexical or grammatical conditioning or 
any degree of social awareness ("change from below"). (ibid.) 
 
Change from above, in turn, is a stand-in for erratic lexical diffusion. It is 
  
the result of the abrupt substitution of one phoneme for another in words that contain 
that phoneme. The older and newer forms of the word will usually differ by several 
phonetic features. This process is most characteristic of the late stages of an internal 
change that has been differentiated by lexical and grammatical conditioning, or has 
                                                        
20 Change from below was never meant to indicate ‘change from lower classes’, and, in retrospective, 
Labov (2006 [1966], p. 203) admits that it probably would have made more sense to call them change 
from ‘within’ and ‘without’ the linguistic system of a speech community (see also Labov, 2007, p. 346). 
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developed a high degree of social awareness or of borrowing from other systems 
("change from above"). (ibid.) 
 
The described mechanism, then, is simple. At some point in time, a new linguistic 
feature (e.g. the raising of a vowel) emerges within a speech community. In most cases, 
the change follows regular trajectories (e.g. peripheral vowels raise, while non-
peripheral vowels lower) and is conditioned by language-internal factors (e.g. raising 
is preferred when followed by a nasal and dispreferred when followed by a liquid). It 
then spreads across the speech community until, towards the completion of a change, 
it can become subject to social commentary. If this happens, speakers can consciously 
adjust their own speech behaviour according to the social evaluation, but they do so 
only superficially and fragmentarily (Labov, 2001, chapter 6). 
  
Curiously, however, even the embedding and actuation of changes from below pattern 
along social dimensions. This becomes apparent in a), the vast evidence of style-
shifting, and b), the general social patterning of changes from below. As to a), Labov 
(2006 [1966]) has distinguished between various stylistic settings, ranging from casual 
speech, the most informal style, to reading out word lists, a more formal style. 
Depending on the type of change involved, the phonetic pronunciation of phonological 
targets can change according to the stylistic context. In changes from above, for 
instance, prestigious variants are tendentially preferred in more formal contexts (e.g. 
in formal interviews), whereas stigmatised variants are tendentially restricted to 
informal contexts. In changes from below, speakers have been often found to use more 
novel forms in informal contexts (see e.g. Labov, 2006 [1966], p. 197). This supports 
Labov’s view that the vernacular, or “morning side speech”, has primacy over socially 
corrected speech. More importantly for this argument, however, it suggests that 
speakers are sensitive to social evaluation even when they are not aware of their own 
changing pronunciation – otherwise they would use novel forms in formal and 
informal contexts alike. As to b), it has been empirically shown that changes from 
below originate in central social groups (e.g. lower middle class or upper working 
class) and in lower class neighbourhoods, and that upwardly-mobile women 
overwhelmingly lead in the use of novel linguistic forms (Labov, 2001, chapters 5, 7-
8). 
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Both bullets pose the interesting question how linguistic phenomena which are not 
available to the conscious experience of speakers interact with the social domain. This 
problem Labov inherited from Saussure himself, who struggled with similar issues 
concerning the unconscious and social behaviour without ever resolving them (see 
Joseph, 2000). Labov’s take seems to be to posit so-called language-internal processes 
following their own rules and mechanics, which are then embedded into and carried 
forward by a social structure (a speech community). This relative unidirectionality is 
an empirical matter, but more and more research (to be discussed in the following 
chapters) points towards this not necessarily being a one-way road. It is here where 
Labov’s narrow interface between language and society becomes problematic. 
  
In more detail, Labov (2001, pp. 29-33) investigates the embedding of language-
internal processes by studying the social characteristics of leaders of linguistic change. 
These have been portrayed as follows: 
 
we find that they are women who have achieved a respected social and economic 
position in the local networks. As adolescents, they aligned themselves with the social 
groups and symbols that resisted adult authority, particularly when it was perceived 
as unfairly or unjustly administered, without deviating from their upwardly mobile 
path within the local social structure. (ibid., p. 409) 
 
However, Labov remains faithful to his own logic in admitting that these 
characteristics cannot explain their linguistic choices of which they themselves are 
unconscious, for instance small changes on the F2 domain (ibid.). These are better 
explained by their non-conforming behaviour in language socialisation. Labov (ibid., 
p. 437) argues that children acquire early in their childhood the formal/informal 
distinction of linguistic variation (which can subsequently lead to social stratification, 
for instance when working class speech is considered ‘impure’). New linguistic 
changes are by definition informal because they do not match the linguistic status-quo. 
By analogy, they are then ‘unconsciously associated with non-conformity to 
sociolinguistic norms, and advanced most by youth who resist conformity to adult 
institutional practices’ (ibid.). Since it has been empirically shown that females 
conform less to sociolinguistic norms that are not prescribed than men (ibid., p. 293), 
and that children acquire their vernacular from their female caretakers (ibid., chapter 
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9), this nonconforming behaviour can account for generational linguistic change from 
below without recourse to any conscious agency. 
  
It is by this means that Labov aims to uphold the linguistic/social distinction. 
Unconscious continuation of a sound change is the ‘material substratum’ (ibid., p. xv) 
of how ‘internal’ factors operate. This allows Labov to distinguish between what could 
be called a social patterning of linguistic factors, and other social factors, which, when 
narrowly construed as changes from above, hinge on the conscious awareness of a 
linguistic feature. It is this distinction that lets orthodox Labovianism avert the danger 
of conflating the linguistic/social distinction into one. And it is this distinction that has 
recently been called into question, and which the remainder of this paper shall address.  
3.2. The (non-)conformity of third-wave variationism 
Following this train of thought, Labov’s orthodox language/society distinction hinges 
on the limits of awareness (on which see Silverstein, 2001). Sociolinguistic agency, if 
one wants to remain faithful to the distinction, seems to be separated into two domains: 
Unintentional agency is restricted to changes from below and remains socially 
‘meaningless’ on account of the speech community not being able to overtly comment 
on it. Intentional agency is relevant when it comes to describing changes from above, 
for instance the overt prescription of correct speech or the social commentary on 
changes that near completion, which are also described with recourse to social facts. 
In the famous department store study, for instance, Labov (2006 [1966], chapters 3 
and 12) showed that, in more formal styles, the second highest status group 
hypercorrects its r-usage because of its linguistic insecurity. Since this pattern is 
empirically generalisable for various speech communities, he postulated 
hypercorrection as a social fact that is indicative of whether a change from above or 
stable variation is observed (Labov, 1972b, chapter 5; 2006 [1966], p. 167). 
  
From a ‘social action’ perspective (Coupland, 1998, p. 114), resorting to such patterns 
takes for granted how ‘the social’ is performed linguistically in everyday life.  Labov 
(2006 [1966]) was not interested in how New York City citizens attribute social 
meaning to rhotic forms in everyday life. Yet, there is a lot of insight to be gained from 
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how social meaning is constituted in day-to-day interaction. This is why some of 
Labov’s former students, with Penelope Eckert leading the way, have started to add 
such interactional components to the variationist framework. Eckert’s (2012) wave-
model puts forward the idea that some sociolinguists (e.g. Campbell-Kibler, 2007; 
Podesva, 2007; Sharma, 2011; Zhang, 2005, 2008) have turned away from social facts 
in their analyses in favour of a systematic analysis of how speakers take up and 
attribute new meaning to linguistic features. They do so by expressing their identity 
through voicing of characterological figures/personae. For instance, Zhang (2005) has 
shown that professionals in Beijing use full tone variants and less local features to 
voice a yuppie (young urban professional) persona. Sharma (2011) has shown that 
British Asians make systematic use of retroflex /t/ to voice in-group affiliations to 
ethnic communities. Podesva (2007) has shown that one gay man uses falsetto to voice 
the persona of a ‘flamboyant diva’ in order to express his homosexual identity. 
  
These studies shed light on how social meaning is attributed to linguistic variables in 
day-to-day sociolinguistic interaction. The underlying idea is that sociolinguistic 
variables (e.g. full tone variants in Beijing Mandarin or [ʈ] in British Asian English) 
can have a range of possible meanings (they spread out an 'indexical field', Eckert, 
2008). Specific meanings are activated contextually (see e.g. Levon, 2016) in locally 
situated communities of practice (Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 1998), and can 
subsequently spread to a broader level of the speech community (e.g. Agha, 2003, p. 
259). As such, third-wave approaches can add explanatory depth to orthodox Labovian 
variationism because they provide a means to explore how sociolinguistic variables 
are the outcome of agentive semiotic practice. Crucially, however, it is not assumed 
that speakers are consciously aware of their own socially-meaningful agency (see e.g. 
Eckert, 2016, pp. 77-79; Eckert & Labov, 2017, p. 470; Zimman, 2017, p. 366, 
footnote 1). Whether this challenges Labov’s ontological commitment to a clearly 
distinguishable social and linguistic side is not so clear. Eckert herself has been 
ambivalent in sorting out the ontological implications of her own school of thought. 
Notice, for example, her 2008 account of this matter: 
 
To seek explanations for chain shifts in the day-to-day construction of meaning would 
certainly be futile and ridiculous. But to ignore what people do with the elements of 
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these chain shifts to construct social meaning is to turn a blind eye to an aspect of 
human competence that is at least as mind-blowing as the ability to maintain distance 
between one’s vowels. (Eckert, 2008, p. 454) 
 
Here, it is clear that she clings onto Labov’s ontological distinction: We have to take 
both language and society into account to see the whole picture but, fundamentally, 
they are different things. She even reaffirms it in stating that it would not only be 
unwarranted to seek explanations for ‘language internal’ processes like chain shifts in 
the construction of social meaning, it is also ‘futile and ridiculous’. Compare this 
statement to her 201221 account: 
 
Whereas the first two waves viewed the meaning of variation as incidental fallout from 
social space, the third wave views it as an essential feature of language. Variation 
constitutes a social semiotic system capable of expressing the full range of a 
community’s social concerns. [...] The third wave locates ideology in language itself, 
in the construction of meaning, with potentially important consequences for linguistic 
theory more generally. (Eckert, 2012, pp. 94, 98) 
 
Something has happened here: When she says that the meaning of variation has 
become ‘an essential feature of language’, then by implication it follows that the 
relatively rigid dichotomy between the social patterning of linguistic factors and other 
social factors, as found in orthodox Labovian variationism, is watered down 
considerably. Because if it is indeed assumed that social meaningfulness operates on 
both planes, independent from conscious awareness, the ‘socially-
meaningless/socially-meaningful’ distinction underlying Labov’s ‘change from 
below/change from above’ dichotomy (which finally underlies his ‘language/society’ 
distinction) no longer stands. 
 
What might be the insinuated ‘consequences for linguistic theory more generally’? 
The answer seems to depend on the importance of variation and how it is intertwined 
with language change. Labov distinguishes between stable variation and variation 
indicative of change. The former describes, for example, the use of stops or affricates 
for English /θ/ or /ð/. In many English-speaking speech communities, apical stops for 
                                                        
21 Her 2012 paper, I have been told by an anonymous reviewer, circulated widely in North America in 
unpublished form for many years, hence it is more or less contemporary with the 2008 paper – which 
makes the occurring ambivalence even more interesting.  
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fricatives connote stigmatised working-class speech, and it has done so ever since the 
beginning of the 20th century (Labov, 2001, p. 90). Nothing has changed in this regard, 
and it has had no influence on language change whatsoever. In Labov’s (ibid., pp. 83-
85) view, stable variation therefore takes an intermediary position between language 
and society. It is part of the community grammar, but its role in the language faculty 
(Labov’s own words) is negligible. If, however, variation leads to change (or is 
indicative thereof), this is no longer the case since it is commonly held that sound 
change affects the phonology of a language (e.g. Eckert & Labov, 2017). 
 
Crucially, there is nothing in the above quote to suggest that Eckert restricts herself to 
stable variation. Nothing stops us from extrapolating the importance of meaning in 
variation to sound change in general. Put differently, this allows for the opportunity 
that even changes from below can be socially meaningful in one way or another. Thus, 
when she, at least by implication, advocates for the construction of meaning to be an 
important part of sound change (and thus language), she cries for a more sophisticated 
analysis of the social mechanisms behind changes from below, which are rather 
undertheorised in orthodox studies. Her assumption that social meaningfulness 
operates independently from conscious awareness seems to challenge heavily Labov’s 
orthodox language/society distinction that rests on the power of social evaluation alone 
(see preceding chapter). If even changes from below can be socially meaningful, 
shouldn’t one redraw the line between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors; ‘language’ and 
‘society’? The insinuated consequences for ‘linguistic theory more generally’ might 
then be that Eckert is perhaps no longer convinced that we can uphold Labov’s belief 
in a narrow interface between language and society after all. If so, this seems like an 
ontological breach of Labovian variationism, and even though Eckert speaks of 
‘loosely-ordered waves’ on her webpage22, it is dubious to imply any continuity 
between two approaches that seem to be separated by an ontological chasm this 
fundamental. 
 
Her critique becomes evident in the discussion of the female lead in sound changes 
(Eckert, 1989b, 2011). Gender, she argues, is complex social practice, and as such it 
                                                        
22 https://web.stanford.edu/~eckert/thirdwave.html, last accessed on 23 February 2018. 
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needs to be teased apart if we want to understand women’s leading position in changes 
from above and below. In her (1989b) paper, she argues that women are not able to 
acquire material capital as easily as men do, and therefore need to rely on symbolic 
capital – among other things their speech. Eckert concludes that ‘If women are more 
constrained to display their personal and social qualities and memberships, we would 
expect these expressions to show up in their use of phonological variables’ (ibid., p. 
257). Labov (2001, pp. 275-276) has refuted similar claims on the grounds that, in this 
logic, we would expect less economic power to correlate with more conformity. In the 
Philadelphia Neighborhood Study, for instance, change from above originates in the 
lower middle class, with women in leading position. However, Labov could not find a 
higher differentiation of economic power between men and women here than in any 
other social class. In fact, many women have shown higher job mobility than men 
(ibid., p. 276). The power differential of the sexes is therefore not pivotal in explaining 
why it is particularly the second-highest status group that leads. As to change from 
below, in order for personal and social qualities to be reflected in women’s use of 
phonological variables, this would require a superior sociolinguistic sensitivity to the 
social evaluation of language compared to men. As was outlined in the previous 
chapter, this is not an assumption Labov finds defensible, as in changes from below, 
speakers (men and women) are not consciously aware of their own altering 
pronunciation (ibid., p. 291). 
 
To offer a way out of this dilemma, Eckert (2010, 2011) turns to sound symbolism (on 
which see also Silverstein, 1994). The idea of sound symbolism is at least as old as 
Plato’s Cratylus (ca. 370 B.C.), in which Hermogenes adopts the position that is now 
known as a conventionalist: a name gains it meaning by pure convention. Socrates gets 
Hermogenes to agree that if a sentence can be false, the words within a sentence can 
likewise be false. Turning to Cratylus who maintains the naturalness of words, 
Socrates gets him to agree that the origin (and correctness) of a word depends on 
whether it correctly represents the essence of the thing denoted. Greek rho, for 
example, might stand for movement because of its trill, and we could thus decipher 
parts of the sense of Greek ‘Phronesis’ (wisdom) with recourse to the ability to 
perceive motion and flux. Similarly, Greek iota might stand for the delicate, and Greek 
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lambda for the smoothing. Phonetic targets, in this understanding, have meaning in 
which ‘sound as sign becomes independently endowed with apparently denotationally 
relevant value qua signifier’ (Silverstein, 1994, p. 42, italics in original). Eckert (2010) 
takes up this idea when she reconceives of social categories which have traditionally 
been studied under variationism (e.g. gender) as affective categories. For instance, she 
finds that two preadolescent girls in Detroit use fronted nuclei in /ay/ (e.g. might) and 
/o/ (e.g. posh) to portray childlike innocence, while more backed variants are reserved 
for adolescent topics (ibid., p. 76). 
  
Females, according to Eckert (2011), make more use of the range of affective sound 
symbolism than boys. This has to do with how adolescents are socialised into what she 
calls a ‘heterosexual market’: 
 
[T]he girls in the crowd become increasingly flamboyant, engaging enthusiastically in 
the technology of beauty and personality and in constant drama in the continual 
making and breaking of friendships and couples. It is in the context of this heightened 
social activity that heightened styles come into play, involving new ways of moving, 
dressing, interacting, and talking. (ibid., p. 91) 
 
Adolescent girls become more licensed than boys to be flamboyant (ibid., p. 87). 
Flamboyancy, by definition, is taking a norm and pushing it to the limits of the sphere 
of what is considered normal. The same mechanism applies to the phonetic realisation 
of phonological targets: The grade of fronting of backing are deviations of the 
sociolinguistic norm, and, by analogy, they establish a symbolic link to flamboyancy. 
Eckert perceives this to be intertwined with ongoing sound change, coinciding with 
heightened prosody (ibid., p. 91).  
 
Labov (2001, chapter 15) has hypothesised that change from below begins with 
outliers, phonetic realisations which skew the distribution of a vowel along the 
internally-set trajectory of the change. Since, in Labov’s view, children acquire their 
vernacular from their female caretakers (see preceding chapter), they perceive their 
caretaker’s outliers as the regular norm and consequently centre their own production-




Figure 7: Fronting of a vowel, where the new F2 mean of the dashed distribution is centred at the 
leftward outlier of the old (bold) distribution.  
 
As already outlined above, for Labov, this process can be accounted for with recourse 
to non-conformist behaviour in language socialisation. For Eckert (2011), the 
underlying mechanism guiding continuation of a change is ‘social engineering’.23 To 
count as an adolescent girl in the heterosexual market demands the ability to show 
dominance by making and breaking friendships or following the latest beauty trends 
(ibid., pp. 91, 95). All of this requires elaborated styles, of which advanced vowel 
quality plays an important part. For instance, when reporting on a quarrel with a peer, 
one of her interview participant’s use of quotative ‘go’ is further advanced in the /ow/ 
fronting, an ongoing change in the California Vowel Shift, compared to other /ow/ 
tokens (ibid., p. 94). 
  
Affect and social life, therefore, are vital in Eckert’s account of the female lead. Her 
findings emphasise that speakers meaningfully perform their agency even in what 
Labov has conceptualised as ‘change from below’, that is, even if they are not 
consciously aware of it (see Eckert, 2016, pp. 77-79). After all, the interviewees in 
Eckert’s studies add emphasis and share their affects for pragmatic purposes. 
                                                        
23 It is not clear whether social engineering is a subtype of non-conformist behaviour as theorised by 
Labov. Both seem to have to do with affective performativity, but their exact relationship needs to be 
spelt out. 
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3.3. An ontological reorientation in Labov’s own work? 
In a way, Eckert’s and similar claims have resonated with Labov’s more recent work, 
in which he acknowledges that 
 
driving forces which may be responsible for the continuation, acceleration or 
completion of change […] involve the association of social attributes with the more 
advanced forms of a change in progress: local identity, membership in communities 
of practice, social class, age or gender. (Labov, 2010, p. 368) 
 
At the same time, he acknowledges the possibility of cultural driving forces to explain 
large-scale phenomena like the Northern Cities Shift: 
 
Though the NCS remains below the level of social awareness, it is possible that its 
speakers have (if unconsciously) come to associate this sound shift, over the past few 
generations, with the political and cultural outlook inherited from the Yankee settlers. 
Those associations have evolved over time with various social and demographic 
changes, and especially with the realignment of the two major parties in the 1960s. As 
long as these ideological differences persist, speakers may be more likely to align their 
productions towards those around them who share their own identity and world-view. 
(Labov, 2010, p. 235)  
  
This could and should be read as a cesura, an ontological reorientation, that marks a 
departure from the orthodox Labovian framework outlined above. For one, the 
autonomy of linguistic processes is weakened considerably when he acknowledges 
that even change from below can be meaningful in a broader sense. Social attributes 
can be associated with changes in progress regardless of conscious awareness and 
overt social commentary (Kristiansen, 2015 and Preston, 2018 are cases in point) – the 
decisive factors behind the orthodox language/society distinction (see preceding 
chapters). Therefore, changes from below cannot be accounted for by unconscious 
continuation of internal factors on account of analogous links between novel forms 
and non-conformity alone. Labov acknowledges this very subtly: in his later work, the 
nonconformity principle, which Labov (2001) proposes as the mechanism to describe 
how internal factors operate across vast geographical areas (see also preceding 
chapters), is treated as one possible mechanism among many (see Labov, 2010, chapter 
9). Put differently, this means that it would be oversimplifying to posit a rigid social 
patterning of linguistic factors where the speech community is the ‘material 
substratum’ of language-internal mechanisms, as is done in the orthodox framework. 
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But neither Eckert nor Labov seem to follow through with this ontological 
reorientation. In Eckert and Labov (2017), they fall at the same hurdle Eckert is trying 
to overcome. They argue, very much inspired by Labov’s earlier work, that since the 
attribution of social meaningfulness is located at a low level of abstraction, i.e. 
allophones rather than specific sounds, it cannot reach the linguistic deep structure 
(ibid., p. 481). They illustrate this in the discussion of near-mergers and chain shifts. 
Near-mergers are a phenomenon first outlined by Labov et al. (1972), which describes 
how speakers might be able to produce a phonetic distinction without being able to 
perceive it, or vice versa. This is seen as ‘the clearest case of the divergence between 
social meaning and linguistic structure. When we try to direct speakers’ attention to 
the difference, they cannot find it’ (Eckert & Labov, 2017, p. 486). This passage, of 
course, ignores Eckert’s (e.g. 2016) own claim that social meaningfulness is a complex 
phenomenon that extends beyond conscious awareness. Instead, it redraws the line 
between linguistic structure and social meaningfulness along availability to social 
commentary – faithful to the orthodox framework. Similarly, in chain shifts, it is 
possible that two adjacent targets are imbued with social meaning, but more complex 
chains ‘do not seem to be objects of social perception’ (Eckert & Labov, 2017, p. 489). 
If parts of the chain shift are imbued with social meaning, it is most likely to be parallel 
shifts, for instance the backing of short and mid vowels in the Northern Cities Chain 
Shift (ibid., p. 490). It is here where the authors allow for the opportunity of sound 
symbolism: ‘[S]ome parallel shifts may be a generalisation of a phonetic gesture that 
in itself has some potential meaning‘ (ibid., pp. 490-491), but this can never account 
for the whole phonological reorganisation in chain shifts. The unaware speech 
community is once again treated as a passive receptor – ‘the material substratum’ – of 
an independent linguistic change. 
3.4. Towards the total linguistic fact 
Admittedly, phenomena like chain shifts or near mergers are tricky to account for, and 
resorting to language-internal factors to explain these phenomena, as is done in Eckert 
and Labov (2017), seems like a safe haven for everyone who is not willing to concur 
with a major paradigm shift in the study of language. After all, this leaves the door 
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open for a certain automaticity of linguistic processes, as evidenced by Labov (2001, 
p. 499), who metaphorically equates sound change with seafaring: 
 
To the extent that general linguistic principles apply, they form the favorable 
undercurrent, or perhaps prevailing wind, for changes now in progress. Given enough 
social motivation or contrary linguistic pressures, retrograde movements can be set in 
motion, just as a boat may tack into the wind. When all other conditions on change are 
balanced or neutralized, structural principles might in themselves be a sufficient basis 
for continuation. This seems particularly true for the expansion of mergers, where 
social pressures and social consciousness are minimal. 
 
But not every linguist has gone down the road of such a language-centred approach. 
Hymes’s (1964b) Language in Culture and Society, for instance, prefers the study of 
the community over the study of linguistic codes, and thereby argues that linguistic 
investigation has to be part of a broader anthropological endeavour (Murray, 1998, p. 
106). Granted, the title of the edited volume seems to suggest that language and culture 
and society can be easily divided, and indeed, many authors in the anthology adhere 
to pre-1960s views in anthropology that maintain a relatively strict distinction between 
language and society.24 But language, according to Hymes, can be distinguished as a 
phenomenon for the sake of academic interests only ‘so long as one remembers that 
on a theoretical plane the situation is different’ (Hymes, 1964a, pp. xxvi-xxvii). 
  
Of all sharp critics of a clearly distinguishable linguistic and social side, it was 
probably Malinowski at the frontline who rejected a belief in language-internal factors: 
 
Can we treat language as an independent subject of study? Is there a legitimate science 
of words alone, of phonetics, grammar, and lexicography? Or must all study of 
speaking lead to sociological investigation, to the treatment of linguistics as a branch 
of the general science of culture? [...] The distinction between language and speech, 
still supported by such writers as Bühler and Gardiner, but dating back to de Saussure 
and Wegener, will have to be dropped. (Malinowski, 1964 [1937], p. 63) 
 
Ralph Pieris, for one, carried forward Malinowski’s (1923) notion of phatic 
communion when he argues that language mirrors the situational demands of a given 
society (Murray, 1998, p. 54). However, many linguistic anthropologists have been 
rather doubtful of such a strong claim. Goodenough (1964 [1951], p. 188), for instance, 
argued that we should rather study language and society separately, and only once we 
                                                        
24 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this observation. 
 68 
have understood both well enough, we should bring them together. Boas (1964 [1911], 
p. 17) saw in language ‘a means to a clearer understanding of ethnological phenomena 
which in themselves have nothing to do with linguistic problems.’ Others were more 
interested in social phenomena that cut across language, such as Levi-Strauss’s (1964 
[1963]) kinship systems. Thus, the theoretical consensus within linguistic 
anthropology has been fragmentary at best. What is shared in the different approaches, 
at the very least, is their scruples about a narrow interface between language and 
society by either placing emphasis on a broader culture-language interface, as in the 
case of Goodenough and Levi-Strauss; or by reducing ‘[a]ll forms of linguistic 
expression […] to a common psychological ground’ (Sapir & Swadesh, 1964 [1946], 
p. 101), the path sought by Sapir. 
  
The adherence to a narrow or broader interface between language and society has been 
captured by Dell Hymes in his theoretical assessment of sociolinguistics. He 
subdivided the field into three different types based on their treatment of language and 
society: 
 
(1) the social as well as the linguistic: addressing social issues which have a language 
component 
(2) socially realistic linguistics: basing linguistic investigation on real-society data 
(3) socially constituted linguistics: affirming that language is inherently social and 
society is inherently linguistic. (Hymes, 1974, p. 195, emphasis in original) 
 
The first type captures endeavours within sociology of language which address 
socially relevant topics, concerning, for instance, the different language status in 
diglossic communities (Ferguson, 1972 [1959]). How language and society are related 
is treated as a subordinate matter because it is not deemed directly relevant for the 
issues in question. The second type is the label Labov (1972b, p. xvi) himself used 
when describing his own work – after all he has claimed from the outset that we need 
to include ‘non-linguistic’ data in our accounts of linguistic phenomena. As already 
established in the preceding chapters, orthodox Labovianism perceives a narrow 
interface between language and society, in which the ‘social structure’ is limited to 
social evaluation (e.g. Labov, 2001, p. 28). The third and last type describes the 
rejection of an ontological dichotomy of language and society, or at least it allows for 
a dialectical relationship between the two. In the recent volume Sociolinguistics: 
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Theoretical Debates edited by Coupland (2016c), the general tenor is that this 
conception underlies contemporary social-semiotic research which reconceives 
language as a pool of semiotic resources speakers are constantly engaging with 
(Coupland, 2016a, p. 437). Such a reconception is a means to tackle the ‘structure-
agency duality’ (Bell, 2016, pp. 399-401): we can study social variation for what it 
reveals about the linguistic structure (langue), the path sought by Labov, but we need 
a systematic theory of parole that goes beyond stand-in social facts like social class or 
gender (see chapter 3.1) if we want to conceive of language as something that speakers 
‘do’. 
 
Bell (2016) and Johnstone (2016) have argued in the same volume that Hymes’ 
distinction is not a mere description of the status quo of sociolinguistics, but that it 
actually captures the path along which sociolinguistic metatheory has progressed. 
According to Johnstone (2016), more and more sociolinguistic studies have begun to 
theorise language as social and ideological practice; they have thus come closer to 
what Hymes classified as socially constituted linguistics. Bell (2016) adds that this has 
gone hand in hand with analysing the agency of speakers: style and indexicality have 
become pivotal in sociolinguistic analyses. 
 
The theory of indexicality goes back to Silverstein (1976) and is grounded in a Peircian 
understanding of the linguistic sign. For Peirce (1932 [c. 1897-1910]), the sign is 
triadic and consists of a sign vehicle, an object and an interpretant. The sign vehicle is 
what ‘does the signifying’. It relates to an object, the thing being signified. This 
relationship creates a new sign, the interpretant, which again can function as a sign 
vehicle, and so on.25 This process Peirce calls ‘semiosis’. To give an example, a 
molehill (the sign vehicle) signifies a mole (the object), and this relationship 
                                                        
25 In fact, Peirce changed his position as to the interpretant. Given that he was a logician, he was 
interested, among other things, in the nature of knowledge, not so much in linguistic problems as 
Saussure. In his earlier accounts, Peirce allowed for infinite semiosis: if an interpretant can function as 
a new sign vehicle that again engages in semiosis, this suggests that ‘an infinite chain of signs precedes 
any given sign’ (Atkin, 2013). He dismissed this position in his later work, in which he began to see his 
sign theory ‘as part of the logic of scientific discovery’ (ibid.). Infinite semiosis gives way to a 
teleological understanding, where ‘at the idealized end of inquiry we have a complete understanding of 
some object’ (ibid.).   
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establishes an interpretant by virtue of which we are able to infer the presence of a 
mole when we see a molehill. 
  
 
Figure 8: The triadic linguistic sign as theorised by Peirce 
 
Silverstein’s (1976) theory of indexicality is concerned with the relationship between 
the sign vehicle and the object. Sign vehicles, in accordance with Peirce (1932 [c. 
1897-1910], pp. 136, 143-144), do not necessarily have one single fixed symbolic, 
indexical or iconic meaning, but can actually signify various things: The word car, for 
instance, can symbolically denote a transport vehicle. The pronunciation of the word, 
however, can index additional information about the speaker that does not necessarily 
add to the original referential meaning. A rhotic pronunciation in New York City might 
signify upper class speakers (Labov, 2006 [1966]). In this case, we could speak of a 
symbol and a ‘non-referential index’ (Silverstein, 1976, pp. 30-33) at the same time. 
 
The way in which rhoticism indexes certain members of social categories is not 
congruent with a molehill indexing a mole. For Peirce (1932 [c. 1897], pp. 168-169), 
‘[t]he index is physically connected with its object; they make an organic pair, but the 
interpreting mind has nothing to do with this connection’. This does not seem to hold 
for a sociolinguistic variable indexing social categories. By physical connection only, 
pre-consonantal and word-final /r/ would index certain speakers much like a dialectal 
feature might index speakers from a specific region. It is only with recourse to a 
social/cultural construal that we add the characteristic of class to the index. This 
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cultural construal, according to Silverstein (2003), is inherent in indexical semiosis, 
i.e. the production of new indices. That is, indexicality is always subject to ideological 
(‘ethno-metapragmatic’) modification, by which route a physical index can be 
transformed into a higher-order index. Rhoticism in New York City English might 
have started out as an index of certain speakers; it then was brought into second-order 
play by generalising the social class of the speakers; and it could again be brought into 
third-order play if decision makers decided that the standard language taught at schools 
should resemble the language spoken by posh speakers. Silverstein (ibid., p. 193) 
claims that, by means of such indexical orders, we can ‘relate the micro-social to the 
macro-social frames of analysis of any sociolinguistic phenomenon’, because they 
allow us to trace how, for instance, standard registers are the outcome of ordered 
indexical semiosis. Agha (2003) has elaborated on this with regard to the 
enregisterment of British Received Pronunciation (RP). He takes RP as the end-result 
of typifying speech with subsequent role-alignment with ‘exemplary speakers’ (ibid., 
p. 265). In the early 20th century, for instance, graduates of elite public schools were 
taken to be such exemplary speakers (ibid.). In the 1930s, RP connoted for the public 
the language spoken by British Army Officers (ibid., pp. 265-266). Later, in the 1970s, 
BBC announcers had a similar function (ibid., p. 266), and the public aligned their 
own speech behaviour with them. Typifying speech, then, is rather flexible: with 
changing conceptions of educated social class, exemplary speakers have changed. In 
all cases, however, a certain type of speech spoken by a professional group was 
brought into second-order play by generalising social class traits which were deemed 
desirable by speakers. 
 
Arguably, then, we cannot fully account for structural entities like RP without 
analysing its inherent social components and how they are continuously enregistered 
in social practice – otherwise it would be hard to explain how such structural entities 
have come into being and how they are changed continuously. Accordingly, 
Silverstein (2003) argues that an exhaustive theory of language ought to be able to 
depict the dialectical character of language in which microsocial (interactional speech 
at the level of parole) and macrosocial aspects (phenomena at the level of langue, for 
instance RP) of linguistic practice are constantly mediated by ideology. Silverstein 
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(1985, p. 220) sees in this ‘[t]he total linguistic fact, the datum for a science of 
language’, which comprises pragmatic, structural and ideological aspects. 
  
The latter two Silverstein discusses with regard to the Modern English gender system. 
From a structural point of view, the possessive in a sentence like ‘A passenger must 
have dropped his scarf’ (ibid., p. 228, my emphasis) expresses the semantic property 
of a human referent. Crucially, the generic use of the masculine includes (used to 
include?) the possibility of both female and male referents. When feminist activists 
have argued that asymmetric gender markedness resembles sexism in everyday life 
too much, the structure-ideology intersection becomes evident. Speakers have taken a 
formal semantic property literally and, in numerous languages, have started to employ 
either gender-neutral terms (e.g. ‘they’) or the generic feminine ‘she’ in their fight for 
equality. This is grounded in the ideology that language ‘both is and ought to be a 
truthful reference-guide to “reality”’ (ibid., p. 251, emphasis in original). This kind of 
language ‘correction’ has gained considerable momentum because, at the same time, 
the usage or non-usage of gender-neutral pronouns became indexical of whether 
someone supports the feminist movement or not (ibid., pp. 251-253). As to the 
pragmatics-part of the total linguistic fact, many languages have indexical systems 
pointing to some kind of social reality regardless of the actual discourse content. 
Koasati, for instance, marks the gender of the speaker to signal who does the speaking 
and who is spoken to (ibid., pp. 232-234). In other languages, such indexes do not 
mark gender solely, as in Thai, where the choice of gendered participant pronominals 
(‘I’, ‘You’) patterns analogously to social status, ‘such that female speaking to male is 
as lower status speaking to higher status’ (ibid., p. 238). Thus, the pronoun usage 
corresponds to a large-scale social differential. 
  
In summary, thus, the total linguistic fact acknowledges that pragmatic aspects of 
language are part of the linguistic structure. As such, the social sphere is inherent to 
language. The linguistic structure itself is subject to constant ideological modification, 
guided, as in the case of the Modern English gender system, by a literal interpretation 
of the structural pronoun system. This creates a new linguistic structure which again 
determines the ‘use-value’ of its possible modification (ibid., p. 256). 
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Hall-Lew (2013) has recently applied the total linguistic fact in her study of variation 
in the Sunset District in San Francisco. She has shown that San Franciscans present 
with a LOT-THOUGHT merger, initiated by the lowering and fronting of THOUGHT which 
is carried forward predominantly by Chinese Americans. Initially, Hall-Lew argues, 
raised THOUGHT was an unmarked means for San Franciscans to identify themselves 
with the East Coast. With the general spread of the low-back merger across the 
Western US, lowered THOUGHT became the regional norm. Raised THOUGHT, in turn, 
became a marked feature to distinguish San Franciscans from the broader Californian 
norm. When, from the 1990s onwards, ethnic Asians became the new population 
majority in the neighbourhood she studied, younger people began to see San Francisco 
as an integral part of the rest of California. As a consequence, raised THOUGHT lost its 
indexical meaning of localness, at least for the younger generation. This is a good 
example for the structure-ideology intersection outlined in the previous paragraphs: 
Racial tensions in the 1970s and 80s over local authenticity led to a reindexicalisation 
of a linguistic feature. Chinese Americans have carried forward the low-back merger, 
thereby aligning themselves with the broader Californian norm, while European 
Americans have resisted it because, for them, merge indexes a localness deviant from 
the original East Coast oriented norm. Hall-Lew (2017) discusses a similar 
reindexicalisation in her analysis of apparent-time style-shifting of /ow/ fronting 
during this critical period. Like the LOT-THOUGHT merger, /ow/ fronting is an ongoing 
change in the California Vowel Shift (see preceding chapter). In Hall-Lew’s sample, 
one Chinese American participant born in 1970 uses significantly backer /ow/-nuclei 
when reading word lists out loud, which, in the Labovian sociolinguistic interview, is 
among the most formal styles (Labov, 2006 [1966], chapter 4). On the other hand, one 
Chinese American participant born in 1983 shows the opposite pattern, where 
significantly more fronted nuclei are produced in formal contexts. In the classical 
Labovian paradigm, such style shifting in formal contexts is indicative of correction 
from above (Labov, 1972b, p. 180). Hall-Lew retheorises it, following Silverstein 
(2003, p. 218), with recourse to ‘register demand’: As the underlying standard 
changed, so did the vowel realisations in formal contexts. In the 1970s, at the peak of 
transition between a White and Asian population majority, Asians did not formally 
participate in /ow/ fronting because it was not for them to utilise local norms yet. As 
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Chinese Americans gradually acquired local legitimacy, they were licensed to utilise 
what was once the local norm and carried it forward. With changing social 
surroundings, thus, the stylistic use-value of /ow/ fronting among Chinese Americans 
seems to have changed.    
3.5. The limits of awareness 
Much as Eckert has shown that unaware speech can be socially meaningful, Hall-Lew 
makes a strong case for reconceiving ‘automatic convergence’, another important 
aspect of Labovian change from below, as a social process that extends Labov’s (2001) 
account of nonconformity in language socialisation. In the case of the Sunset District 
in San Francisco, it was the reindexicalisation of vowels as an index of ethnicity that 
renegotiated what counts as the local norm, and speakers, both European and Asian 
Americans, reacted to it in adjusting their own speech behaviour. Whether they do so 
consciously or unconsciously is a concern Hall-Lew raises but leaves open. What is 
important is who is constrained to use a certain variant at a certain point of time; 
whether consciously or unconsciously is a subordinate matter. 
 
If we look outside the realm of phonology and sound change, we find many linguistic 
phenomena unconscious in nature where no one advocates for ‘language-internal’ 
explanations. Wasco-Wishram Chinookan in Columbia River, for instance, expresses 
graduation forms (augmentive ® neutral ® diminutive) by alternating consonants and 
sometimes vowels (Silverstein, 2001, p. 389). Augmentive forms are used in mocking 
and insulting speech, while diminutive forms are used in baby talk (ibid.). When the 
speakers’ attention is drawn to what they have said, they are able to report the 
referential content, for instance that they have just insulted someone, but they are not 
consciously aware of how they achieved this with the help of consonant and vowel 
alternation. Silverstein argues that this is because native speakers do not have access 
to what Whorf (1964 [circa 1936]) called ‘cryptotypes’, only to ‘phenotypes’ on the 
surface (Silverstein, 2001, pp. 399-400). For Whorf, grammatical systems like 
graduation or gender can pattern along covert ‘rapport-systems’. Speakers’ awareness 
of such a system has ‘an intuitive quality; we say that it is sensed rather than 
comprehended’ (Whorf, 1964 [circa 1936], p. 131). For instance, much as speakers 
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‘sense’ the grammatical gender of an unknown object, they ‘sense’ the range of words 
to which the un- prefix can be added in English to produce derivatives such as 
‘unrelenting’ or ‘unbelievable’ (ibid., pp. 132-133). English-speakers also ‘sense’ that 
words with sl- onsets denote something slippery (slide, sludge, slut; see Darian, 1979, 
p. 50). 
  
For Whorf, the task of linguists is to investigate rapport systems for what they reveal 
about thought and cultures (Whorf, 1964 [circa 1936], p. 133). Silverstein (2001, pp. 
400-401) extrapolates this modus operandi to the whole dimension of language when 
he urges us not to restrict social aspects of language use to metapragmatic awareness 
of certain linguistic features. According to Silverstein (2001, p. 401), the limits of 
metapragmatic awareness are ‘definable, constrained, and semiotically-based’. How 
exactly they are definable, he leaves open. The important thing to notice is that even 
speech of which speakers are not consciously aware is not agentively unconstrained. 
Silverstein locates here the programme for social anthropology that, at least by 
implication, heavily challenges the ontological groundings of the orthodox Labovian 
paradigm: 
   
This, I want to lay before you, is the program for social anthropology, to understand 
the properties of ideologies and ethnotheories, that seem to guide participants in social 
systems, as part and parcel of those social systems, which must be seen as meaningful. 
(ibid., emphasis in original) 
 
Which conclusions can we draw from this? For one, speech (aware and unaware alike) 
is guided by meaningful ideologies. This has been hammered home by Eckert and 
Hall-Lew when they argue that the sound changes they have studied can only be 
understood with recourse to the social systems in which they are embedded: in Eckert’s 
case, socialisation of preadolescents into the heterosexual market; in Hall-Lew’s case, 
racial debates of local authenticity. If we reconceive of linguistic variables as semiotic 
means to meaningfully engage with such social surroundings, both the ‘change from 
above/below’ and ‘social/linguistic’ dichotomies are on shaky ground, particularly 
because the latter hinges on the former. That is to say, just because we sometimes 
cannot account for speech behaviour with recourse to conscious agency, we are not 
forced to commit ourselves to the orthodox belief that speech is embedded in linguistic 
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processes that are ontologically distinct from social mechanisms. Granted, this notion 
is rather programmatic at this stage, but much recent critique of the Labovian paradigm 
seems to be grounded in a similar notion (see Coupland, 2016c). Variationists have 
only recently begun to challenge their own commitment to an ontologically distinct 
linguistic and social side in favour of analysing ‘the properties of ideologies and 
ethnotheories, that seem to guide participants in social systems’ (Silverstein, 2001, p. 
401). 
  
Silverstein has driven this point home when he argues that variation ought to be 
reconceived of as 
 
a movement of a sociological structure of repertoires of enregisterment – with or 
without explicitly standardized ones – distributed over a language community, always 
changing but always immanent in the variance of parole in which people perform their 
context-relevant identities via indexical semiosis. This will finally realize a dialectical 
and simultaneously socio- and historical linguistics conceptually adequate to succeed 
the would-be mechanism of “mindless” – really, unminded – Neogrammarian additive 
phonological change. (Silverstein, 2016, p. 63) 
 
In this quote, Silverstein suggests than one should seek explanations for phonological 
change in ‘repertoires of enregisterment’ that are always subject to indexical semiosis. 
In such a view, indexical functionality is inherent to what has been traditionally 
classified as language-internal processes (ibid., p. 60). But one might ask: Where 
exactly are the ‘context-relevant identities’ performed in [-son] ® [-voi] | _#, a 
phonological rule that is responsible for final obstruent devoicing in Russian, so that 
we get ‘occasion’: nom.sg. /ras/, but gen.sg. /raza/? It is hard to see how such a rule is 
a formal abstraction of ‘people performing their context-relevant identities via 
indexical semiosis’, and the implications of claiming this would be grave. It is 
commonly held that phonological change targets the grammar of a language or variety. 
In the case of Labov’s (2006 [1966]) department story study, for instance, indexical 
semiosis that attributes social prestige to rhoticism introduces a new phonological rule 
to the grammar: /Æ/ ® [r] | _C, _#. But it seems like a strong claim to make that all 
phonological rules are the outcome of similar semiosis. For when one argues that every 
additive phonological change is explainable with recourse to indexical agency, by 
implication it follows that phonological grammar is a purely social product. This 
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would seem like a strong claim many linguists are not willing to accept. Still, 
Silverstein raises the reasonable concern that even phonological phenomena like final 
obstruent devoicing might have a social-indexical origin that has been papered over 
by phonologists. After all, in one way or another, one needs to account for why Old 
Dutch developed final obstruent devoicing considerably sooner than other West 
Germanic languages. If not for language-internal reasons, why else? At this point, it 
seems, the only reasonable answer proposed to this question is what it cannot be: an 
ontologically different entity exterior but connected to society – an ‘unminded 
Neogrammarian additive phonological change’. In fact, such a radical view is not new 
at all: one could trace it at least to the 19th century. This may come as a surprise to 
many readers, but Jakob Grimm did not formulate what is now anachronistically 
known as Grimm’s law as a rigorous law, he spoke of mere tendencies. What is more 
important is that he saw in these sound changes ‘an early assertion of independence on 
the part of the ancestors of the German peoples’ (Robins, 1997, p. 200) – a meaningful 
act of national identity that was later rebranded as a prime example for Neogrammarian 
change. 
 
As we have seen in the discussion of third-wave variationism, and to a certain extent 
in Labov’s own work, many sociolinguists are still coming to grips with whether they 
want to share such a view. That social meaning has become an important part of sound 
change (both above and below the level of consciousness) is something many 
sociolinguists probably agree on nowadays. What is still contentious, however, is 
where to draw the boundary between the social and the linguistic, and which one has 
primacy. The Northern Cities Chain Shift, for instance, was initiated by the 
unconditional raising of /æ/, which Labov (2010, pp. 113-118) traces back to a dialect 
convergence in the course of settlement processes in Western New York in the first 
half of the 19th century. The Canadian Shift and Pittsburgh Shift were both triggered 
by the low back merger (Labov, 2010, chapter 5). In the former case, the emergence 
of a koine is a social process and the resulting phonology essentially a ‘linguistic by-
product’ which compensates for the initiated changes. In the latter cases, language-
internal processes have primacy: indexical functionality might be attributed to the 
phonological compensation of the triggering event, but the triggering event itself 
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remains linguistic. In one case, ‘the social’ triggers ‘the linguistic’, in the other case 
‘the linguistic’ triggers ‘the social’. From this follows that the language/society 
distinction is no longer considered a one-way road, where a speech community can 
‘take up’ a change in progress to attribute social meaning to it. ‘Language-internal’ 
factors, instead, are restricted to adjustments to ‘a disequilibrium created by a 
triggering event’ (Labov, 2010, pp. 369-370) – regardless if ‘social’ or ‘linguistic’ in 
origin. Language change, in such a view, is ‘a long-range readjustment of the system 
to the effects of an original population disturbance – migration or invasion’ (ibid., p. 
370) – a sort of homecoming to Martinet’s catastrophism. 
3.6. Conclusion 
I have shown that orthodox Labovian variationism is grounded in a ‘narrow interface 
between language and society’, in which ‘the force of social evaluation’ is confronted 
with an ontologically distinct Neogrammarian automaticity. Social agency, however, 
extends beyond overt social commentary and is operationalised twofold: either as the 
ability of the speech community to consciously initiate a change (‘change from above’ 
which is subject to overt social commentary), or the speech community’s unconscious 
continuation of a change already existent in the linguistic structure (‘change from 
below’). Crucially, even changes from below pattern along social lines. Labov makes 
do with this with recourse to unconscious nonconforming language socialisation. 
Paired with his conviction that children acquire their vernacular from their female 
caretakers, this allows him to account for generational sound change from below by 
operationalising the speech community as ‘the material substratum’ of an internal 
change. Neogrammarian change, in such a view, is embedded into and carried forward 
by the ‘social structure’. This leaves him in an ambiguous position: on the one hand, 
he wants to uphold the autonomy of linguistic processes, on the other hand he 
acknowledges that these can only be explained with recourse to social processes. 
 
Relatively young strands of variationism have recently raised awareness of the 
complexity of this socialisation. Eckert’s (2010, 2011) studies exchange social macro-
categories for affective categories, which calls into question that changes from below 
are socially ‘meaningless’ (in the orthodox paradigm, on account of the speech 
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community’s inability to overtly comment on it). Hall-Lew has added to this that 
automatic continuation of a sound change, another flagship of orthodox Labovian 
change from below, can be accounted for with social-semiotic processes that surpass 
Labov’s (2001, p. 516) nonconformity principle. Taken together, these studies 
operationalise social meaningfulness beyond the ‘unconscious/conscious’ dichotomy 
that underlies the ‘narrow interface between language and society’ in the orthodox 
Labovian framework. As a consequence, it has become increasingly difficult to draw 
a sharp line between social and linguistic aspects of language. Sociolinguists, 
including Labov in his later work, seem to have turned away from perceiving a narrow 
interface between language and society in virtue of a broader one. 
 
Such a broader interface between language and society has been taken up by 
Silverstein’s ‘total linguistic fact’, which has recently been applied in the study of 
variation and change. It seeks to reconceive of language as inherently pragmatic, 
ideological and structural. Admittedly, however, it raises at least as many issues as it 
manages to get rid of, and, as I have exemplified with third-wave variationism and 
Labov’s own later work, sociolinguists are still coming to grips with the consequences 
that go hand in hand with reconceiving language in such a way. Some of the remaining 
questions include: 
  
1. Where does social meaningfulness end and ‘pure’ language-internal factors begin? 
2. Is social meaningfulness parasitic on language change or the other way around? Or 
both? 
3. If social meaningfulness extends beyond consciousness, why is availability to overt 
commentary still a factor in maintaining the language/society distinction in Eckert and 
Labov (2017)?  
 
Finally, what does it buy us to give up the neatness of a Neogrammarian regularity, 
grounded in linguistic structure alone, in favour of messy social-semiotic processes? 
Perhaps the obvious answer – that it buys us an escape from the illusion of regularity 
that our idealistic approach imposes, at least in part, on the reality of a complex 
diversity – is unsatisfactory, and even Labov (2001, p. 504) eventually acknowledges 
that ‘[a] certain linkage between social dimensions and linguistic traits is established 
as the result of an arbitrary and accidental concentration in history.’ 
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In any case, what I aimed to show is that the moment Labov’s notion of ‘internal 
factors’ is conceived of as a stand-in for socially meaningful processes, we witness an 
ontological reorientation within sociolinguistics that has important consequences for 
the field. All claims of continuity between so-called first-wave and third-wave 
variationist approaches paper over the fact that was has separated the two is not a mere 





CHAPTER 4: SCIENTIFIC REALISM AND 
LINGUISTICS: TWO STORIES OF SCIENTIFIC 
PROGRESS26 
Discussions about scientific progress have, for a long time, been focussed exclusively 
on physics and chemistry, without making significant inroads into other scientific 
disciplines. This is despite the fact that philosophers of science such as Carl Gustav 
Hempel (1965b, p. 171) or Ernest Nagel (1961, p. 583) have made it clear that, from a 
philosophical perspective, the distinction between so-called hard and soft sciences is 
arbitrary. The only difference seems to be that, in the hard sciences, metatheoretical 
concerns became part of mainstream literature quite early compared to the soft 
sciences, in which they remained part of a minority discourse. It seems that this has 
started to change recently, as discussions of scientific progress now tend to go beyond 
the realm of particles (e.g. Alexandrova, 2016; Kincaid, 2008), inviting all kinds of 
scientists to incorporate philosophical notions of reference continuity, explanatory 
value, or objectivity into their own theorising.  
 
Linguistics, it seems, has become part of the same trend. Nefdt (2016a, 2016b), for 
instance, has pondered continuity in generativism. He argues that even though we 
cannot infer ontological continuity from the history of generativism (minimalism has 
arguably little to do with the generativism of the 1960s), we can find continuity in its 
scientific modelling practice of idealisation. In the context of sociolinguistics, I have 
laid out how, in the past 50 years, the explanans of large-scale sound change has shifted 
from language internal factors to socially meaningful language behaviour that is 
logically prior to what Neogrammarians theorised as rigid ‘sound laws’ (Woschitz, 
2019).  
 
                                                        
26 A shortened version of the following chapter is currently under review with Philosophy of Science 
(Woschitz, under review). 
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The goal of this paper is to take these descriptions one step further and ask what they 
can tell us about progress in their respective fields. While Nefdt (2016a, 2016b, 2019) 
lays out modelling continuity in generativism quite convincingly, he is hesitant in 
passing judgement on the ontological breaches he discusses (which I describe in some 
detail in chapter 4.3 below).27 If we want to ponder scientific progress, however, we 
need something to measure these ontological breaches against; something by virtue of 
which we are then able to say: “Theory A is better than Theory B, and hence the 
ontological breach”, without ignoring the fact that what counts as better, truer or more 
real is, in part, theory-dependent (Kuhn, 1970 [1962]). In ways which will be laid out 
in the following two chapters, scientific realism has the potential to offer such a 
measure, but it comes with certain challenges. If these challenges are dealt with 
adequately, scientific realism can provide us with a theoretical toolkit that lets us 
argue, in the context of Nefdt (2016a, 2016b), that the dynamic turn in syntax did away 
with key assumptions of the traditional generativist framework because it was able to 
predict pronoun reference more successfully; or because treating the sentence as the 
pivotal studied subject was an unjustified restriction. In the context of Woschitz 
(2019), it enables us to state that sociolinguists have started problematising the 
autonomy of linguistics because they feel it is merely a heuristic stand-in for social 
processes at work.  
 
My aim is to show that these seemingly diverse reasons can be broken down to 
philosophical criteria on the basis of which one could construct a yardstick of scientific 
progress. I shall discuss two of these criteria, both brought up regularly by 
philosophers of science and scientists themselves, which by no means exhaust the list: 
explanatory power/value, where I shall draw on the philosophy of Hempel (1965a); 
and the avoidance of value-laden presumptions, where I shall draw on Nagel (1961) 
and on Alexandrova’s (2016) reading of Nagel. When assessed against these two 
criteria, I argue that a theory’s ‘relational objectivity’ (Nagel, 1961) becomes evident. 
The broad generalisation put forward is that if one theory has more relational 
                                                        
27 Nefdt adheres to a form of ontic structural realism in his discussion (on which see Ladyman, 2016). 
Ontic structural realism is a relatively benign form of realism that posits that we cannot be realist about 
the entities posited by our theories, only about the mathematical structure the posited entities are 
embedded in. 
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objectivity than another, it makes sense to say that the former supersedes the latter. 
Such an approach ideally allows us to reconcile historical relativism with a non-naïve 
form of realism. In practice, things tend to be more complicated than that, which is 
why, to make my case, I shall discuss two examples where scholars have gradually 
eliminated questionable value-laden presumptions by attributing increasingly less 
explanatory value to entities posited in their respective theory: Chomskyan syntax and 
Labov’s study of phonological change. In both cases, ontological reorientations in their 
work reveal much about their relational objectivity, and thus about progress within the 
field. 
4.1. A short history of scientific realism 
In a nutshell, scientific realists believe that the aim of science is to provide us with 
theories which, literally construed, can be accepted as true or approximately true (see 
e.g. Boyd, 2010). ‘True’ theories tell us something about how the world is structured, 
and how physical, chemical or other phenomena are subject to lawful behaviour that 
can be described with the help of scientific scrutiny. ‘True’ theories bring about a state 
of affairs in which students can, in good conscience, read a chemistry textbook and 
take the existence of molecules at face value. Our best theories point to the fact that 
our concept of molecules corresponds to mind-independent facts of the world, and the 
same holds for atoms in physics and chromosomes in biology.  
 
From this, it is only a small step to account for why some theories are preferred over 
others in the school syllabus: the preferred ones are taken to correspond better to mind-
independent facts than others. Newtonian mechanics, for instance, describes the falling 
of a stone with recourse to gravity, the physical force between any two objects with 
mass. Aristotle, on the other hand, held that a stone falls to the ground because it moves 
towards its natural place (Kuhn, 1970 [1962], p. 104). Fire behaves differently because 
of its natural place in the air. From today’s point of view, this is an approach that does 
not reach the standard of scientific scrutiny because we no longer believe in entities 
having such intrinsic properties by which they act (see, perhaps quite surprisingly, 
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Chomsky, 2006, p. 7, chapter 1).28 Similar examples from other fields are abundant. 
Before the Chemical Revolution in the 17th and 18th centuries, for instance, people 
believed that so-called phlogiston was released during combustion. When air was 
saturated with phlogiston, this impeded further combustion from happening. Chemists 
saw proof of this in the fact that candles are extinguished in an enclosed container – 
there is only so much phlogiston a finite amount of air can take. However, many 
inconsistencies arose with such a view. Metals, for instance, gain mass during 
combustion. This means that, under certain circumstances, phlogiston needed to have 
variable mass; sometimes negative, sometimes positive, dependent on the material in 
question (see e.g. Partington & Mckie, 1937). Lavoisier’s account of combustion as a 
chemical reaction with oxygen dispenses with such irregularities. In his theory, 
combustion requires a gas with mass (oxygen). Burning metals combine with oxygen, 
which explains the mass increase. Therefore, when one sends one’s child to school, 
they will learn about oxidation theory, not phlogiston.  
 
The crux of the matter is that, in the late 18th century, the general belief was that 
phlogiston was real – corresponded to mind-independent facts – much as today’s 
chemists believe in the actual reality of oxidation. Throughout ancient and medieval 
times, both in the West and the East, all material things, in line with Aristotle’s view, 
were believed to be a combination of the four elements water, earth, air and fire (see 
Joseph, 2018, pp. 49-50). What convinced people to give these theories up? What gives 
us the epistemic authority to deem these theories less trustworthy than our state-of-
the-art theories? To address this issue, scientific realists have begun scrutinising the 
characteristics in virtue of which some theories are better than others at explaining a 
given phenomenon. This is important if one wants to avoid conceiving of scientific 
realism as merely grounded in hindsight. While it is comparatively easy to point one’s 
finger at errors and misconceptions in the past, when faced with contemporary 
theories, things get more complicated. Hardly anyone deliberately makes fallacious 
                                                        
28 James McElvenny has pointed out to me that Newton’s treatment of gravity is in its own way 
mysterious because it posits gravity as an irreducible force that acts at a distance. That is a strong 
metaphysical statement that Newton himself has been criticised for in his day. Einstein’s general theory 
of relativity does away with this metaphysical baggage because it describes gravity not as a force but 
as a consequence of the curvature of spacetime. 
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assumptions, unless in highly controlled settings as is done in Quantum Mechanics to 
describe, for instance, wavefunction scarring (see Jansson, 2016).  
 
Psillos (2000, p. 706) has identified three assumptions most schools of scientific 
realism share in their assessment of theories: the metaphysical thesis, which holds that 
‘[t]he world has a definite and mind-independent structure’; the semantic thesis, which 
holds that ‘[s]cientific theories should be taken at face value’; and the epistemic thesis, 
which holds that entities posited by a theory really inhabit the world. Most discussions, 
it seems, are centred upon either metaphysical or semantic claims and often, these two 
are intertwined. If I, on a hike, pick up a stone and say, ‘this is a stone’, I a) imply that 
this stone constitutes a mind-independent fact (metaphysical), and b), that the word 
‘stone’ in English accurately refers to this fact (semantic). Or to put it in a more 
sophisticated way, in so doing I claim that a term we use denotes truthfully an entity 
that exists mind-independently. A possible caveat is that, intuitively, this only pertains 
to what analytic philosophers call ‘natural kinds’. Can the same logic apply when one 
talks about abstract terms such as love, society or language? Given that it is in the spirit 
of this paper not to jump the gun, I do not want to take social scientific explananda out 
of the equation too hastily. The Durkheimian term ‘social facts’ implies the mind-
independence of what it denotes, the key word being facts; or, to give another example, 
no linguists have expressed doubts that there is a mind-independent shift in 
pronunciation of millions of people in the United States (see e.g. Labov, 2007), even 
though it is a social product and has nothing to do with ‘natural laws’ in the strict 
physical sense. 
 
If we focus on the semantic thesis for the moment: as stated above, it holds that our 
scientific theories, including the terms within our theories, should be taken at face 
value; or, in philosophical jargon, that they refer to a mind-independent state of affairs 
either truthfully or not. What is the source of the link between the word and the 
referent; a jargon term and the entity existing mind-independently? Typically, this link 
is established via a truth-value, which, under the traditional semantic view, is fixed in 
a sentence (see Putnam, 1981, pp. 32-33): X is a stone is true if and only if x belongs 
to the set of stones. Such a view is problematic, however, because ‘truth-conditions of 
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whole sentences underdetermine reference’ (Putnam, 1981, p. 35, emphasis omitted). 
This was shown in Putnam’s (1981) famous permutation argument: we can switch the 
referents in the building blocks of a sentence while the truth value of the sentence 
remains the same, such that the truth values of the sentences the cat is on the mat and 
the cat* is on the mat* are equivalent, even though cat* picks out cherries and *mat 
picks out trees (while cat and mat pick out their usual referents as expected). Truth-
conditions of whole sentences, then, do not tell us anything about how reference 
works. But this is important, since one wants to take a word to truthfully (semantically) 
denote an actual mind-independent state of affairs – just as one wants whole statements 
of a scientific theory to do. 
 
Philosophers have long engaged in heated debates over this issue. Putnam’s 
permutation argument was a fatal argument against semantic descriptivism (on which 
see Michaelson & Reimer, 2019, section 2.1). Descriptivism is a view attributed to 
Frege and Russell which holds that speakers have, in their minds, a variety of 
descriptions such as ‘the man who is currently president of the USA’ and ‘the man 
who was born in June 1946’. When speakers hear the name Donald Trump, they 
associate it with these descriptions and are therefore able to pick out the correct 
referent. Meaning, in this view, resides in the head, while ‘referential success hinges 
on speakers attaching to each name in their repertoire some descriptive 
content F which uniquely singles out a specific object in the world’ (Michaelson & 
Reimer, 2019, section 2.1, italics in original). An alternative proposed in the 
Kripke/Putnam causal view of reference (e.g. Putnam, 1975) holds that meaning lies 
instead in the referent and is chained to it via causal baptism. That is, reference is fixed 
externally, and meaning depends on a correspondence to a class of objects which 
shares likeness with this referent. For instance, at some point, someone decided to call 
H2O water29 (even if that someone was not necessarily aware of its chemical formula), 
and from then on, people have used the term water to denote a class of objects which 
shares likeness with the referent (in this case, H2O).  
 
                                                        
29 Or perhaps something like *h₂ékʷeh₂ in the case of Proto-Indo-European, but these details tend to be 
overlooked by people who want to make a philosophical point. 
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Others, such as Quine (1968), have contested this view by arguing that reference 
cannot be fixed externally that easily. Put simply, what guarantees that when someone 
points at the ocean and says “Water!” that a non-English speaking witness does not 
think the person means the movement of the waves or the colour of the ocean? This is 
the famous gavagai problem. Quine’s point is that we cannot ontologically individuate 
an entity by ostension alone. We always need a background ‘coordinate system’ (p. 
200) to regress into, something the interlocutors share and with recourse to which they 
are able to disambiguate “Water!”. In a first instance, it is the language they share. In 
a second instance, it is the ontological system we acquire with language.30 Since, so 
the argument goes, different ontologies come with different languages, the best we can 
do is translate a term unknown to us with reference to our own ontology. Or put 
differently, ‘[a] question of the form “What is an F?” can be answered only by recourse 
to a further term: “An F is a G”. The answer makes only relative sense: sense relative 
to an uncritical acceptance of “G”’ (Quine, 1968, p. 204, italics in original). Such a 
view relativises ontology because reference becomes dependent on something that is 
not set in stone but acquired in our upbringing. Interlocutors are treated as translators 
between different world-views; and ontology, Quine argues by quoting Kant, becomes 
part of transcendental metaphysics. 
 
Quine’s postulate of a background coordinate system has often been rejected as too 
radical – it would heavily threaten the metaphysical thesis stated above – but it has had 
considerable impact on competing theories. Putnam’s (1982) internal realism, for 
instance, incorporates it by holding that there might be a mind-independent state of 
affairs (here he remains faithful to the metaphysical thesis), but that it is the scientific 
method that puts our thought in correspondence with it, not language, as Quine would 
have it (see Putnam, 1982, pp. 145, 162-163). With this change, a hardline approach 
to truth, in which a term can truthfully denote a mind-independent entity or not, gives 
way to a softened approach in which ‘rational acceptability’ (Putnam, 1981, p. 49) 
decides on the value of a theory. Quine’s critique has evidently rubbed off on Putnam, 
                                                        
30 Here, Quine seems to follow ideas commonly associated with the Sapir-Whorf-hypothesis, which, 
strictly speaking, is not one coherent theory but a collection of ideas that posit that our language at least 
inclines us to perceive a thing in a certain way (see Joseph, 2002, chapter 4). 
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along with many others, because correspondence between a jargon term and a mind-
independent state of affairs is no longer something that is solely determined externally, 
but something that scientists co-construct in their theorising. 
 
From this point of view, ‘progress’ could be conceived of as a process in which 
scientific theories incrementally get better at world-representation. But more often 
than not, theory changes go hand in hand with radical changes in world-representation, 
and the continuity one would expect under such a view is practically non-existent. In 
his famous The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn (1970 [1962]) argued that 
we cannot infer ontological continuity (and therefore ‘progress’ in a streamlined sense) 
from the history of physics or chemistry. To return to the water example above: 
according to Putnam, the term water has always picked out H2O, even when people 
had yet not found out about the chemical formula empirically. But in the 1750s, Kuhn 
(1990, pp. 310-312) convincingly argues, the referent of water picked out only liquid 
water. Only as late as in the 1780s did chemists begin to distinguish between states of 
aggregates (Kuhn, 1990, pp. 310-312). When people in the 1750s spoke of water, they 
denoted a subset of what water denotes today. What is more, before the Chemical 
Revolution, chemists distinguished between species more or less by ‘what are now 
called the states of aggregation’ (Kuhn, 1990, p. 311). Water was subsumed under 
other liquids on account of having the same aggregate, which is no longer the case. 
So, can we really say that water has always denoted H2O? Kuhn’s answer is no. While 
he acknowledges that Putnam’s logic might still pertain to natural kinds (water in the 
1750s still “kind of” picked out what it picks out nowadays), when analysing the 
historical development of terms like planet, star, force or weight, one can no longer 
speak of minor adjustments (Kuhn, 1957; 1990, p. 313). Aristotle’s definition of 
motion, for instance, is characterised by two endpoints (Kuhn, 1990, p. 299): if change 
of quality happens between two contraries, such as black and white, Aristotle would 
speak of motion (Rosen, 2012, p. 65). If change happens between endpoints that are 
‘neither contraries nor intermediates but rather contradictories’, such as white and not 
white, Aristotle would not classify that as motion (Rosen, 2012, p. 65). Are these 
criteria still relevant when Newton talks about motion? This time, Kuhn’s answer 
would be a definite no. This is why we are so often puzzled when we study superseded 
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paradigms: their categories are not the same as ours, and even the entities posited by 
the theory are not congruent with ours. 
 
Consequently, much as chemists nowadays think about water within different 
paradigms from those of pre-Chemical Revolution times, physics underwent a 
paradigm shift between Aristotle’s Physics and Newton, and again when Einstein 
jettisoned some key assumptions of Newton in his theory of relativity (and yet again 
with the emergence of Quantum Theory). These competing paradigms (our 
background languages in Quine’s terminology), Kuhn (1970 [1962], 1990) argues, are 
incommensurable, because they are not translatable into one another. In Kuhn’s view, 
Quine’s translator is therefore really a language learner (Kuhn, 1990, p. 300). When 
physics students nowadays study Aristotle, they have to acquire a whole lexicon of the 
categories Aristotle thought in. It is not enough for them to trace the putative 
development of motion, because he and Newton conceived of motion in such different 
terms. Even if two competing paradigms use the same term, there would never be an 
exact 1:1 correspondence, because with new lexicons, new referents are introduced 
(Kuhn, 1970 [1962], pp. 200-201). And, per Saussure’s principle of contrast, when 
new referents (or more precisely, signifieds) are introduced to the lexicon, the whole 
coordinate system changes (Joseph, 2012, pp. 597-600). 
4.2. Of superseding and superseded theories 
This short history of scientific realism shows us two important things for the following 
discussion of scientific progress. One is that many philosophers of science want to 
hold that correct theories correspond to mind-independent facts, as per the 
metaphysical thesis (also subsumed under 'the correspondence theory of truth', see 
Marian, 2016). However, there is no God’s-eye view, and we can only assess scientific 
claims about the world against the backdrop of our own scientific theorising. This is 
complicated by the fact that, as Kuhn argued, there is no ontological continuity in 
scientific theorising. Is this a nail in the coffin for belief in scientific progress? 
 
Kuhn did believe in scientific progress; his criticism just happened to complicate the 
picture. What he rejected is progress in the form of ‘evolution-toward-what-we-wish-
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to-know’ (Kuhn, 1970 [1962], p. 171), as if scientists incrementally worked towards 
ideal world-representation. But he did hold that scientific revolutions happen for a 
reason: a novel paradigm can for instance lead to better accuracy of prediction, an 
increased number of problems solved or better compatibility with other specialities 
when compared to the superseded paradigm (Kuhn, 1970 [1962], p. 206). From this 
perspective, nothing prohibits one from stating that Galileo’s analysis of the pendulum 
movement improved on Aristotle’s, or that Einstein’s operationalisation of gravity 
allowed for a better account of light deflection than Newton’s (see Kuhn, 1970 [1962], 
pp. 206-207). Kuhn’s sense of progress is then an ‘evolution-from-what-we-do-know’ 
(Kuhn, 1970 [1962], p. 171). Some paradigms are better equipped to solve puzzles 
than others, but the puzzles are ultimately constrained by the paradigm one is working 
in. From this it follows that one can and should measure the success of theories against 
each other, not against an idealised notion of truth. 
 
A new paradigm, for Kuhn (1970 [1962], pp. 23-24), does not gain ground because it 
is necessarily successful, but because it promises success. The actual scientific success 
can often take years, decades, sometimes centuries to manifest. But in times of 
scientific crisis, scientists need to choose among two or more competing theories rather 
spontaneously. It is hard for them to estimate the success potential of an emerging 
paradigm, so their decision often requires a leap of faith. This allowed scientists to 
commit to the wave theory of light, even though the corpuscular theory was initially 
more successful in resolving, for instance, polarisation effects (Kuhn, 1970 [1962], p. 
154). This allowed them to commit to the heliocentric model, even though the 
geocentric view, meticulously discussed in Kuhn (1957) as the ‘two-sphere universe’, 
was very successful in predicting trajectories of stars and the sun.  
 
The cost of giving up such theories with considerable predictive success is high. In 
modern times, a scientist renouncing a paradigm could lose their job, or not get invited 
to an interview in the first place. But the stakes are even higher. As alluded to above, 
scientific revolutions are born from scientific crises (Kuhn, 1970 [1962], p. 77), and 
these crises, such as the inability of the two-sphere model to smoothly account for 
planetary movement, are crucial in converting people from the old paradigm to the 
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new. A new paradigm could, for instance, promise to explain phenomena that, in the 
current paradigm, cannot be accounted for accurately enough (or, in more extreme 
cases, are treated axiomatically). In the example just mentioned, two-sphere theories 
– increasing theoretical complexity notwithstanding – never really achieved 
measurement accuracy of planetary movement. This led to the so-called Copernican 
revolution (Kuhn, 1957), whose heliocentric model outperforms the geocentricism of 
the two-sphere model on the grounds of its explanatory power/value: if we treat the 
earth as a planet that itself moves, the movement of other planets becomes less opaque. 
Such explanatory power is moreover often linked to the new paradigm outperforming 
the old by virtue of being less dependent on value-laden presumptions, examples of 
which can be found below.  
 
Both notions are philosophically rather vague. Every description, even if taxonomic in 
nature, creates knowledge. The Bible, arguably, explains everything, from the creation 
of the universe to the moral understanding of humanity. But explanatory value and 
value-laden presumptions are still utilised and endorsed by philosophers and scientists 
alike; the following two chapters are cases in point. When it comes to explanatory 
value, Chomsky argued in the late 1950s that Neo-Bloomfieldian distributionalism had 
mere descriptive adequacy (see Chomsky, 1965, pp. 26-27; also Matthews, 1993, pp. 
31-32), while his notion of a mental grammar shed light on the intricacies these 
descriptions are born from (and thus has explanatory adequacy). So-called third-wave 
variationists claim that what Labovian variationists do is merely correlational (they 
establish patterns like: working-class males are more likely to say I’m walkin’ down 
the street instead of I’m walking down the street), while their own approach traces 
these large-scale patterns back to socially meaningful persona projection. In other 
words, correlating language variation and change with social macro-categories such 
as social class or gender does not explain the underlying dynamics that make them 
important. In this regard, the generative and third-wave variationist criticisms are 
similar: predecessors are credited for their meticulous description of the phenomenon 
in question, but now it is time to explain how the described regularities come about. 
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As regards philosophy, Hempel (1965a), for instance, argues that scientific progress is 
essentially a teleological process from descriptive to explanatory quality: 
 
Broadly speaking, the vocabulary of science has two basic functions: first, to permit 
an adequate description of the things and events that are the objects of scientific 
investigation; second, to permit the establishment of general laws or theories by means 
of which particular events may be explained and predicted and thus scientifically 
understood; for to understand a phenomenon scientifically is to show that it occurs in 
accordance with general laws or theoretical principles.  
In fact, granting some oversimplification, the development of a scientific discipline 
may often be said to proceed from an initial “natural history” stage, which primarily 
seeks to describe the phenomena under study and to establish simple empirical 
generalizations concerning them, to subsequent more and more “theoretical” stages, 
in which increasing emphasis is placed upon the attainment of comprehensive 
theoretical accounts of the empirical subject matter under investigation. (Hempel, 
1965a, pp. 139-140, emphasis in original, footnote omitted) 
 
For the reasons discussed in the preceding chapter, such a view seems idealistic and 
falls short of addressing either the problems circling Psillos’ semantic thesis (p. 85 
above), or the Kuhnian notion of theory-dependence in general. In the majority of 
cases, the ‘general laws or theoretical principles’ alluded to in the quote are projections 
from within theories themselves, rather than what Hempel calls phenomena. But the 
essence of the quote seems reasonable nonetheless: if an observer on earth predicts the 
sunrise from the crowing of a rooster, they have established a descriptive correlation, 
but that does not explain why, from their perspective, the sun seems to move (Craver, 
2006, pp. 357-358). It is a mere starting point for in-depth reasoning, and one could 
come up with a range of hypotheses to try to account for the factors that could underlie 
the perceived movement of the sun. For instance, one could postulate that (1) that the 
sun tailors its movement to the activity of roosters, or (2) that what we perceive as a 
sunrise is the result of earth’s eastward rotation on its axis, and that roosters tailor their 
crow to the presence or absence of sun exposure. 
 
Few readers will take the first hypothesis seriously, and to account for their intuition, 
Nagel’s (1961) notion of ‘value assumptions’ is useful.31 Nagel’s (1961, p. 582) 
account of scientific explanation is less idealistic than Hempel’s, because it is not 
reliant on objective, theory-external truth. ‘[T]hough absolutely objective knowledge 
                                                        
31 I am using this term interchangeably with value-laden presumptions (motivated by Alexandrova's 
2016 use of the term). 
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of human affairs is unattainable’, he argues, ‘a “relational” form of objectivity called 
“relationism” can nevertheless be achieved’. A theory with relational objectivity 
should be able to state all its claims in the form of conditionals: if we operationalise X 
as Y, Z holds. What can then be criticised is the operationalisation of X as Y, as other 
operationalisations might be better or more accurate. To return to the examples above, 
hypothesis (1) hinges on roosters having extraterrestrial powers, while (2) does not 
require the assumption that what we perceive as the sun’s movement is influenced by 
such small-scale factors. We have abundant reason to believe that the former 
operationalisation is incorrect, and hence is a value-laden presumption (perhaps 
motivated by a desire for this distant, mysterious, powerful object that is the sun to be 
under the control of creatures over whom we ourselves have control) that should be 
dropped.32  
 
Notice that the notion of value-laden presumptions is necessarily intertwined with 
explanatory value. What validates or invalidates a value assumption is, in the spirit of 
scientific realism, in part dependent on a mind-independent reality, in this case the 
modern view that the sun does not move at all and is instead orbited by planets. For 
the following discussion of Chomsky and Labov, I will keep the notions of explanatory 
value and value-laden presumptions separate nonetheless, for heuristic purposes. Both 
scholars, it seems, have attributed less and less explanatory power to certain entities 
over the years, until they have been identified by some as value-laden presumptions 
that need to be challenged or dropped entirely. This led to ontological 
breaches/discontinuities typically associated with scientific revolutions. It does not 
matter that the history of Chomskyan linguistics is one of widening scope, whereas 
our case study of variationism is of narrowing scope. Both, in their own ways, tell the 
story of theories being superseded by competing approaches because they rely on 
                                                        
32 Another, rather bizarre example showing that predictive success does not necessarily warrant accurate 
world-representation comes from econophysics, a branch of economics that applies models from 
physics to solve problems in economics: One can model an economy’s income distribution by treating 
economic agents as if they were two gas molecules colliding (see Bradley & Thébault, in press, pp. 3-
5). This model presupposes that all ‘zero intelligence’ agents carry all their money with them in cash. 
If they meet another agent, they both drop their entire belongings and then pick up a random amount. 
This process is then repeated. While no one seriously believes that this is how a homo œconomicus 
actually behaves, the result is accurate enough to depict an economy’s income distribution. 
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debatable value assumptions that bring their validity limits (Rohrlich & Hardin, 1983) 
to the fore. 
4.3. Chomsky: From a formal description of language to biolinguistics 
A word of caution: Chomsky’s approach is rational, hence non-empirical (though he 
would deny that, see e.g. Chomsky, 1993 [1981], p. 35; 1995, pp. 171-172; 2006, p. 
168), and therefore essentially not falsifiable (Itkonen, 1978; Katz, 1981). Granted, 
Chomsky has claimed over the years that the structures posited by the generativist 
paradigm can be falsified by data from a previously understudied language, or indeed 
from a well-known language. The replacement of earlier phrase-structure grammars 
by the Principles and Parameters framework (discussed below) is a prominent example 
of such a falsification-driven development. But the posited structures are always 
inferred and never directly observable, and therefore potentially at odds with the 
epistemic thesis outlined in chapter 4.1 – we can never be sure if they actually describe 
how the brain works, or if they are merely part of a formalised description. This makes 
generativism rather hard to assess against the above-mentioned criteria of explanatory 
value and value-laden presumptions. I will try nonetheless, given that Chomsky 
himself, as alluded to above, grounded his criticism of structuralism and behaviourism 
in the fact the he assigned them mere descriptive adequacy. Generative Grammar, on 
the other hand, claims explanatory adequacy, because it ought to – theoretically – 
account for underlying principles of natural languages (see, for instance, Chomsky, 
1993 [1981], p. 87). The distinction between descriptive and explanatory adequacy is 
laid out in Chomsky’s Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965). 
 
Chomsky’s œuvre seems to be a good example of what Kuhn (1970 [1962], p. 184) 
referred to when he said that there is a continuum between heuristic and ontological 
models. More often than not, changes in the ontological commitments of generativism 
have been papered over by downgrading past accounts to heuristic approximations – 
as if all theoretical detours in the past 60 years logically lead to the present view of 
things. Syntactic Structures (2002 [1957]) started out as a formal description of 
language, exemplified largely by English, in part as a reaction to Hockett’s statistical 
information theory. Radick (2016) shows that Hockett was also the principal target of 
 95 
Chomsky's (1959) aggressive review of Skinner. At this stage, we read of no 
competence/performance dichotomy, no Language Acquisition Device, no Universal 
Grammar, let alone I-language. Only in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965), and 
later in Lectures on Government and Binding (1993 [1981]) and in the Minimalist 
Program (1995) does he speak about language as biological endowment in its fully-
fledged form. This is a first, relatively coarse-grained ontological reorientation: a 
formal description of language became a biological property of humans, and thus 
ontologically real (see Chomsky, 2006, chapter 7; Nefdt, 2019, pp. 178-179). 
 
Other, more fine-grained ontological reorientations can be found in his treatment of 
so-called representational systems of grammar. In the so-called ‘Standard Theory’ 
developed in Aspects, Chomsky posits that every speaker possesses a mental linguistic 
capacity called “grammar” that allows them to generate language. This capacity “base-
generates” a deep structure with the help of the syntactical component of grammar, 
and then derives from it a surface structure by various transformations.33 This is 
typically exemplified by the following sentences: John is easy to please and John is 
eager to please have essentially identical surface structures, as both main clauses take 
infinitival complements. Their deep structures, however, are different, as eager takes 
a deep structure subject denoting the person who experiences the eagerness, whereas 
easy takes a clausal deep subject but undergoes subject-raising. In the course of 
transformations that map these deep structures to their surface structures, it just so 
happens that they have the same surface structure. Similar examples include 
passivisation, emphatic affirmatives, negation or interrogatives. The latter two, 
Chomsky (2002 [1957], pp. 64-65) derives from the same underlying structure, which 
he again takes as proof of the distinct reality of the two representational systems. 
 
Over the years, the transformations between the representational systems have been 
refined in numerous ways. While in Syntactic Structures, Chomsky describes 
                                                        
33 It should be noted that Chomsky has never put forward the idea that for every sentence in every 
language, a deep structure is wholly fixed by UG. Rather, according to Chomsky, some sort of innate 
formal schematism is universal and present in the mind of every new-born human, but a distinction 
needs to be made between universal and parochial schematisms. I would like to express my gratitude to 
Geoff Pullum for pointing this out to me. 
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grammatical functions such as passivisation and negation directly, in Lectures on 
Government and Binding he argues that grammatical functionality is subordinate to 
principles such as case and binding theory, which themselves can be reduced to the 
theory of government (Chomsky, 1993 [1981], pp. 7, 14, 44, 121). Transformations, 
or movement in general, become more abstract in nature, and, for Chomsky, more 
explanatory because they describe abstract regularities that seem to underlie each and 
every language (and are therefore part of Universal Grammar). At the same time, more 
importance is attributed to semantics. In the Standard Theory, for instance, syntax is 
treated as relatively autonomous, with semantics playing a subordinate role of 
interpreting these syntactic structures (Matthews, 1993, pp. 39-41). Many scholars 
deemed this a fallacious assumption, and after the so-called ‘linguistics wars’ in the 
1960s and 70s (Harris, 1993), Chomsky developed as an answer the Extended 
Standard Theory, in which semantic interpretation is determined by multiple levels of 
representation, not just one, via the so-called projection principle and the assignment 
of theta-roles. Syntactic behaviour, for instance the ability or inability of a given verb 
to take a clausal complement (I promised him [to leave] is fine, but *I gave him [to 
leave] is not), in this view, is lexically specified along with other morphophonological 
properties (Chomsky, 1993 [1981], p. 5). Deep and surface structures are then 
essentially treated as ‘projections of lexical properties’ (Chomsky, 1993 [1981], p. 39) 
– a considerable change of mind.34 
 
In a further step, in the Minimalist Program (Chomsky, 1995), deep and surface 
structure are dropped, and with them the notion of government, which had been so 
carefully fleshed out in the Lectures on Government and Binding. The derivations – 
present since 1950s generativism – are instead entirely ‘driven by morphological 
properties to which syntactic variation of languages is restricted’ (Chomsky, 1995, p. 
194).  
 
This concludes our brief philosophical journey: first, language-specific 
transformations were abandoned in favour of more abstract principles; then these 
                                                        
34 In the same vein, Chomsky exchanged the notion of deep structure with D-structure to acknowledge, 
‘behind a very thin veil’, the criticism of generative semanticists (Harris, 1993, p. 304). 
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abstract principles were dropped in favour of morphological properties of the lexicon, 
and deep and surface structure with them. Taken at face value, it is hard to infer any 
ontological continuity from this development, and we could thus speak about them as 
examples of Kuhnian scientific revolutions. But many generativists spot continuity 
elsewhere (here,  Nefdt, 2016a; 2016b gives a good overview). The main driving force 
behind this development, arguably, is Chomsky’s conviction that humans are born 
with a language faculty that enables them, and only them (not animals), to create 
language (Chomsky, 2006, chapter 3). The argument outlined in Language and Mind, 
and similarly in numerous other publications by Chomsky, is as follows: certain 
intricacies in language use are never available for introspection by the native speaker. 
However, every speaker of English, independent of intelligence, is able to assign 
complex stress patterns to sentences they produce, without being aware of the 
regularities. They are not learned, therefore they must be innate. In the 1960s and 70s, 
this led Chomsky and other generativists to posit that people are born with an innate 
schematism that consists of, for instance, the principle of cyclic application (which 
underlies phonological stress-assignment) and the so-called A-over-A principle 
(which prohibits the extraction *London, I enjoyed my trip to, but allows My trip to 
London, I enjoyed35) (Chomsky, 2006, pp. 39-40, 46). As principles like these 
proliferated, the sentiment grew stronger within linguistics that they would render 
language acquisition a trivial phenomenon (see Nefdt, 2019, p. 181). When they were 
later dropped in favour of lexically specified morphological properties, the complexity 
behind language acquisition grew so large that it would become hard to account for 
the speed and ease of language acquisition (Joseph, 2002, pp. 62-65). 
 
Chomsky’s answer to this impasse was that if there indeed exists a language faculty in 
the brain, its properties must be abstract and general enough so as to balance the 
complexity of natural languages with the ease of language acquisition. When one 
describes how stress is assigned to English sentences, for instance, the scope of one’s 
claims is likely to be limited to English alone, and one therefore runs the risk of 
describing an idiosyncrasy rather than a property shared by all natural languages. If, 
                                                        
35 I have been told that most native English speakers find the former sentence perfectly fine, which 
shows that grammaticality judgments made in syntactic theory are often peculiar to linguists themselves. 
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on the other hand, one wishes to uncover Universal Grammar as something that 
‘determine[s] the class of possible languages’ (Chomsky, 2006, p. 155), the 
characteristics must become necessarily more general, so the logic goes. This of course 
papers over the fact that the principle of cyclic application and the A-over-A principle 
were in fact believed to be part of that very UG, as were deep structure and surface 
structure; and it would be inadequate to not mention the fact that the ontological 
commitments UG eventually boils down to have changed considerably in the last 60 
years.36 But in a way, these reorientations are justified by the fact – and Chomsky 
acknowledges this from the start – that different theories of grammar can be 
descriptively adequate. In theory, they can all account for the same corpus of data, and 
they can all predict ungrammaticality. The principle of cyclic application outlined in 
Chomsky and Halle (1968) still holds – is still descriptively adequate – for stress 
patterns in English, but it would be too specific a principle to hold for natural languages 
in general, hence it lacks explanatory adequacy and cannot be part of Universal 
Grammar. There must, therefore, be a principle underlying it, which is part of UG. 
This captures the essence of the Principles and Parameters framework developed in 
the Lectures on Government and Binding (1993 [1981]). Principles and Parameters 
holds that natural languages share certain abstract principles, and it is these abstract 
principles that need to be captured by UG. In this vein, the principle of cyclic 
application can be re-theorised as the principle that transformations apply in embedded 
domains before applying in superordinate domains – in phonological and syntactic 
environments alike. A prominent example of a parameter is the existence of so-called 
empty categories, one of which is PRO, a phonetically unrealised feature sharing 
syntactic properties of pronouns which allows us to resolve pronoun antecedents in 
sentences like I expected to leave as Ij expected PROj to leave. 
 
How Chomsky justifies the existence of such empty categories can be inferred from 
the following quotes. Notice that he still adheres to the idea of a deep and surface 
structure at this stage. 
                                                        
36 Whether a cyclic principle is part of UG or not has been a controversial topic within generative 
literature (see Pullum, 1992). One could make a case that it survived in Minimalism in the notion of 
‘phase’, but only when acknowledging that it is not a phenomenon restricted to phonological form (PF). 
I would like to express my gratitude to Geoff Pullum for pointing this out to me. 
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Note that the distribution of the empty categories, the differences among them and 
their similarities to and differences from overt elements are determined through the 
interaction of quite simple principles that belong to several different subtheories, in 
accordance with the modular approach to grammar that we are pursuing throughout. 
(Chomsky, 1993 [1981], p. 72) 
 
The range of phenomena – by no means exhausted in the preceding discussion – is 
fairly complex, but it follows, assuming the projection principle, from quite simple 
and for the most part independently-motivated principles of the interacting theories of 
bounding, government, binding, Case and control, a fact of some significance, I 
believe. (Chomsky, 1993 [1981], p. 85) 
 
What is remarkable is that he actually seems to follow Kuhn (1970 [1962], p. 171) 
here in his modus operandi. When it comes to improving theories, his concept of 
‘progress’ seems to be one of ‘evolution-from-what-we-do-know’, rather than one of 
‘evolution-toward-what-we-wish-to-know’. The empty categories he posits follow 
from ‘quite simple’ and ‘independently-motivated’ principles. If we operationalise UG 
as consisting of these independent principles, it may no longer seem so outlandish to 
add empty categories which build them into our theoretical apparatus.  
 
It is here that Chomsky’s epistemological tension comes to the fore. His ontological 
commitment to grammar being a biological endowment separate from other cognitive 
traits does not seem to fit the modus operandi underlying his theorising. His theorising 
broadly falls under a coherence theoretical approach of truth (Young, 2016), in which 
ontological commitments are not inferred from a mind-independent reality but from 
how well they fit with the applied theoretical apparatus. Such approaches to truth 
typically do not state an epistemological “endpoint” because they are at odds with the 
metaphysical thesis outlined in chapter 4.1. For Chomsky, however, the 
epistemological endpoint is set: Universal Grammar is a biolinguistic capacity, 
separate from other cognitive faculties. From this perspective, it becomes quite 
illuminating why the study of Chomsky’s œuvre tells us a story of abstraction and, in 
the end, one of widening scope. As generativists became aware that many properties 
they had previously attributed to the autonomy of language(s) might actually be part 
of more general, abstract cognitive capacities (Chomsky, 2006, p. 183), the principles 
underlying each and every language (UG) have become broader and broader. In the 
end, it might all boil down to Merge, the capacity of natural languages to combine 
constituents to form larger structures. ‘The simplest account of the “Great Leap 
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Forward” in the evolution of humans would be that the brain was rewired, perhaps by 
some slight mutation, to provide the operation Merge’, Chomsky (2006, p. 184) says. 
What is left of elaborated notions of I-languages as developed in the Standard Theory 
and Extended Standard Theory is a mere linkage of sound and meaning, which takes 
us back to a Saussurean doctrine, and ultimately to the behaviourists who Chomsky 
was so eager to resist in the first place (see Joseph, 2002, p. 154). 
4.4. Labov: From linguistic autonomy to sociolinguistic performativity 
In many regards, William Labov can be regarded as a successor to the 
Neogrammarians, a late 19th century German school of linguists including, among 
others, Karl Brugmann (1849-1919), Hermann Osthoff (1847-1909) and Hermann 
Paul (1846-1921) (see Morpurgo Davies, 1998, chapter 9). He himself praised them 
as the ‘heroes of the story’ (Labov, 2006 [1966], p. 9) for their approach to the study 
of phonetic change, i.e. the study of changes in pronunciation. The Neogrammarians 
held that ‘every sound change, inasmuch it occurs mechanically, takes place according 
to laws that admit no exception’ (Osthoff & Brugmann, 1878, p. XIII). If the 
pronunciation of /a/ changes, it will do so in every word in which /a/ occurs, without 
exception. ‘Mechanical’ needs to be understood as the opposite of the ‘organic’ 
approach which they attributed to the work of August Schleicher (1821-1868), who 
conceived of language as a biological entity that evolves independently of its speakers 
(Morpurgo Davies, 1998, chapter 9). The Neogrammarians instead proposed that the 
emphasis should shift to the speakers who actually produce and change language on a 
daily basis; and that the explanation of language change needs to be sought in the 
change of the psychological ‘sense of movement’, or Bewegungsgefühl in Paul’s (1920 
[1880]) terminology. Only if the Bewegungsgefühl of e.g. the pronunciation of a vowel 
changes in many individuals at the same time can one speak of a change in the 
‘language custom’ (Sprachusus). Readers familiar with the work of Labov will 
immediately recognise parallels between his and their theorising. In fact, Paul (1920 
[1880]) even mentioned repeatedly that changes in the sense of movement can go 
entirely unnoticed, an important determinant in Labov’s (1972b, 2006 [1966]) early 
work to distinguish between change from above and change from below.  
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These similarities notwithstanding, the modern paradigm of language variation and 
change (the Labovian school, nowadays often called ‘first wave variationism’) was 
essentially born out of a criticism of the above-quoted Hermann Paul, whose 
Principien der Sprachgeschichte ‘at some stage counted as the Bible of the 
contemporary linguist’ (Morpurgo Davies, 1998, p. 235). Weinreich et al. (1968) argue 
that Paul overemphasised the role of the individual: 
 
Jede sprachliche Schöpfung ist stets nur das Werk eines Individuums. Es können 
mehrere das gleiche schaffen, und das ist sehr häufig der Fall. Aber der Akt des 
Schaffens ist darum kein anderer und das Produkt kein anderes. Niemals schaffen 
mehrere Individuen etwas zusammen, mit vereinigten Kräften, mit verteilten Rollen. 
(Paul, 1920 [1880], p. 18) 
 
Every linguistic creation is always the work of an individual. Many can create the 
same, and this happens very often. But the act of creation, for this reason, is not 
different and the product not different either. Never do many individuals create 
something together with united forces or with allotted roles. (translation by me, the 
author) 
 
Weinreich et al. (1968, pp. 107-108) argue, for instance, that, in this approach, Paul 
trivialises sociological issues concerning the relationship between the individual and 
the society they live in – particularly in relation to how a ‘language 
custom’/Sprachusus comes about; and they further accuse him of woefully 
undertheorising the mechanisms underlying idiolectal change. It should be noted at 
this point that, to the linguistic historian, this critique seems rather anachronistic. 
Paul’s focus on individuals as the driving forces behind language change is essentially 
a counterproposal to H. Steinthal’s (1823-1899), and later Wilhelm Wundt’s (1832-
1920) Völkerpsychologie37 (Klautke, 2013, pp. 30-32; Morpurgo Davies, 1998, pp. 
247-250) – much as the whole Neogrammarian project was essentially an attempt to 
rid linguistics of romantic baggage and render it a modern, empirical science. But 
Weinreich et al. (1968, p. 125) saw in this an opportunity to propose a powerful 
alternative to the then-blossoming Chomskyan approach to grammar. A linguistic 
system, so the argument goes, always systematically correlates with non-linguistic 
factors such as social class, age or gender; and we must come to the conclusion that 
Chomsky’s (1965, p. 3) ‘ideal speaker-listener […] in a completely homogeneous 
                                                        
37 For differences between their approaches to Völkerpsychologie, see Klautke (2013). 
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speech-community’ is not only ideal but impossible (see Weinreich et al., 1968, pp. 
101, 125). In every speech community one can establish social stratifications along 
lines of social class, gender, or age; where older people speak differently from the 
young, men differently from women, or the working class from the upper class. It is 
these social categories, contra Paul, that allow us to identify the driving forces behind 
language change. If the Bewegungsgefühl of a single individual changes, it is merely 
a token of a social type.38 
 
With meticulous attention to detail, Labov studied the social stratification of language 
empirically. For instance, he soon established that when the collective pronunciation 
of a certain vowel changes without being noticed by the speech community, it is likely 
that upper-working class or lower-middle class women are leading the change (Labov, 
2001, chapter 8). If a certain pronunciation is used by upper-class speakers, the lower 
middle class will likely hypercorrect its own pronunciation to match theirs, with 
women once again in the lead (Labov, 1972b, chapter 5). The former example is a case 
of ‘change from below’, the latter of ‘change from above’. Soon, these empirical 
generalisations evolved into fully-fledged principles of linguistic change, to which 
Labov devoted an entire trilogy (1994, 2001, 2010).  
 
Similarly to the case of Chomsky described in the preceding chapter, several important 
Labovian concepts have undergone considerable change to arrive at their current state 
– sometimes on account of inaccurate interpretations of Labov’s work by his readers, 
at other times because Labov himself dramatically shifted the focus of his thinking (a 
detailed discussion can be found in Woschitz, 2019, sections 2 and 4). A case in point 
is his treatment of change from below. Ask a linguist who is only peripherally 
concerned with sociolinguistics to define it, and they are likely to say that it refers to 
changes initiated by the lower class. This, Labov (2006 [1966], p. 203) admits in 
                                                        
38 In some regards, this logic seems to echo Wundt’s criticism of Paul between the 1880s and the 1910s 
(see Klautke, 2013, pp. 30-32, 64-65, 71). Wundt held that a language is the product of a Volk, not 
something that is created individually (Klautke, 2013, chapter 2). A Volk is always more than the sum 
of its parts and a phenomenon Herbartian individual psychology (which Paul followed) cannot account 
for – hence the need for Völkerpsychologie (Klautke, 2013, pp. 64-65). This view is preserved in the 
sociology of Durkheim (1938 [1895]), who similarly held that ‘social facts’ cannot be explained solely 
by the behaviour of individual members of a society – they exist sui generis. Durkheim’s sociological 
method underlies Labov’s work down to the present day (see Figueroa, 1994, chapter 4). 
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retrospect, has been an egregious misreading all along, and that he should have used 
‘change from within’ and ‘without’ the linguistic system instead (in the spirit of Labov, 
2007). But in earlier work (Labov, 1972b, 2006 [1966]), whether a change in the 
linguistic system has its origin within or outside its own linguistic system played only 
a subordinate role. What mattered more as a distinguishing feature was the change’s 
availability to social commentary and social awareness more generally: if speakers are 
not aware of their own changing pronunciation, Labov (1972b, p. 123) 
correspondingly spoke of change from ‘below the level of conscious awareness’; if 
speakers are aware of their own changing pronunciation, Labov spoke of change from 
above the level of conscious awareness. 
 
Recent critiques by the so-called third-wave (e.g. Eckert, 2016, pp. 77-79; Zimman, 
2017, p. 366, footnote 1) have pointed out that the conscious/unconscious distinction 
does not adequately capture socially meaningful aspects of behaviour. Body language 
is a case in point: if I have a hunched posture, this could stem from a lack of self-
esteem which I unconsciously project to the outside; and even if I have it because of 
orthopaedic reasons, other people could still pick up on it to form their opinion about 
me. Why should linguistic behaviour be any different? After all, the way I talk can 
involve my own desire to project an identity to the outside (for instance, that I am a 
Western, urban male); and even if not, others can still pick up on the way I talk to see 
if I fit a social stereotype. It should then not be too hard to introduce similar kinds of 
optional performativity into the above-mentioned distinction between change from 
above and below.  
 
The stakes, however, are surprisingly high, not because Labov denies the importance 
of social meaningfulness, but because in the orthodox framework, the distinction 
between language and society, in other words between internal (Labov, 1994) and 
external (Labov, 2001) factors, largely hinges on the distinction between conscious 
and unconscious awareness (see Woschitz, 2019). If not for language-internal 
organising principles, so the logic goes, how can a complex reorganisation of the 
phonological space in a chain shift come about if speakers are not even aware of it? 
For example, it seems to be a pattern in Indo-European languages that when raising 
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vowels reach the point where they can go no higher (e.g. when a raising /æ/ has come 
to be pronounced as a tense [i]), they can diphthongise to continue their movement 
(Labov, 1994, pp. 120, 122, 248-249). The prime example of this is, of course, the 
English Great Vowel Shift, but we also find present-day varieties of English that have 
[miən] where others have [mæn] or [men] for man. Another tendency is that vowels 
positioned at the peripheral track of the vowel space become less open (Labov, 1994, 
p. 262): on average, we are much more likely to witness raising of long peripheral /æ/ 
towards [i], as in the above example, than a lowering and backing to long [ɑ], as in 
Southern British English bath.  
 
Principles such as these do not seem to be attributable to social meaningfulness or 
performativity in the sense described above. They just ‘happen’ to a speech community 
undergoing multigenerational language change (Labov, 1994, pp. 264-265), by 
placing restrictions on which change in pronunciation is likely to happen, and in which 
direction it is likely to go (Labov, 1994, p. 115). Labov (2001, p. xv) accordingly treats 
the social structure as the ‘material substratum’ of language change, the latter being 
ontologically prior to what speakers do when they open their mouth to speak. Notice 
the parallel to Chomsky’s justification of the innateness of certain linguistic principles 
discussed in the preceding chapter: the principle of cyclic application is too abstract 
for native speakers of English to be aware of, so the argument goes; thus, it needs to 
have an ontological existence separate from other, inductively learned parts of 
language. 
 
It should be noted that the term ‘material substratum’ is rather ambiguous, and it allows 
for diametrically opposed readings. It could address Locke’s substance/substratum 
distinction (which, it should be noted, is a matter of controversy itself; see Robinson, 
2018, section 2.5). ‘Properties – or, in Locke’s terms qualities – must belong to 
something – cannot ‘subsist… without something to support them’’ (Robinson, 2018, 
section 2.5). In this logic, if one abstracts all properties away from an orange, such as 
its weight, its colour or its shape; there is still something left that functions as the 
carrier of these properties – the substratum. In the context of above, the ‘material 
substratum of a language change’ would then be what is left when one abstracts all 
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linguistic regularities such as the described restrictions on vowel-raising or 
diphthongisation away from speakers engaging in communication. ‘Social structure’, 
the substratum, functions as the carrier of language-internal processes, much like the 
substratum of an orange is the carrier of roughly 130g, a round shape and orange 
colour.  
 
In a more colloquial reading, on the other hand, ‘material substratum’ can also denote 
‘something important from which something else develops, but that is not immediately 
obvious’ (Cambridge Dictionary, retrieved February 22, 2019). This could be read as 
the opposite of the Lockean conception because it does not attribute to the substratum 
the role of a carrier or that of a mere recipient of properties. Instead, the substratum 
constitutes the observed properties. In the case of the above-described phonological 
restrictions, this would mean that the diphthongisation of [i] or the raising of peripheral 
[æ] is somehow the product of a speech community engaging in communication, rather 
than an ontologically prior restriction of language use. This is Labov’s intended 
reading in the quote above.  
 
Still, that he would use ‘material substratum’ to make his point is interesting because 
the epistemological tension between the two readings is also somewhat reflected in the 
contrast between his later and earlier work, and, to some extent, in his whole œuvre. 
In sum, what seems to have changed in Labov’s theorising is how much in language 
change we can attribute to language-internal organising principles, and how much we 
can attribute to the social structure (the ‘material substratum’) in which it unfolds. In 
his earlier phase, Labov (1994, p. 3) argued that ‘the two sets of factors - internal and 
external - are effectively independent of each other’, and he attributed quite a lot to the 
former. All a linguistic community had to do is take up a change in vowel production 
(that came about because of linguistic pressures such as a phonemic merger, or ‘in 
response to social motivations which are relatively obscure’, Labov, 1972b, p. 123) 
and carry it along a pre-set path to its conclusion. In Labov (2001), this continuation 
is explained by the so-called ‘nonconformity principle’. Children, in this view, 
interpret more advanced tokens of a vowel as informal/nonstandard speech, which they 
then reinterpret as not conforming to sociolinguistic norms (Labov, 2001, p. 513). 
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Therefore, juveniles from a social stratum more likely to resist these kinds of norms 
make comparatively greater use of such variants (Labov, 2001, p. 516); they are the 
‘leaders’ of the change. 
 
These ‘abstract polarities’ (Labov, 2001, p. 515) of standard/non-standard speech and 
conforming/non-conforming behaviour then allow us to account, at least in part, for 
how large-scale regularities in e.g. vowel raising come about:   
 
[I]t may be observed that the very generality of these abstract polarities makes it 
possible to conceive of how linguistic change may be driven in the same directions 
across thousands of miles in many separate communities. […] The general principles 
of chain shifting outlined in volume 1 give us one clue to the uniformity of these great 
regional developments. If this volume has added anything to our understanding of 
linguistic change, there must also be an explanation for the uniformity of socially 
motivated projection throughout these vast areas. The nonconformity hypothesis is 
submitted as a first step in that direction. (Labov, 2001, p. 515)39 
 
In Labov’s later phase, much more is attributed to less abstract socially 
meaningful/performative language behaviour, with the nonconformity principle being 
downgraded to one possible explanation among many: 
 
In one form or another, [driving forces which may be responsible for the continuation, 
acceleration or completion of change] involve the association of social attributes with 
the more advanced forms of a change in progress: local identity, membership in 
communities of practice, social class, age or gender. (Labov, 2010, p. 368) 
 
In this passage, and in fact in the whole volume, the social structure is no longer treated 
as something in which language change is merely embedded. We witness instead an 
orientation away from a Lockean ‘material substratum’ to the colloquial reading 
mentioned above. The social structure is now in part constitutive of that change 
because advanced tokens carry performative meaning, often more locally relevant than 
an analogous equation of advanced tokens with nonconformity to sociolinguistic 
norms would suggest. And as third-wave variationists and socio-phoneticians continue 
to discover social performativity in small-scale features involved in sound change (see 
Eckert, 2010), less and less in language change can be captured under linguistic 
                                                        
39 In this paper I have discussed two of these general principles of chain shifting: diphthongization and 
peripheral vowel raising. 
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structure ‘unfolding itself’ in a social structure. Or, conversely, linguistic structure 
becomes more and more restricted in its application domain. This invites us to look 
for the reasons of language change not in abstract principles but in the psychological 
reality of speakers, through which they have access to their sociolinguistic 
surroundings that cannot be separated from what linguists like to call ‘language’. 
4.5. A similar kind of progress? 
From 1965 on, Chomsky persuaded a critical mass of scholars to seek explanations for 
linguistic phenomena, including language acquisition, in a Universal Grammar located 
in the brain. As history unfolded, however, the representational systems needed to 
capture UG in a form that would account for all the syntactic structures of known 
languages became ever more complex. He adjusted his framework numerous times to 
rise to the challenge, but this has had important implications for the ontological 
commitment of his theory. Since the 1970s, fewer and fewer specific characteristics 
have been attributed to a linguistic genetic endowment, to a point where other scholars, 
such as Kirby, Smith, and Brighton (2004, p. 587), have started to attribute many 
properties previously attributed to UG to a ‘prior learning bias’ which seeks to explain 
intricacies of language entirely by general cognitive mechanisms. 
 
I have argued that the theoretical reorientations in generativist theory can be 
understood as driven by the conviction that language is something biological and 
“natural”; that, at the end of the day, there is at least something in our brain that is 
distinctively linguistic and allows human beings alone to speak. But from a 
philosophical perspective, this is a strong assumption that is at odds with the applied 
methodology. If the preceding discussion of Kuhn and scientific realism has taught us 
anything, it is that mind-independent entities are projected in part out of our own 
theorising. But there is nothing in the modus operandi of Chomsky from which we can 
infer that the described regularities are distinctively linguistic, let alone a genetic 
endowment. Abstract regularities do exist, but we can never tell for sure if they belong 
to a distinct biolinguistic endowment or to other cognitive or social capacities. That 
the treatment of UG has become more and more general is then essentially an 
epistemological tension playing out in the pursuit by generativists to safeguard the 
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autonomy of linguistics. If one axiomatically believes in the existence of a 
biolinguistic entity, one must live with the fact that such an entity, if it exists at all, is 
so simple that others would call it trivial. 
 
‘Progress’, to return to the scope of the paper, can then be found in the developing 
awareness over the last 60 years that less and less in language behaviour can be 
explained by UG, and that it should be treated as a last resort rather than an explanation 
for everything. To attribute too much explanatory importance to it, as was done in the 
1960s and 70s, is nowadays considered a value-laden presumption in the sense 
outlined in chapter 4.2; an ontological commitment that academics have started giving 
up in favour of more general cognitive principles on the one hand, and social and 
cultural aspects on the other hand. Chomsky seems to be at ease with this: 
 
The quest for principled explanation faces daunting tasks. We can formulate the goals 
with reasonable clarity. We cannot, of course, know in advance how well they can be 
attained – that is, to what extent the states of the language faculty are attributable to 
general principles, possibly even holding for organisms generally. (Chomsky, 2006, 
p. 185) 
 
He seems to be satisfied with the fact that his work of the previous 50 years, in which 
he tried so eagerly to bring linguistics to the level of a natural science, is now 
considered the harbinger of a modern cognitive science in which his linguistics has 
been swallowed up. Where some see in this the ultimate self-abolition of generativism, 
Chomsky sees biolinguistics brought to its logical conclusion. Both, in a way, are right 
in their assessment. 
 
A similar kind of epistemological tension resolving itself seems to underlie the 
historical development of Labovian sociolinguistics. On the one hand, ‘first-wave 
variationists’ celebrate Neogrammarians for their analysis of sound change. On the 
other hand, however, early Labov has failed to live up to their conviction that each and 
every sound change is a psychological phenomenon. Large-scale regularities 
notwithstanding, the Neogrammarians never attributed driving forces of sound change 
to abstract principles like “if the vowel is tense, raise it”. If anything, they resisted such 
claims on account of their empiricism: if something is not regular sound change, it is 
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the result of analogy. We can never go further than this if we want to remain faithful 
to the data. All other things that we extrapolate from the data are entirely speculative.  
 
It just so happened that as descriptions of large-scale phonological changes 
proliferated, linguists began to abstract from them principles that were then taken to 
be ontologically prior to how speakers communicate in everyday life. Crucially, 
however, all proposed explanations of how internal factors come about – for instance, 
that, in many Indo-European languages, tense vowels seem to raise and diphthongise 
if need be – have proved inadequate. Laziness or carelessness, for instance, cannot 
account for the fact that some English varieties diphthongise tense [i] (see Labov, 
2001, p. 25). Diphthongisation is generally treated as a change across two levels of 
phonological subsystems, which makes the pronunciation more complicated for 
speakers. Labov’s loophole is to follow Meillet in his assumption that ‘the sporadic 
character of language change can only be explained by correlations with the social 
structure of the speech community in which it takes place’ (Labov, 2001, p. xv). What 
a speech community does is to break loose a change in a linguistic system which then 
adjusts itself to the disequilibrium (Labov, 2010, pp. 369-370). This allows Labov to 
have his cake and eat it too: on the one hand, he can maintain the ontological status of 
internal factors, on the other hand, he is able to foreground the importance of the 
speech community in bringing changes about. 
 
As, over the years, increasingly more importance has been attributed to social 
meaningfulness and performativity associated with changes in progress, Labov’s 
notion of internal factors has been constrained in the process. Remnants of internal 
factors can, for instance, be found in so-called near-mergers, which Eckert and Labov 
(2017, p. 486) describe as ‘the clearest case of the divergence between social meaning 
and linguistic structure’. Near-mergers are when speakers cannot perceive a phonemic 
contrast but still produce it, or vice versa (Labov, Karen, & Miller, 1991; Labov et al., 
1972). They are ‘motivated by more abstract principles of change’ because members 
in a speech community never direct their attention to ‘the more abstract levels of 
phonological organization’ (Eckert & Labov, 2017, pp. 467, 491). However, as 
mentioned in the previous chapters, sociolinguists have started to criticise theorising 
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agency or performativity along the lines of conscious awareness (see Eckert, 2016, pp. 
77-79). Lack of awareness does not preclude social performativity, of which Nycz’s 
(2018) study is a good example. She studied seven Canadians who moved to New 
York and had been living there for at least ten years before data collection. Speakers 
of Canadian English, unlike speakers of New York City English, typically present with 
the low-back merger, so that they cannot distinguish their vowel-pronunciation of lot 
and thought. Sophie, one of her interviewees, however, shows incipient unmerging 
without being aware of it (Nycz, 2018, p. 189): she shows a clear distinction between 
lot and thought, albeit not as clear as normally found in New York City English. She 
had been living in New York for 27 years and, incidentally, had been married to a New 
Yorker for almost two decades. For interviewees with Canadian spouses, unmerging 
is still present, but less distinct (Nycz, 2018, pp. 189, 198). The fact that Sophie’s 
unmerging is more advanced is undoubtedly meaningful or performative. She could, 
for instance, express intimacy by aligning her low-back vowel production with her 
spouse’s, regardless of whether she is consciously aware of it or not. Findings like 
these motivate Eckert (2019, p. 1) to argue quite radically that she ‘would not be 
satisfied with the claim that a sound change was meaningless unless every effort had 
been made to prove otherwise’. We can see that the tables have turned: social meaning 
and linguistic structure are so hard to separate that what was once theorised as a 
‘material substratum’ merely carrying forward language-internal processes is no 
longer accepted. This view is instead downgraded to a heuristic approximation of a 
phenomenon that, in reality, follows different rules that are driven by social 
meaningfulness. 
 
It should be noted that third-wave variationists still seem to be unsure of how radically 
they want to follow through with this reorientation. One can find remnants of past 
ontological commitments even in Eckert’s most recent work: 
 
Whatever its origins, whether from linguistic pressures (“change from below”) or 
social pressures (“change from above”), sound change spreads by virtue of its 
incorporation into a semiotic landscape, as non-referential material is recruited into 
signs articulating social distinctions. (Eckert, 2019, p. 1) 
 
 111 
It remains to be seen whether she will eventually do away with ‘linguistic pressures’ 
entirely, or whether she will at least conclude that we can attribute so little explanatory 
power to them that they are negligible when compared to social-semiotic aspects. 
 
In conclusion, we can see interesting philosophical parallels between the Labovian and 
the Chomskyan paradigms: internal factors and UG were attributed much explanatory 
power in the late 20th century, but recently they have been treated as stand-ins for 
other processes at work (socially meaningful language behaviour and cognitive 
principles respectively). The explanatory value attributed to them has decreased as 
other things began ‘doing the explaining’. Many scholars have started treating them as 
value-laden presumptions. As I have discussed in chapters 4.1 and 4.2, this is progress 
in the scientific realist and Kuhnian sense. Scientific progress in generativism is 
reflected in the fact that it did away with UG as an explanation for linguistic intricacies, 
and instead finds its new home in cognitive science. To some this appears to represent 
failure and abdication (or usurpation); but in fact, it has freed linguistics from the 
constraints of having to seek explanations for a variety of linguistic phenomena in one 
alleged entity in the brain, which no one to date has been able to locate on an fMRI 
scan. Scientific progress in the study of phonological change is reflected in the fact 
that the almost axiomatic assumption of internal factors unfolding themselves in a 
social structure is being overthrown.  
 
Both generativism and sociolinguistics have increased their relational objectivity in 
the process, as epistemologically ‘expensive’ concepts have been questioned and re-
theorised. That this has led, for many, to the self-abolition of generativism in the one 
case, and a less radical but still significant ontological reorientation in variationist 
sociolinguistics in the other, is a byproduct of disciplines resolving epistemological 
tensions.  
4.6. Conclusion 
I hope to have convinced the reader that philosophical scrutiny, and the philosophy of 
science more generally, allows us to penetrate all kinds of academic endeavours, 
“hard” and “soft”, “natural” (or “biological”, as generativists would have it) and 
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“social” alike. With our philosophical spectacles on, we can trace ontological, 
semantic or epistemological continuity, or the lack thereof, in an academic pursuit that 
could otherwise remain opaque. But this is not just a descriptive exercise by 
philosophers: if we conceive of the philosophy of science as a way to look at things, 
essentially a kind of take-a-step-back mentality, it provides us academics with a useful 
toolkit that allows us to address specific tensions in our fields, make explicit what is 
at stake when defending or adopting a position, and help resolving the issues at hand. 
All of this can contribute to the advancement of our discipline by providing it with a 
strong metatheoretical foundation. 
 
In the spirit of a scientific realism that is faithful to Kuhn, we cannot measure the 
epistemic worth of a theory solely on the grounds of how well it corresponds to a mind-
independent reality. We also need to consider how phenomena are in part projections 
of our own theorising. It is these projections that can be improved on; and whether 
theories have addressed specific epistemological tensions or not can then become a 
yardstick of scientific progress. Chomskyan syntax and Labovian study of 
phonological change were found to be cases where theoretical constructs (Universal 
Grammar or internal factors) have been attributed less explanatory value over the 
years. The described historical trajectories – from formal descriptions of language to 
biolinguistics, and from linguistic autonomy to sociolinguistic performativity 
respectively – have been told as stories in which scholars have sorted out 
epistemological tensions by identifying and addressing value-laden presumptions. In 
Chomsky’s work, the axiomatic belief in a biolinguistic entity led to the trivialisation 
of his former claims; in Labov’s work, social performativity challenged the 
questionable primacy of internal factors. 
 
Joseph (2002, p. 134) has claimed that ‘[t]he crucial distinction to be drawn is between 
linguists who acknowledge their ideological stances and those who do not’. I would 
add to this that it is also the theories of those who acknowledge their stances that will 
survive in the longer run; and that it is they who do best in shedding light on the mind-
independent reality that scientific realists are so eager to discover. 
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CHAPTER 5: FROM INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
FACTORS TO REGISTERS 
Discussions in variationist sociolinguistics have, for a long time, followed closely the 
framework laid out in Weinreich et al. (1968), who capture as ‘problems’ various 
domains that they think should be addressed when studying language change 
empirically (table 1).  
 
Table 1: The problems of language change as conceived by Weinreich et al. (1968) and 
how they have been classified under internal and external factors in subsequent work  
  Internal External 
Constraint problem What are general constraints of change?  ✔  
Transition problem How do linguistic innovations spread? ✔ (✔)*	
Embedding problem How are linguistic changes embedded in the 
linguistic and the social structure? 
✔ ✔ 
Evaluation problem How are changes evaluated by the speech 
community, and what influence do such evaluation 
have on language change? 
✔ ✔ 
Actuation problem What forces can initiate language change? ✔ ✔ 
* The reason for putting this in brackets is that Weinreich et al. discuss the transition problem mainly 
in terms of how alternate forms are learned by speakers, how archaic and innovative forms coexist for 
a while, and how the innovative variant eventually ‘wins’. They are not explicit about whether the 
language learner plays an important part in this trajectory, and primacy of internal factors is in no way 
precluded. 
 
The constraint problem seeks to ‘determine the set of possible changes and possible 
conditions for a change’ (Weinreich et al., 1968, p. 183). Raising front vowels, for 
instance, tend do diphthongise because they cannot move to the front like raising back 
vowels – a pattern which is often explained by the ‘asymmetry of the [oral speech] 
organs’ (Martinet, 1952, pp. 26-27; see also Martinet, 1955). The transition problem 
asks how innovative linguistic forms spread through the speech community and 
eventually come to completion (Weinreich et al., 1968, pp. 184-185). The embedding 
problem concerns how a linguistic change manifests itself in the linguistic structure 
and in the social structure (Weinreich et al., 1968, pp. 185-186). The evaluation 
problem seeks to ‘establish empirically the subjective correlates of the several layers 
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and variables in a heterogeneous structure’ – i.e., in a speech community (Weinreich 
et al., 1968, p. 186). Finally, the actuation problem addresses possible stimuli of 
language change, which Weinreich et al. (1968, pp. 186-187) attribute to ‘society’ or 
‘the structure of language’ – a position Labov (2010, chapter 5) remains faithful to in 
his discussion of triggering events. 
 
One can infer from table 1 that, for most categories, both internal and external factors 
must be considered when studying language change. Indeed, Weinreich et al. (1968, 
p. 188) claim that  
 
Linguistic and social factors are closely interrelated in the development of language 
change. Explanations which are confined to one or the other aspect, no matter how 
well constructed, will fail to account for the rich body of regularities that can be 
observed in empirical studies of language behavior. 
 
In subsequent work, however, the discussion of internal factors mainly falls under the 
constraints and the transition problems, while social factors fall under the evaluation 
problem (Labov, 1994, p. 2). Granted, the embedding and the actuation problems still 
comprise both aspects – as does the evaluation problem when maintenance or loss of 
meaning is concerned; for instance, when a language-internal change (a ‘change from 
below’) has led to the loss of a phonemic contrast. Regarding the embedding problem, 
however, internal factors have primacy, and the speech community is downgraded to 
a passive recipient of continuous Neogrammarian change – the ‘material substratum 
of language change’ (see chapters 3.1 and 4.4). 
 
What justifies the orthodox Labovian paradigm to uphold a narrow interface between 
language and society is the conviction that social evaluations of sound change are too 
sporadic and never targeted at abstract changes in the phonological system (Eckert & 
Labov, 2017, see also chapter 3.1). Abstract changes in the phonological system must 
therefore have different driving forces – ‘internal’ principles. But to posit language 
change as the ‘embedding’ of such principles in a social structure implies ontological 
primacy of the former, and doing so re-instantiates a radical dichotomy which 
Weinreich et al. have set out to challenge in the first place. I locate here, following in 
the footsteps of Figueroa (1994), a paradox that has defined mainstream variationist 
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sociolinguistics from the beginning; a paradox currently being addressed in 
metatheoretical literature (Coupland, 2016c) and, implicitly, in the increasing 
popularity of third-wave variationism:  
 
From a historical perspective, variationist sociolinguists were eager to contest 
linguistic parochialism by introducing sociology to the study of language. But they 
have never fundamentally challenged the distinction between language and society, 
internal and external factors, in the first place. 
 
Whether Eckert’s notion of ‘style’, and third-wave variationism more generally, is 
such a fundamental challenge still needs to be fleshed out by third-wave variationists, 
as argued in chapter 3. For my part, I believe that it is, and I think that its philosophical 
underpinning waters down Weinreich et al.’s framework and the subsequent separation 
of internal and external factors considerably by depriving many problems stated in 
table 1 of their ontological status.  
 
In the remainder of this thesis, I shall try to make explicit what I mean by this, and I 
shall draw out the implications of locating ‘ideology in language itself’ (Eckert, 2012, 
p. 98) by elaborating on the critique offered in Silverstein (2016, pp. 59-63, see chapter 
3.5). To recapitulate, Silverstein (2016, p. 63) argues that one needs to theorise 
language variation and change as 
 
a movement of a sociological structure of repertoires of enregisterment – with or 
without explicitly standardized ones – distributed over a language community, always 
changing but always immanent in the variance of parole in which people perform their 
context-relevant identities via indexical semiosis. This will finally realize a dialectical 
and simultaneously socio- and historical linguistics conceptually adequate to succeed 
the would-be mechanism of “mindless” – really, unminded – Neogrammarian additive 
phonological change.  
 
A lot seems to hinge in this critique on the notion of the ‘register’ (Agha, 2006), which 
I have alluded to in the preceding chapters of this thesis without having made explicit 
what is meant by it. Agha conceives of registers as ‘reflexive models of language use 
that are disseminated along identifiable trajectories in social space through 
communicative processes’ (Agha, 2005, p. 38, emphasis in original). By reflexive is 
meant the indexical and performative nature of the register applied. For instance, 
deference indexicals such as French vous or German Sie evoke social inequality by 
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belittling one of the interlocutors and putting the other on a pedestal. Regardless of the 
actual social standing of the interlocutors, the utterance of one single vous or Sie 
assigns to the situation a social frame (in the sense of Goffman, 1974) that all 
interlocutors can decipher if they have access to the register in questions, in this case 
the register of deference. In other words, 
 
The utterance or use of a register’s forms formulates a sketch of the social occasion 
of language use, indexing contextual features such as interlocutors’ roles, 
relationships, and the type of social practice in which they are engaged. (Agha, 2006, 
p. 25, emphasis in original)  
 
Typically, registers have been treated in the literature by scholars and non-scholars 
alike as ‘metapragmatic classification[s] of discourse types’ (Agha, 2006, p. 23). These 
discourse types can cover everything from deference systems, gender-specific 
grammatical codes (Haas, 1964 [1944]) to codes applied in professional contexts, such 
as academic jargon or ‘legalese’ (a derogatory term for jargon-heavy language used in 
legal contexts). When someone employs forms of legalese in a conversation, for 
instance, one could infer that the social occasion of language use is perhaps a legal 
argument, that the interlocutor has probably been trained in law, that their proficient 
usage of jargon expresses expertise, and so on.  
 
Crucially, however, registers can cover a wide range of social occasions and are not 
necessarily restricted to forms of codified language use. They offer insight into how 
agents navigate through all kinds of social situations. Social agents can themselves 
create registers “on the fly” to do social work by recruiting signs into their repertoire 
(the case of hayır in chapter 2 is a good example of this). Current anthropological 
literature is therefore not so much interested in the taxonomic description of what kinds 
of registers exist in codified form but how registers (codified and uncodified) come 
into being in the first place and how they are circulated through what Silverstein in the 
above quote calls ‘movement of a sociological structure of repertoires of 
enregisterment’. A newly-formed register can “catch on” and lead to the emergence of 
a social stereotype, which, in turn, makes the register in question more salient in the 
social landscape via ‘sensorially perceivable signs’ (Agha, 2006, p. 27). Because of 
this saliency, Lakota men can use grammaticalised female speech, British Asians [ʈ] 
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for /t/, North American girls HRT or Turkish grassroots hayır to do important 
illocutionary work, namely evoking motherliness, ethnic affiliation or the persona of 
a Valley Girl, or engaging in political resistance respectively (see chapter 2.1).  
 
Such signs, ‘semiotic artifacts’ (Agha, 2006, p. 27), are not necessarily linguistic, and 
can involve clothing, bodily movement or other ‘semiotically “readable” objects’ 
(Agha, 2006, p. 27) as well. A good example of this is punks wearing safety pins as 
earrings, which can be construed as a statement against capitalist society and the 
obsession with expensive luxury goods. The point is that systematic usage of registers 
structures – gives a frame to – interactions in everyday life. Eckert’s focus on style 
and personae follows the same logic, and she would gladly use the term register if it 
were not for its connotations ‘of features associated with a specific setting or fixed 
social category' (Eckert, 2018, p. 146). She also acknowledges the importance of 
enregisterment (ibid.), which Agha defines as follows: 
 
A register exists as a bounded object only to a degree set by sociohistorical processes 
of enregisterment, processes by which the forms and values of a register become 
differentiable from the rest of the language (i.e., recognizable as distinct, linked to 
typifiable social personae or practices) for a given population of speakers. (Agha, 
2006, p. 37, emphasis in orginal) 
 
Since the collection of individuals that we call a society is constantly changing in 
demographic composition (due to births, deaths, and migrations, for example) the 
continuous historical existence of a register depends upon mechanisms for the 
replication of its forms and values over changing populations (e.g., from generation to 
generation). The group of ‘‘users’’ of a register continuously changes and renews 
itself; hence the differentiable existence of the register, an awareness of its distinctive 
forms and values, must be communicable to new members of the group in order for 
the register to persist in some relatively constant way over time. (Agha, 2006, p. 27, 
emphasis in orginal) 
 
The above quotes, I believe, are valuable resources to re-conceptualise the transition 
problem stated in Weinreich et al. (1968). ‘Transition’ suggests that languages change 
from state A to state B, and then the variable in question loses potency – the change 
has ‘gone to completion’ (e.g. Labov, 1994, p. 342). But changes are never complete 
when acknowledging that they continue doing social work as part of a register that, 
per the above quote, is ‘differentiable from the rest of language’. My joint paper 
(chapter 2) is a powerful example of this: the indexical meaning of hayır ‘good’ has 
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been extremely robust over two millennia, and one could say that the restriction to 
religious indexicality has ‘gone to completion’ ever since hayır was borrowed into 
Turkish between the 8th and 10th centuries. But this could only happen by re-
enregistering hayır ‘good’, over generations, through religious practice, thereby 
continually reinstating in the social landscape a contrast between religious cohorts 
using hayır and those using yok/iyi instead (see chapter 2.3.1). When, with the rise of 
the AKP, religious practice became associated with Anti-Kemalism, a new salient 
opposition emerged in the social landscape, and the register in which hayır ‘good’ has 
been employed changed its scope and illocutionary meaning: what once indexed pure 
religiousness has come to index a political ideology that grounds its claims in the 
former (see chapter 2.3). The meaning of hayır was therefore never fixed; the change 
never ‘complete’. Its indexical associations remained constant for a good while, but 
they were never detached from social life.  
 
The same logic can and has been applied to the context of phonological change. The 
English short-vowel system has been robust compared to the long-vowel system ‘from 
the earliest records of the language’ (Labov, 1994, p. 10). Yet, this only seemed to be 
an ‘illusion of stability’ (ibid.), as evidenced by English speakers of the Inland North 
of the USA who are undergoing a clockwise vowel rotation (the Northern Cities Shift, 
see chapters 3.1, 3.3 and 3.5). According to Labov (2010, pp. 116-118), a variety of 
settlement processes in Western New York in the first half of the 19th century led to a 
koine, a dialect arisen from contact of many dialects, which shows general tensing of 
short a. This koine then subsequently spread to the inland after the uplifting of the Erie 
Canal. Labov himself has theorised that speakers from the Inland North can utilise this 
vowel rotation as a linguistic register to distance themselves from the cultural South, 
in addition to already present cultural differences circling settlement history and voting 
behaviour (Labov, 2010, chapter 10, see also chapter 3.3): 
 
Though the NCS remains below the level of social awareness, it is possible that its 
speakers have (if unconsciously) come to associate this sound shift, over the past few 
generations, with the political and cultural outlook inherited from the Yankee settlers. 
Those associations have evolved over time with various social and demographic 
changes, and especially with the realignment of the two major parties in the 1960s. As 
long as these ideological differences persist, speakers may be more likely to align their 
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productions towards those around them who share their own identity and world-view. 
(Labov, 2010, p. 235)  
 
Labov, Rosenfelder, and Fruehwald (2013) provide a similar example. They trace in 
Philadelphia English a reversal of the fronting of the back upgliding vowels /aw/ and 
/ow/. Geographically, Philadelphia can be classified as the northernmost region of 
Southern Cities (Labov et al., 2013, p. 49). The retraction of /aw/ and /ow/ fronting is 
a sign of Philadelphia turning away from the Southern pattern to a typological 
Northern pattern: 
 
Dialect features that Philadelphia shares with the North and the Inland North show a 
linear incrementation across the century. Dialect features that differentiate 
Philadelphia from the North and North Midland and identify Philadelphia with the 
Southeastern region show an increase up to the middle of the twentieth century (for 
speakers born before 1940), and a symmetrical decline in favor of the Northern pattern 
thereafter. (Labov et al., 2013, p. 51) 
 
Labov et al. (2013) explain this by the social evaluation associated with the variables 
in question. As the two variables have progressed in raising, they have become 
increasingly salient to the speech community. Data collected in the 1970s shows that 
speakers in Philadelphia had developed ‘a moderate degree of social awareness’ of 
/aw/ and /ow/ fronting (Labov et al., 2013, p. 52).  They then started to retract from it 
– apparently starting with speakers born in the middle of the twentieth century (Labov 
et al., 2013, pp. 44-47) – because /aw/ and /ow/ fronting index Southernness, 
something the speech community deemed undesirable. Similarly to the above 
example, thus, the North-South cultural opposition has functioned as an important 
‘axis of differentiation’ (Gal, 2016b) in the social landscape, and the two registers 
associated with it, which Labov et al. (2013) discuss in the context of dialect regions, 
have become important vehicles to signal ideological affiliation beyond the borders of 
the speech community. 
 
Compare these examples to what Weinreich et al. (1968, p. 187) have to say: 
 
The advancement of the linguistic change to completion may be accompanied by a 
rise in the level of social awareness of the change and the establishment of a social 
stereotype. Eventually, the completion of the change and the shift of the variable to 
the status of a constant is accompanied by the loss of whatever social significance the 
feature possessed. 
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It would be unfaithful to Labov et al. (2013) to argue that they entirely disagree with 
this position. After all, social awareness of /aw/ and /ow/ fronting is an important 
determinant in their theorising, and the Northern dialect features they refer to are 
changes in progress that have not come to completion yet (and can, per the above 
quote, still ‘rise in the level of social awareness’). It is, however, important to notice 
that, from the perspective of the register, the distinction between changes in progress 
and what Weinreich et al. refer to here as a ‘constant’ is a misleading one. As argued 
in chapter 3, it is misleading because it tries to restrict the social sphere to the optional 
commentary of a change already present in the system. When the change has gone to 
completion, the social sphere can “rest” until the next change is under way. But neither 
changes in progress nor changes that have gone to completion are ever completely 
devoid of social significance. Variables might be unmarked for a while, as was the 
case of hayır before the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. Even variables that 
gradually change in their phonetic implementation can be unmarked, as evidenced by 
numerously documented cases of change from below. But registers always define 
themselves ex negativo, and the minute an individual, a community of practice or a 
speech community perceives a difference between their and another’s register, 
unmarked variables can become marked as part of a register speakers can align with 
or distance themselves from. In the above example, Philadelphians perceived a marked 
contrast between their /aw/ and /ow/ fronting and how “Northerners talk”. They then 
got rid of these differences, and this allowed them to align themselves with whatever 
they associate with the North by “talking like a Northerner” (or, conversely, to distance 
themselves from the South by not talking like a Southerner). Other speech 
communities, of course, might spot different variables that set their registers apart, 
thus marking features that might have gone completely unnoticed in the Philadelphian 
context. ‘Social significance’, to return to the quote above, can then not be measured 
with recourse to one linguistic system or one register alone. Even if speakers within a 
single speech community do not attribute meaning to a variant, others might, and this 
can put pressure on even the most historically robust variants. 
 
This is not to say that each and every register adjustment can be traced back to a 
conscious desire to portray or erase difference. The reasons for this are similar to the 
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reasons why Weinreich et al.’s evaluation problem is problematic from a theoretical 
point of view, but I shall return to this matter further below. The point I wish to make 
here is that one perceives difference only relatively to one’s own register (or, as will 
be argued below, relatively to ideas about registers). This perception can be targeted 
at features one is not even necessarily aware of. Figure 9 depicts the vowel dispersions 
of one male speaker of Turkish who grew up in Turkey (red polygons with dashed 
lines), and one male and one female speaker of Turkish who both grew up in Austria 
(blue polygons with solid lines in facet A and B respectively). When Turkish 
respondents were asked to evaluate speech samples by those speakers, they could 
immediately tell that one of the male speakers comes from a diaspora background 
because there are “sharp differences in the way he pronounces his vowels” – a 
judgment they could not specify further (Woschitz, in preparation).  
 
 
Figure 9: Normalised vowel-charts of Turkish speakers. In both facets, the red polygons with dashed 
lines show as a ‘baseline’ the vowel dispersion of the male speaker who grew up in Turkey. The blue 
polygon with solid lines shows the vowel dispersion of the male (facet A) and the female (facet B) 
speaker who both grew up in Austria. Data taken from Woschitz (in preparation). 
 
One can infer from figure 9b that the male speaker who grew up in Turkey and the 
female speaker who grew up in Austria both present with a relatively centralised vowel 
system that is typical of Turkish phonology (Darcy & Krüger, 2012; Stangen, Kupisch, 
Ergün, & Zielke, 2015). The other male speaker (figure 9a) presents with a vowel 
system that makes more use of the lower phonetic space. Both of his low back vowels 
/o/ and /a/ show marked outliers towards the lower end of the spectrum, while his /ɯ/ 
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seems to pattern more with high front vowels (figure 11). Also, his mean /a/ is 
significantly further back (p = .005) compared to the speaker who grew up in Turkey 
(figures 10a and 11a) – indicative of influence of Standard Austrian German 
phonology (Moosmüller, Schmid, & Brandstätter, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 10: Unrounded (facet A) and rounded (facet B) vowels of the male speaker who grew up in 
Turkey (=red polygons with dashed lines in figure 9). Ellipses show 30% confidence interval. Data 
taken from Woschitz (in preparation). 
 
 
Figure 11: Unrounded (facet A) and rounded (facet B) vowels of the male speaker who grew up in 
Austria (=blue polygon with solid lines in Figure 9a). Ellipses show 30% confidence interval. Data 
taken from Woschitz (in preparation). 
 
It is probably these deviations from Turkish Phonology that the respondents perceived 
when they made their judgment (though, of course, there may be others as well). The 
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diaspora male’s pronunciation of back vowels differed markedly from their own, and 
this difference was construed by the respondents as an index of foreignness. 
Participants were thus able to identify a Diaspora Turkish variety which, to my 
knowledge, could not be identified by linguists on purely structural grounds (see 
Backus, 2012). 
 
Such an explanation is, of course, complicated by the fact that speakers’ ideas about 
their own register do not necessarily have to be congruent with what their register, in 
this case their vowel pronunciation, actually looks or sounds like. The Turkish 
respondents might not have compared the diaspora male’s pronunciation to their own 
actual pronunciation but to how they think their own pronunciation sounds like, or how 
they believe Standard Turkish should sound like. 
 
Applied linguists have long acknowledged as a historical fact that production and 
perception do not necessarily have to go together, and that inconsistencies between the 
two can be enhanced or papered over when speakers engage in ideological and political 
work (see Joseph, 2006). Serbian and Croatian, Austrian German and German spoken 
in Germany, or English and Scots are all cases in point where peoples’ desire for 
difference can trump structural similarities. Conversely, if there is a strong desire for 
unity, not even structural differences that make varieties mutually unintelligible can 
stop it from being fulfilled – one only needs to think about Chinese. Once ideological 
disunities or unities like these have been established in the social landscape (e.g. Serbia 
and Croatia being construed as two different nations, thus speaking two distinct 
languages; or the belief in a shared Chinese nation, thus speaking the same language), 
they become powerful ideological constructs that put pressure not only on how one 
perceives oneself but also the speech of those who were ‘othered’ in the process. 
D'Onofrio (in preparation, p. 2) provides convincing experimental evidence of how 
ideological beliefs ‘can bias memory, leading us to attribute utterances to speakers 
even when they did not occur’. In other words, if one has the expectation that group 
A, speaker B or even oneself talks like C, this expectation biases one’s perception and 
papers over aspects that are inconsistent with it (Irvine & Gal, 2000 call this ‘erasure’). 
As already mentioned above, this does not only pertain to registers on a national scale 
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but to more locally relevant registers as well. For instance, North American listeners 
were found to expect backing of TRAP when told that they listened to a Valley Girl 
(D’Onofrio, 2015). Conversely, ‘hearing a backed TRAP led listeners to rate a speaker 
as more likely to be a Valley Girl than hearing the same speaker using fronter TRAPs’ 
(D'Onofrio, in preparation, p. 3). Thus, people have specific ideas how others sound 
like. These ideas are re-instantiated by marked features, in this case TRAP fronting, 
whose presence or absence becomes pivotal in deciding whether a speaker belongs to 
one or the other category, in this case to Valley Girls or not. 
 
Weinreich et al.’s evaluation problem does not seem to do justice to this complexity. 
They – or, rather, Labov in his subsequent work – locate in the production/perception 
asymmetry a linguistic automaticity that follows its own rules (see chapter 3.1). If a 
speech community cannot overtly comment on a change in progress, Labov takes this 
as evidence for the ontological autonomy of the latter. But it seems that in this kind of 
explanation, he massively underestimates the power of ideology.40 Ideology is a 
driving force that transcends the ability of a single speaker or a group of speakers to 
put into words the social meaning of a changing phonetic implementation of a 
phoneme happening from a bird’s-eye view. Where Labov conceives a dichotomy 
along availability to social commentary (or rather, a trichotomy along indicators, 
markers and stereotypes), one witnesses in reality a sliding scale where features can 
be variably marked or unmarked depending on the context and by whom they are 
employed. When a punk wears safety pins as earrings, it is hardly an unconscious act 
– it would be rather a painful one. But when it comes to clothing, body language or 
speech, the lines become increasingly blurred. If one does not give much about posh 
clothing and regularly buys sneakers instead of gents’ shoes, one does not necessarily 
have the intent to make a socio-political statement. But others might read it as one and 
could capitalise on it; for instance, middle-aged upper middle-class men who want to 
portray what could be called ‘ordered carelessness’ and thus youth by wearing 
expensive shirts and jackets with casual, albeit overpriced sneakers. Their behaviour 
will reflect on one’s own, because the register associated with the wearing of sneakers 
                                                        
40 While Labov (2016) engages, for instance, with Gal’s (2016a) criticism of his theorising of style, his 
responses rarely address paradigm constrains as discussed by Silverstein (2016). 
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has changed. The crux, then, lies in the fact that differentiation will happen if one 
wants it or not. This makes social evaluation, contra Labov, a multi-layered, intricate 
process that transcends the ability of a member of a speech community to say, “Sign 
A means B”. Not everyone in the same community has access to the same interpretive 
frame, and no-one has the prerogative of interpretation when it comes to their own 
register, or ‘style’, as Eckert would have it. 
 
As discussed in chapter 3.5, Labov (2010) argues, following Martinet (1955), that 
chain shifting is the long-term adjustment of a linguistic system to ‘a disequilibrium 
created by a triggering event’ (Labov, 2010, pp. 369-370). For Labov, these triggering 
events are not restricted to ‘social’ phenomena like large-scale migration streams, as 
Martinet held, but they can also include ‘linguistic’ triggering events such as phonemic 
mergers. In both cases, the changing phonetic implementations of a phoneme – or, in 
the case of a merger, the collapse of two phonetic implementations into one – threatens 
the equilibrium in the respective phonological subsystem (e.g. long vowels, upgliding 
diphthongs, ingliding diphthongs, etc.). For instance, when /ɛ/ starts to raise, the 
neighbouring variable /e/ would run the risk of becoming indistinguishable from it. It 
therefore moves in lockstep in order to maintain phonemic contrast. This, in turn, 
threatens the autonomy of /i/, which can then, according to the upper-exit principle 
(Labov, 1994, p. 602), change to the subsystem of diphthongs because it can raise no 
more. This, in turn, triggers nucleus-glide differentiation to maximise perceptual 
contrast, and so on. Once vowels have undergone this adjustment and have achieved a 
renewed equidistant position within their respective subsystem, one can say that the 
change has come to completion. From this perspective, it makes sense to conceive of 
a change as having a starting and an end point (Weinreich et al.’s transition problem). 
It even makes sense to ask the questions whether speakers pay attention to 
intermediary stages (Weinreich et al.’s evaluation problem). But the whole explanation 
seems to stand and fall with the principle of maximum dispersion. In Principles of 
Linguistic Change: Cognitive and Cultural Factors, Labov (2010, p. 92) calls it, rather 
parenthetically, a ‘well-recognized principle’, and much explanatory value is 
attributed to it in theorising sound change. Compare this to what Labov et al. (2013, 
p. 48) have to say with regard to developments in Philadelphian English: 
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One can see phonological generalizations operating here, in the raising of /eyC/, /ay0/, 
and /aw/ and the general fronting of /ow/ and /aw/. […] But the explanatory force of 
such generalizations is limited. None of these movements can be accounted for by 
structural adjustments to maximize the functional economy of the system (Martinet 
1955). It has been shown that such tendencies operate within subsystems V, Vy, Vw 
(Labov 1994:273–79). In the Vy system, the raising of /eyC/ is in the opposite 
direction from what a tendency to maximal dispersion would predict, bringing it closer 
and closer to /iyC/, and the raising of /ay0/ cannot be seen as a response to any such 
pressures. In the Vw system, the fronting of /ow/ brings it closer and closer to raised 
and fronted /aw/ so that in Now I know, now [nɛ:<o] may be distinguished from know 
[nɛ:<o] by only a small difference in the second formant of the nucleus. To understand 
the driving forces behind these two types of sound change we have to look elsewhere 
for a common property that would account for such differences in direction. (italics in 
original, footnote omitted) 
 
They conclude that ‘the long-term evolution of language is the result of […] micro-
fluctuations in the social context, controlled by the structural imperatives that govern 
the production of speech in everyday life’ (Labov et al., 2013, p. 61). Of course, a 
critical reader could argue at this point that, three years earlier, Labov had tried to sell 
the idea that the principle of maximum dispersion is exactly such a ‘structural 
imperative’, but now it is downgraded to a ‘tendency’.41 The same critical reader also 
probably observed that the vowel in figures 10 and 11 are by no means in an equidistant 
position, as, for both speakers, /e/ overlaps with /i/, leaving a gap to /a/ that could easily 
be filled in order to increase perceptual contrast. There are other issues concerning the 
principle of maximum dispersion which Labov leaves unaddressed, such as the fact 
that women often present with greater between-category dispersion than men (Diehl, 
Lindblom, Hoemeke, & Fahey, 1996), an example of which can be seen in figure 9b 
above; or that what seems to constrain vowel systems the most is not equidistance but 
whether they are learnable or not (Vaux & Samuels, 2015). 
 
At this point in the discussion, it might make sense to take a step back and re-evaluate. 
The transition and embedding of a change seem to be, following the above quote, 
entirely driven by ‘micro-fluctuations in the social context’. Where one could posit 
internal factors in this understanding, I do not know. Sure, a linguist could go and 
describe how Modern English upgliding vowels have changed in some varieties, but I 
                                                        
41 Mapudungun, a language isolate spoken in Chile and Argentina, for instance, seems to be a language 
that does not conform to the principle of maximum dispersion (Sadowsky, 2019; Sadowsky, Painequeo, 
Salamanca, & Avelino, 2013). 
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am trying to make a philosophical point here: there is nothing in the embedding or 
transitioning of the above-described vowel changes in Philadelphia that needs to be 
accounted for by drawing on distinctly linguistic principles; or, conversely, that cannot 
be accounted for by the concept of enregisterment. The fact that one might witness 
structural tendencies to restore equidistance between phonemes or to distinguish 
between glides and nuclei is surely not enough to postulate primacy of ‘internal 
factors’ as opposed to ‘external factors’. 
 
What, then, are those ‘structural imperatives that govern the production of speech in 
everyday life’ alluded to in the above quote? The answer to this question leads us to 
Weinreich et al.’s constraint problem, the last stronghold of ‘internal factors’. As 
discussed in chapter 3.1, Labov (1994) has established a handful of principles that 
seem to constrain language change, such that, in chain shifts, peripheral vowels 
become more close and non-peripheral vowels more open, or that peripheral high and 
mid vowels can diphthongise. What counts as peripheral can change from one 
language to another: for Germanic and Baltic languages, for instance, the 
peripheral/non-peripheral distinction is congruent with the tense/lax distinction, while, 
in Romance languages, only front unrounded and back rounded vowels are peripheral 
(Labov, 1994, p. 601). Still, Labov is convinced that peripherality is an underlying 
phonological ordering principle, and he is at peace with attributing such an ‘abstract 
principle of language’ to UG: 
 
In 1968, Weinreich, Labov, and Herzog outlined five problems to be solved in 
establishing the empirical foundations of a theory of language change. The first of 
these, the constraints problem, is to discover whatever constraints may exist on the 
form, direction, or structural character of linguistic changes. This definition of the 
constraints problem is not inconsistent with the search for a “universal grammar” that 
is the central thrust of formal linguistics today. The extension of this program to the 
study of language change would seek to establish a set of principles that define the 
concept “possible linguistic change” and that distinguish possible from impossible 
changes. At the heart of this universalistic approach is the idea that there are abstract 
principles of language present in all human beings, which define or permit certain 
types of language change and prohibit others: in other words, that there are some 
possible linguistic actions that human beings never perform, since they are incapable 
of doing so, and that changes that depend on such actions will never be found. (Labov, 
1994, p. 115) 
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Whether drawing a parallel between constraints and UG helps Labov to make his case, 
I leave for the reader to decide. Roughly around the time Principles of Linguistic 
Change: Internal Factors (1994) was published, Chomsky had already adopted the 
Minimalist Program, which considerably simplified UG to a conjunction of a logical 
form (LF) and phonological/phonetic form (PF) mediated by a simplified form of 
syntax (see chapter 4.3). Besides, attributing principles of chain shifting to a UG is an 
unusual rationalist step for Labov, who usually considers himself to be a materialist 
(see Figueroa, 1994, chapter 4; Labov, 2016, pp. 595-597). The attested instances of 
principles of chain shifts in Labov (1994, p. 122) were overwhelmingly found in Indo-
European languages, with occasional Sino-Tibetan or Finno-Ugric languages. Does 
this warrant speaking of ‘abstract principles of language present in all human beings’? 
Chomsky would not see a problem with this, as he is convinced that one could, in 
theory, establish principles of UG by studying just one well-known language (see 
chapter 4.3); but for Labov, who has always been empirically leaned, this seems like 
a long shot.  
 
These concerns notwithstanding, here are some constraints that could, following this 
logic, be attributed to UG: 
 
The last hundred years of evolution of the Philadelphia dialect displays some structural 
patterns that account for the directions of change: the generalization across parallel 
structures (nucleus-glide differentiation of back upgliding vowels, peripheral raising 
of long and ingliding vowels, the simplification of the short-a system). It has also 
shown coarticulatory effects that disrupt the unity of the phoneme (coronal onsets for 
/uw/; consonantal codas for /ey/; voiceless codas for /ay0/). (Labov et al., 2013, pp. 
60-61, italics in original)  
 
As regards the generalisation across parallel structures, to draw on generativist jargon, 
speakers seem to have an ‘intuitive’ understanding that there exist different 
phonological subsystems, such as ingliding diphthongs, upgliding diphthongs, long 
vowels, etc.; and they are regularly found to generalise over variables within such 
‘natural classes’ (see Fruehwald, 2013, pp. 149-150; 2017, p. 35). In the case of 
Philadelphia, speakers recognise that /aw/ on /ow/ belong to the same subsystem 
(upgliding diphthongs), and therefore their phonetic implementation moves in 
lockstep. In layman’s terms, speakers who pronounce south like [sɛʊθ] are also likely 
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to pronounce loathe as [lɛʊð], not [loʊð]. Natural classes, then, constrain changes 
because analogous treatment of variables within a subsystem is more likely than across 
subsystems. Given their identical glides, the vowels in south and loathe are produced 
very similarly in most English varieties. Their nucleus is different (in /ow/, it is more 
close and the tongue body is further back), but, all in all, the Bewegungsgefühl or 
‘sense of movement’, to return to Paul’s terminology (see chapter 4.4), is more similar 
than, say, that of /ow/ (loath) and /ay/ (might). Therefore, /aw/ and /ow/ offer 
themselves to being treated similarly, but /ow/ and /ay/, on average, do not.  
 
Such generalisations are not incongruent with what the Neogrammarians had in mind 
when they talked about analogy (see Paul, 1920 [1880], chapter 5). Speakers, the 
Neogrammarians held, have a desire for a “logical” language system. After language 
change has wreaked havoc, individuals re-establish order by imposing onto the 
linguistic system a new set of relations (Proportionengruppen in Paul’s terminology) 
to minimise the “damage” caused by a language change (Paul, 1920 [1880], chapter 
10).42 In variationist jargon, one could argue that analogy is an “external” intervention 
in the linguistic system to restore or uphold order. Such a view would attribute a good 
part of linguistic changes ‘from within’ (such as the ‘generalization across parallel 
structures’ in the quote above) to actual motivations ‘from without’ the linguistic 
system (to draw on the distinction offered in  Labov, 2006 [1966], p. 203; 2007, p. 
346). If one wishes to fully follow through with the Neogrammarian doctrine, one 
would have to attribute quite a lot to the individual psyche. Internal factors would then 
give way to the general psychological need for structure (something Saussure likewise 
acknowledged in his first Cours, see Joseph, 2000, p. 314), which, of course, 
transcends linguistic domains (Levi-Strauss, 1962 is a case in point).  
 
Again, I am trying to make a philosophical point here: nothing in this logic necessitates 
an ontologically distinct reality of language-internal constraints that are possibly 
located in a UG. The simplification of the short-a system alluded to in the above quote 
                                                        
42 Notice that Saussure himself, in his first Course on General Linguistics, held that analogy can happen 
unconsciously (Joseph, 2000, section 3) – a remark largely forgotten in orthodox variationist 
sociolinguistics that theorises language-internal and language-external change along the lines of social 
awareness (see chapters 3.1 and 3.5). 
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is no different; can likewise be accounted for by an external intervention into the 
linguistic system. Philadelphian English has had a complex system that tenses short a 
in closed syllables with nasals or voiceless fricatives in coda-position. Because there 
are many lexical exceptions to this, it has often been classified as a case of lexical 
diffusion (Labov, 1994, pp. 429-432; Labov et al., 2013, p. 55), and its continued 
existence has been dependent on parent-child transmission (Labov, 2007, pp. 353-
356). Younger, educated Philadelphians have simplified this system to a system that 
tenses only before nasals, thus getting rid of markedly local Philadelphian phonology. 
As outlined above, one can describe this process as register-alignment with the North 
(by getting rid of markedly local features and features shared with Southern English). 
Here, the notion of ‘internal factors’ is restricted to how this register-alignment is 
reflected in the linguistic structure, and to how speakers systematically engage with 
the linguistic system to achieve their goal.  
 
The next point on the list is the disruption of the phoneme by coarticulatory effects. 
As argued above, not every language change is a case of register alignment; often, as 
meticulously studied by third-wave variationists, speakers themselves create new 
registers to do social work. Salient features of their speech might bias them in a certain 
direction; might constrain them in their choice of register form they utilise in the 
process. For instance, coronal fronting is a general coarticulatory effect to reduce 
distance between places of articulation. In most English varieties, too [thuʊ] will be 
pronounced as something like [thʉʊ], thus minimising the distance between the tip of 
the tongue touching the alveolar ridge in /t/ and the back of the tongue approaching 
the velum in /u/. In most North American varieties, the contrast will be even bigger, 
so that too will be pronounced as something like [thiʊ] (Labov et al., 2013, p. 50). In 
this case, fronting after coronal stops has been ‘phonologicalised’ (see Fruehwald, 
2013). This means that speakers have added to their ‘grammar’ (very much in the 
Chomskyan sense) a phonological rule (or, if one prefers constraints-based phonology, 
a re-ordering of constraints) that states that whenever the Vw natural class is preceded 




In Philadelphia, this rule is barred when Vw is followed by the lateral approximant /l/ 
(Fruehwald, 2013, p. 107). Philadelphians often vocalise or reduce /l/ in syllable codas 
to a velar approximant [ɰ], sometimes accompanied by velar frication (Fruehwald, 
2013, p. 106). This results in glide-deletion and compensatory lengthening, so that tool 
[thuʊɫ] is pronounced something like [thu:ɰ]. Given that only the nucleus, more 
specifically the first mora, moves in the above examples (the glide [ʊ] remains 
constant), fronting is no longer possible in this case because the nucleus and the glide 
have collapsed into a long vowel that occupies both moras (Fruehwald, 2013, p. 107). 
In other words, liquid vocalisation in coda-position has alienated the Vw natural class 
from Vwl, which becomes a phonological category of its own, thereby constraining 
quite literally how speakers move their speech organs in certain phonological 
environments.  
 
In other varieties, such as Southern English, Vw fronting is not barred by /l/ in coda-
position, such that tool [thuʊɫ] is pronounced like [thiʊɫ] (Labov, Ash, & Boberg, 2006, 
pp. 152-155). This is a salient feature in the North-American social landscape, 
indexing Southernness. Of course, as explained above, this saliency is grounded in its 
marked difference from other registers, such as Philadelphia English or Northern 
varieties that do not front before /l/. But, as it stands, Philadelphian English and 
Southern English seem to have different constraints within their respective system, 
such that we can say that, in Philadelphian English, Vw → Vː | _l  (see Fruehwald, 
2013, p. 107), while, in Southern English (redundantly), Vw → Vw | _l.  
 
The crucial thing is that, at this point, the discussion has arrived at the level of a 
synchronic comparison of grammars, side-stepping the question how phonological 
rule formation, reordering, simplification, elision, etc. spreads through the social 
landscape, and why phonological innovations come about in the first place. /l/ 
reduction in Philadelphia can explain why the Vwl class does not participate in Vw 
fronting, but it does not account for why Vw fronting happens. It is also not clear why 
the South has phonologicalised coronal fronting entirely while the North did not before 
/l/. All we can do is describe synchronic states of linguistic systems that differ in these 
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regards, and deduce from them different constraints governing, at a certain point of 
time, ‘the production of speech in everyday life’ (Labov et al., 2013, p. 61).  
 
Silverstein (2016, p. 63) bemoans this reductionism to synchronic states of grammar, 
not only because it provides little insight into how language is used by social agents to 
do ideological work, but also because it fails to overcome the synchrony/diachrony 
paradox that has accompanied modern linguistics from the start (see also Silverstein, 
2003). On the one hand, most linguists will agree that languages are in constant flux. 
On the other hand, however, descriptions of languages or grammars are 
overwhelmingly snapshots in time. Language change is largely studied in the form of 
a sequencing of synchronic stages without much insight into how changes between 
stages have come about. Within Optimality Theory (OT), for instance, it is not agreed 
upon whether language change is the initiator or the result of a re-ordering of 
constraints – all one can tell for sure is that a language that underwent change has had 
two different orders of constraints at two points in history (see Holt, 2003).  
 
Some phonologists working in OT argue that a language might have an unfixed order 
of constraints within its grammar that makes two ‘candidates’ equally likely, leading 
to free variation. Sociolinguistic driving forces can lead to one constraint being 
preferred over the other, thereby fixing the order of constraints and affecting language 
change in a certain direction (see Holt, 2003, p. 22). Within such a framework, 
‘external’ factors (as opposed to internal factors) are often treated in terms of a 
‘sociocultural selection device’ that ‘utilizes optionality in the grammatical system’ 
(Fruehwald, 2013, p. 28). Conversely, if optionality does not exist, no amount of social 
willingness will achieve change. Syntactic islands (e.g. Did John ask [where Peter 
went to buy an apple]? vs. *what did John ask [where Peter went to buy t]?) are barred 
by the grammar and will therefore never be utilised to perform social work – they are 
a ‘sociolinguistic impossibility’ (Fruehwald, 2013, p. 29). Under such a view, 
language change could be “complete” at some point, because a language could, in 
theory, arrive at a stage where all optionality within its grammar has been exploited; 
where all constraints have been fixed.  
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There is, however, vast evidence against such an assumption. Languages have changed 
from the beginning, otherwise one would not witness the plurality of languages and 
language families. No matter how many constraints grammar seems to impose on 
speakers, linguists regularly find themselves to return to language-external innovations 
in their explanations of what triggers changes in the grammar:  
 
The constraints isolated as relevant to shifts do not impose a uniformity of direction, 
nor is there any single constraint which remains undominated throughout the historic 
and current changes of the English long vowels. These constraints are sufficient to 
describe quite accurately the initial stage of various changes. Why one or another of 
the constraints takes the lead at a given time or in a given variety of the language is a 
matter of register-dependent innovations making their way into the grammar. 
(Minkova & Stockwell, 2003, p. 186) 
 
At this point, I would like to wrap up. No-one has, to my knowledge, ever been able 
to identify non-trivial internal factors that are clearly independent from social factors. 
Even highly formalised internal factors at the level of grammar find themselves 
returning to ‘register-dependent innovations’.  
 
Over the timespan surveyed, internal factors have covered everything from ‘automatic’ 
changes in a linguistic system, to the adjustment of a linguistic system to achieve 
maximal dispersion, to statements like /e:/ is more likely to raise to /i:/ then fall to /a:/, 
to coarticulatory effects biasing phonologicalisation, to possibly innate constraints like 
‘Maximize the auditory distance between the nuclear vowel and the following glide’ 
(Minkova & Stockwell, 2003, p. 173), ‘An articulation which requires more effort is 
disfavored’ (Minkova & Stockwell, 2003, p. 179) or ‘Maximize the auditory 
distinctiveness of contrasts’ (Minkova & Stockwell, 2003, p. 182). But none of these, 
as I hope to have shown in the above remarks, have been sufficient by themselves – 
certainly not to such an extent that one could, without reservation, speak of a narrow 
interface between language and society. 
  
Still, from a historian’s perspective, internal factors have served their purpose. They 
have always, in the spirit of the register discussion above, defined themselves in 
opposition to external factors. In the early days of variationist sociolinguistics, the 
language/society, change from below/above, internal/external distinction has been 
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largely made along the lines of availability to social commentary (see chapter 3). 
Social behaviour was construed in terms of rational choice, and everything that could 
not be captured by overt commentary in a speech community fell under internal 
factors. Only in the vernacular, free from social constraints, could one can find 
”untouched” changes in the phonological system (see Coupland, 2016b). When 
scholars began to pay more attention to the social functionality of sound change below 
the level of conscious awareness, internal factors were rendered as a compensatory 
mechanism that repairs a disequilibrium of the phonological system. As counter-
examples proliferated, internal factors have narrowed down to structural constraints, 
possibly part of UG, that guide changes in a certain direction, but even those are not 
protected from “being overridden” by social driving forces. 
 
Internal factors, then, seem to have suffered a similar fate as Chomskyan syntax (see 
chapter 4). Once catch-all explanations of linguistic phenomena, they absconded when 
social, cultural, cognitive or other factors have started to “do the explaining”. 
Somewhere along the way, it apparently became agreed upon that when it comes to 
the transition, embedding and actuation of a language change, to follow Weinreich et 
al.’s (1968) terminology, external factors have primacy, and internal factors previously 
associated with these processes are probably void. (Meanwhile, the evaluation 
problem has become void too, because it hinges on a primacy of linguistic processes 
that is no longer needed.) This is where contemporary sociolinguistics seems to part 
from the orthodox Labovian doctrine. To return to the initial question, then, – i.e., 
whether the rise of third-wave variationism marks an ontological breach within 
sociolinguistics –, the answer is a Yes.  
 
What remains an open question is how much revolutionary character one ascribes to 
third-wave variationism, and whether the described renunciation of a narrow interface 
between language and society in favour of a broader one is an epiphenomenon of a 
changing Zeitgeist altogether. In the 1960s, with the rise of Chomsky’s nativism, 
linguistics as an academic discipline underwent unprecedented “scientification”, 
elevating it to the status of a natural science on a par with biology and physics (or, at 
least, this is what linguists envisaged). Linguistics has always been eager to be a 
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“modern” science, though what counts as modern is, of course, dependent on 
sociohistorical context. In the 19th century, linguistics ran the risk of being swallowed 
up by psychology, which, back then, comprised mainly anti-positivistic theories of the 
mind that would today classify as philosophy (see Joseph, 2002, chapter 3). To treat 
language as a social phenomenon, as Whitney, Saussure and Meillet proposed, was a 
positivistic move that placed linguistics on a par with the, back then, modern empirical 
sciences (Joseph, 2000, section 4). In the mid-20th century, modernisation of 
linguistics came with the price that linguists had to scout around for phenomena that 
are distinctly linguistic in nature, and which are therefore only to be studied by 
linguists and not by, say, sociologists. Chomsky went down the rationalist road in his 
search for linguistic autonomy. Labov did not follow – or, rather, only followed half-
heartedly, not least because 1960s generativist doctrines ran counter to his own 
sociology-leaned intuitions (see Figueroa, 1994, chapter 4) – but his journey likewise 
led him to posit quasi-mystical driving forces behind language change that are beyond 
the control of speakers. As time passed by, however, the envisaged linguistic 
autonomy proved to be difficult to adhere to on both sides, and after half a century of 
vigorous advocacy of a distinction between the linguistic and non-linguistic, it seems 
that the two are collapsing into a messy whole again (like the nature-culture opposition 
always does, as argued by Latour, 1991). Both UG and internal factors, when rendered 
too broadly, proved to be epistemologically expensive concepts, and both eventually 
had to bow to the fact that, at the end of the day, languages are spoken by people who, 
first of all, communicate to navigate life – not by ideal speaker-listeners in 
homogeneous speech communities, and neither by individuals who function as mere 
tokens of a heterogeneous superstructure.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
What I hope to have shown in this thesis is that, over the last 50 years, variationist 
sociolinguists have gradually given up a narrow interface between language and 
society in favour of a broader one. This process is not restricted to the third wave alone, 
as even what Eckert calls first-wave variationism – orthodox Labovian sociolinguistics 
– has undergone a significant reorientation from around the turn of the millennium that 
has considerably watered down the distinction between language-internal and 
language-external factors. This, however, has not been explicitly acknowledged by 
Labov. Somewhere between Principles of Linguistic Change: Social Factors (2001) 
and Principles of Linguistic Change: Cognitive and Cultural Factors (2010), he 
implicitly began to drop the notion of linguistic autonomy in favour of the 
performative nature of language change. He has not fully followed through with this 
reorientation – neither have third-wave variationists, for that matter –, and papers like 
Eckert and Labov (2017) are powerful reminders that the quasi-mystical belief in 
abstract driving forces behind language change is far from dead in contemporary 
sociolinguistics. Nonetheless, I locate in the incipient renunciation of the narrow 
interface between language and society a paradigm shift defying the autonomy of 
internal factors that has, for a long time, guided sociolinguistics in the study of large-
scale phonological change. 
 
From a historical perspective, internal factors have always defined themselves in 
opposition to language-external factors. This instantiated in academia an 
understanding that one can, without reservation, distinguish between social and 
‘linguistic’ aspects of language use. Paradoxically, Labov has acknowledged from the 
start that an adequate theory of language change pushes the boundaries of such a 
narrow dichotomy: 
 
To explain a finding about linguistic change will mean to find its causes in a domain 
outside of linguistics: in physiology, acoustic phonetics, social relations, perceptual 
or cognitive capacities. [...] A set of propositions that relate general findings about 
language change to general properties of human beings or of human societies will 
certainly deserve to be called a theory of language change. (Labov, 1994, p. 5) 
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Nonetheless, sociolinguists have devoted themselves to the internal/external 
opposition for half a century, and the narrow interface between language and society 
is one fruit of their labour. 
 
As argued in chapters 3 and 4, a narrow interface between language and society hinges 
on considerable explanatory power attributed to language-internal factors. Roughly up 
to the turn of the millennium, internal factors had to shoulder the responsibility of 
accounting for how complex linguistic systems evolve, over generations, below the 
level of conscious awareness of the speech community. Members of the speech 
communities had to “carry forward” a change by propagating advanced phonetic 
tokens to an endpoint that is predetermined by internal principles like Martinet’s 
(1955) principle of maximal dispersion or nucleus-glide differentiation. None of these 
principles, however, ever fully determine sound changes. In later variationist work, 
they are therefore treated as mere tendencies that have to bow to the fact sound changes 
are, first of all, changes in registers that can never be abstracted away from the social 
surroundings in which they are embedded. What has become important is how social 
agents utilise register differences to situate themselves in the social landscape. 
Language change, in this understanding, is a vehicle that allows speakers to do social 
work. This is a considerable change of thinking compared to early-day variationism, 
and I think it is fair to say that it marks an ontological breach of considerable 
importance. 
 
The fact that this reorientation is not restricted to third-wave variationism alone but to 
variationist sociolinguistics in general seems to be an epiphenomenon of a broader 
development within linguistics. Parallel to the downfall of internal factors, one can 
witness, almost simultaneously, the downfall of UG as it was envisaged by Chomsky 
in the 1960s. Once catch-all concepts for complex linguistic phenomena, both UG and 
internal factors have been considerably restricted over the years. In the case of UG, 
what is left of early phrase-structure days is a conjunction of a logical form and a 
phonetic/phonological form mediated by a simplified form of syntax. In the case of 
internal factors, what is left of structural principles “unfolding” themselves in a 
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material substratum (i.e., a speech community) are tendencies that can constrain how 
register alignments or disalignments are likely to occur. 
 
I have argued in chapter 4 that, from a philosophical perspective, these developments 
share striking similarities, as they both challenge “linguistic autonomy” in their 
respective domain. Early UG, for instance, tried to restrict a complexity of linguistic 
phenomena to a genetically inherited psychological mechanism of the mind that 
enables language acquisition (or, in later work, the acquisition of an I-language) and 
that is somewhat prior to semantic aspects of language. The representational systems 
needed to capture such I-languages in a form that would account for all the syntactic 
structures of known languages became ever more complex, up to the point that 
scholars began to doubt that they realistically capture actual cognitive processes of 
language learners. As an answer, Chomsky reconceived UG in simpler terms, but he 
could only do so at the expense of explanatory value attributed to it. Compared to the 
1960s and 70s, significantly less in language acquisition is nowadays explained by 
UG, and much more is attributed to e.g. the role of caretakers and language 
socialisation in general (but Chomsky has never shown much interest in such matters). 
 
Internal factors seem to be suffering a similar fate. Once, they captured all linguistic 
behaviour that was deemed to be beyond the control of speakers – all those ‘more 
abstract principles of change’, to echo Eckert and Labov (2017, p. 467). In the 1960s 
and 70s, conscious awareness was an important determinant in deciding whether a 
change was in control of speakers or not; whether a change could be classified as 
“internal” or “external”, “within” or “without”, “below” or “above”. Roughly 40 years 
later, when third-wave variationists have started hammering home that social 
performativity transcends conscious awareness, the above distinctions became 
redundant. Internal factors, much like Chomsky’s UG, had to forfeit much explanatory 
value when scholars started to treat them as stand-ins for socially-meaningful 
processes. 
 
That linguists have readily adopted both UG and internal factors despite their 
epistemologically problematic nature can be considered a child of its time. Doing 
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modern linguistics in the second half of the 20th century meant restricting one’s 
research domain to phenomena that are, allegedly, distinctly linguistic in nature. The 
price of this was compartmentalisation and parochialism, which still haunts many 
linguists who try to push the boundaries, but it needed to be paid in the interest of 
creating a scientific paradigm that is on a par with other “scientific” disciplines such 
as biology or physics. The whole history of modern linguistics shows that linguists 
have always “gone with the flow” in order to appear modern at that time. From 
Humboldtian ideas that sought to reconcile languages with ideas of the national soul, 
to Neogrammarian psychologism, to Saussurean sociologism, to Chomskyan nativism, 
back to 21st century sociologism – it covers almost everything.  
 
I have tried to show in chapter 4 that this does not prohibit talking about scientific 
progress in the broad sense, and that scientific realism steers a sensible middle course 
that can reconcile historical relativism with a notion of progress that acknowledges 
theory-dependence of truth. From such a perspective, it is undoubtedly true that 
science can never be separated from the Zeitgeist it is part of. Geocentrism, as a case 
in point, stemmed from the belief that God created mankind in his image. Given that 
mankind populates planet Earth, it would have been insulting to God to not place it at 
the centre of the universe. 
  
One must not surrender to the belief that modern science is exempt from similar 
constraints. The internal-external opposition, I hope to have shown, is such a paradigm 
constraint, albeit smaller-scaled. Granted, third-wave variationists did not have to 
challenge an entire religious worldview as Copernicus did. Still, their implicit 
renunciation of the narrow interface between language and society, and the rigid 
distinction of internal and external factors with it, is a form of iconoclasm reminiscent 
of 16th and 17th-century scholars who have stood up against the establishment to fight 
for their version of things – the “real truth”.  
 
If this truth means that we linguists can no longer lay claim to an area of investigation 
that is distinctly ours; if treating internal factors as stand-ins for socially performative 
phenomena means getting rid of our academic autonomy; I have no problem with this. 
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Language, and human behaviour in general, is too complex a phenomenon to 
compartmentalise. Then again, I am a PhD student whose salary does not yet depend 
on it. Maybe, when I re-read this in 20 years from now, I will chuckle. But this does 
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